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VOL. XXVI · JANUARY 1974 · NO. 2

CONTENTS

Where Have All the Theories Gone? *Warren R. Phillips* 155

Why Change? Toward a New Theory of Change Among Individuals in the Process of Modernization *Joel S. Migdal* 189

The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing *Colin S. Gray* 207

REVIEW ARTICLES

Assessing Presidential Character *Alexander L. George* 234

Comparative Grassroots Politics in Africa *Walter L. Barrows* 283

The Contributors ii

Abstracts iii

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ABSTRACTS

Where Have All the Theories Gone?

by W. R. Phillips

Several major criticisms have been leveled at students of the quantitative approach to international politics. These criticisms are subsumed under the charge that international relations is impoverished by a lack of theory and an over-strong commitment to induction. The arguments are defeated by demonstrating that there is obvious evidence of theoretical growth. In the past, there has been a lack of understanding of the demarcation between science and non-science and the limited scope of the explanations involved in these "mini-theories." An attempt has been made to develop an understanding of theory and how to recognize it, and to review a selection of theories by Richardson, Rummel, Riker, and Axelrod in accordance with the criteria for recognition.

Why Change? Toward a New Theory of Change Among Individuals in the Process of Modernization

by J. S. Migdal

The reasons for peasants changing from traditional to "modern" patterns are usually attributed in the literature to culture contact—exposure to or relations with those with an alternative life-style. However, this explanation has come under attack because of its failure to account for cases in which (1) no change took place after culture contact; (2) people have changed some patterns but not others; and (3) people have abandoned their traditional patterns but have opted for non-modern ones. Individual changes can better be understood not simply through culture contact but through the economic crises that strike village households as a result of contact. These crises have weakened restraining village institutions. There is a differential response to change among those who were restrained by the traditional institutions and those who saw those institutions as protection against an exploitative outside.

The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing

by C. S. Gray

Arms races tend to be waged for reasons that seem good and sufficient to the participants. Serious measures of arms control must rest upon analyses that seek to understand why states choose to race in armaments. Too often, arms controllers, as an interest group, tend to deny the legitimacy of the many rationales for racing. The following seven non-exclusive rationales for arms racing must be examined: that states race for the purpose of deterrence, for defense, for diplomatic weight, for the convenience of defense administration and modernization, for the satisfaction of vested interests, for the sake of reputation, and because technology provides no alternative. Intellectual fashion accords a greater legitimacy to some rationales than to others. Since arms control can only be advanced if the competitors' rationales for racing are taken seriously, advocates of arms control must consider carefully the positive as well as the negative consequences of arms races for international order and stability.

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Assessing Presidential Character

by A. L. George

James David Barber's trenchant analysis of the styles of eleven Presidents (in his *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*, 1972) contributes much to an understanding of their performance in that office and illuminates the ways in which personality expresses itself in political behavior. Less successful is Barber's effort to develop a theory for predicting performance in the Presidency well enough to contribute to the assessment of candidates for that office. The personality theory he employs for this purpose is insufficiently developed and insufficiently validated to carry the burden of prediction.

Comparative Grassroots Politics in Africa

by W. L. Barrows

Each of the books under review investigates politics in an African town—Kita in Mali, Gondo in Uganda, and Swedru in Ghana. Comparison of the three reveals remarkably similar patterns of local politics. Each community is characterized by an instrumental, materially oriented style of politics in which the ambitions of leaders for prestige and the desire of followers for tangible benefits lead to groupings which cut across ethnic lines. Indeed, many of the familiar categories for analyzing African politics—communalism, tribalism, traditionalism—are inadequate and misleading in the three cases considered here. The point of departure adopted by each author, which emphasizes rational actors pursuing their separate goals, reveals a politics based on utility-maximization rather than on the evocation of collective identities. Factions emerge as the characteristic expression of utilitarian politics in two of the local communities, but in the third (Gondo), intra-elite unity is emphasized in order to close ranks in the face of a political environment which historically has been hostile. Even though each book deals with a single case, comparison was facilitated by the common theoretical perspectives adopted by the authors.

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

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WHERE HAVE ALL THE THEORIES GONE?

By WARREN R. PHILLIPS*

THE student who begins his study of international relations today is faced with a discipline that has changed greatly in the last decade. Some would say that it has matured to the point of being a true science. Others would argue that it has fallen into the abyss of data collection, technological quantrophobia and unenlightened description, never to return to the light of theoretical explanation. In part, such debates are healthy signs of growing pains in a young science; but there may be a disheartening aspect to them—one that is not immediately obvious. Let us begin by looking at the two sides in this argument.

Research Revolution

What has the past decade of research bequeathed to us? The amount of information currently available to political scientists or students of international politics is truly staggering. It is relatively easy to find economic measures, such as Gross National Product, for any nation in the world. We know the amount of trade, the number of ambassadors sent abroad, and the diplomatic protests exchanged between any two nations for selected years. We have the war experience of the system as far back as 500 B.C., and although it could be pointed out that we have relatively few time-series data, we certainly have information about the post-World War II period covering the national behavior and national characteristics of most states.[1]

In addition to the availability of data, the development of techniques for generating data makes it quite possible that we will be inundated with computer outputs in the not-too-distant future. These techniques include content analysis, opinion surveys, simulation and laboratory experimentation, and roll-call analysis.[2] Another measure of the impact of data requirements can be seen in the efforts that news agencies such as the *New York Times* are exerting to computerize their indexes.

In addition, the advent of computer technology has increased the

* The author wishes to thank Stuart Thorson and Arnold Kanter for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

[1] The data holdings of the Inter-University Consortium for Political Science's International Relations Archive and the data available through the UN Statistical Office are representative of the great storehouse of information available today.

[2] John E. Mueller's collection of essays, *Approaches to Measurement in International Relations: A Non-Evangelical Survey* (New York 1969), describes a wide range of data-generating methodologies currently available.

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ease of data analysis. Most computer centers around the country maintain a substantial library of canned programs that an analyst may use at will. The list of such techniques is overwhelming. It includes bivariate correlational techniques such as Spearman's *RHO*, Pearson's *R*, and Mann Whitney's *U*, as well as associational techniques such as *Chi-Square*, Yule's *Q*, Fisher's *F*, and the like. Multivariate techniques are growing in use and include regression, factor analysis, multiple discriminate analysis, canonical analysis, and causal modeling.[3]

To facilitate the use of data-generation and -analysis techniques, many schools have encouraged the growth of courses in techniques, statistical analysis, and research design. Few colleges or universities do not offer courses in these areas; many students find that the courses are required. Indeed, it is not uncommon to find Fortran accepted as a foreign language these days.

Thus, advocates of the argument of maturity in the science of international relations point with pride to the data holdings in various archives and to the growth of techniques in statistical analysis. They would argue that success can be measured in part by these quantitative indicators. The critics, on the other hand, would argue that this very richness condemns international relations to the junkyard of backwardness, that the behavioralists in our midst have gained acceptance too rapidly in both the intellectual community and the government, and that this early acceptance has come far too easily. They would contend that the pioneers in this area have been allowed to escape criticism and to ignore the demands of demonstrable proof. The use of computers and the almighty .05 significance level has permitted the early pseudo-scientists to hide behind a little-understood language, mathematics.[4] The traditionalists, the argument goes, were too quick in assuming that quantitative results were based upon the same concerns for scholarly detail, logic, and qualified, well-balanced assertions that governed their own research. This misplaced awe has certainly given way to serious criticism in the current period.

Recent criticism has identified some of the problems in the current behavioralist literature. Among these are Oran Young's review of Bruce Russett's *International Regions and the International System*, Ronald

[3] Perhaps a good indicator of the impact of these techniques upon students in international relations is the growth of books explaining one statistical technique or another. See for instance R. J. Rummel, *Applied Factor Analysis* (Evanston, Ill. 1970) and Edward R. Tufte, ed., *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems* (Reading, Mass. 1970).

[4] For a very clear and demanding critique of significance tests, see Denton E. Morrison and Ramon E. Henkel, eds., *The Significance Test Controversy* (Chicago 1970).

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Rogowski's article assessing the disagreements between system theorists and the realists, and Marion J. Levy's article suggesting the logical pitfalls which represent much of the behavioral activity in international relations.[5]

Young, in discussing Russett, implies that the faults he finds may be encountered in much of the current research in the field. "Russett has become so preoccupied with the intricacies of various techniques for the manipulation of data that he has seriously neglected a number of critical and antecedent problems of epistemology and theory. The result is an elaborate presentation of data whose purposes are unclear and whose utility is undermined by the absence of an adequate conceptual foundation."

Thus, if we were to take "a hard look at the epistemological and theoretical bases upon which the elaborate infrastructure of empirical data rests," we would find only the "collection of empirical materials *as an end in itself* and without sufficient theoretical analysis to determine appropriate criteria of selection." (Emphasis in original.)

Young calls upon the "fallacy of puristic induction" in explaining the problems inherent in the current research efforts. His summation of his position is an eloquent plea for improvement: "the development of theory (to the extent it may prove possible) in this field appears to depend on three conditions. First, we need to develop greater familiarity with the basic rules of scientific endeavor, as practiced in all those disciplines in which substantial theoretical progress is discernible. Second, we need to pay much more attention to fundamental problems of epistemology in this field. As matters stand, we spend too much time entangled in the confusion caused by definitional inconsistencies and conceptual ambiguities. And third, there is emphatically *no substitute for good ideas*."[6]

Rogowski's criticism, on the other hand, covers an even broader spectrum. He finds that those who have joined in the contemporary counterattack on the traditionalists can be grouped together under the title "systematic."[7]

[5] Oran R. Young, "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor," *World Politics*, XXI (April 1969), 486-511; Ronald Rogowski, "International Politics: The Past as Science," *International Studies Quarterly*, XII (December 1968); Marion J. Levy, Jr., " 'Does It Matter If He's Naked?' Bawled the Child," in Klaus Knorr and James N Rosenau, *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton 1969).

[6] Young (fn. 5), 486, 487, 489, 490-91, 511. For Russett's reply to these charges, see Bruce M. Russett, "The Young Science of International Politics," *World Politics*, XXII (October 1969), 87-94.

[7] "I mean by this adjective to comprehend both general systems theory and its derivatives or cognates as these have been applied to the study of international politics. A

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Rogowski points out that followers of the Spykman-Morgenthau realist paradigm were "acutely aware of the power of pre-existing theories and assumptions to influence perception" but that the new group disagrees: "they demand instead an exclusive attention to 'real' variables and relationships."[8] He proceeds to select quotes from three eminent systems theoreticians, Charles A. McClelland, Morton Kaplan, and Richard Rosecrance,[9] to provide us with the flavor of the popular systems approach. Rogowski's major concern in this discussion is that the "new philosophy" is indeed an old position traceable back to Bacon and Mills, and that this inductivist position is in fact quite impossible. "Systemicists will of course cling to their attachment to Mills and assert that the very effort to cull data by systematic concepts represents a major step away from Baconianism of the purer type. This misses the point. As long as a theorist believes in the objective existence of 'facts' and seeks a theory which will sort and organize, but not help *form* them, he is tacitly accepting the conventional perceptual matrix which shaped the 'facts.'"[10]

His solution is in the form of an "annoyingly modest proposal." "It will seem an evasion to paraphrase Mao Tse-tung and assert that the only way to learn about theory-building is by building theory, but this, rightly understood, is the heart of the matter."[11] Rogowski's point here

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distressingly large variety of theorists and researchers would appear as adherents of such a framework. Kaplan and McClelland, whose attempts rely fairly obviously on general systems theory; Rosecrance and Modelski, who employ systems vocabulary and concepts in eclectic ways; and even Waltz and Singer, whose debt to general systems work is almost subliminal but especially suggestive of the force of the quasi-metaphysical revolution.

"Much obviously separates these writers, but I wish to suggest that their differences lie mainly in the ontological realm, the realm of statements about *what* we can know; and that they exhibit affinities of epistemology, statements about *how* we can know, that are far greater and more useful in explaining the nature of their attack." Rogowski (fn. 5), 408-9.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] "[Theory] is constructed purposefully to order some particular range of facts. . . . Theoretical statements for scientific purposes are formulated to order the largest possible number of observed facts in the simplest possible framework of concepts. . . ." Charles A. McClelland, *Theory and the International System* (New York 1966), 12-13.

"The crux of the matter is whether regularities can be discovered which permit the organization of the materials of international politics within a simple framework of reasonable explanatory or predictive power." Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957), 3.

"[The essential works of diplomatic and political history] could provide the raw data from which systematic characterizations could be derived." Richard Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston and Toronto 1964), 5.

[10] Rogowski (fn. 5), 410 n.

[11] *Ibid.*, 416.

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is taken from Popper—that the act of inventing a theory is external to the logic of the theory and not susceptible to logical inquiry.[12]

Marion J. Levy's criticism of the field of international relations follows in the spirit of Rogowski's last comment. After reviewing the exchange between Bull and Kaplan[13]—two articles which stimulated the current era of debate—he sees the problem as lying at the very heart of the current state of the social sciences. "The enormously verbal productivity of those whom he [Kaplan] most admires has produced little that could be admired by others for whom science was not the name of the game (e.g., Professor Bull) and that they have perhaps produced even less that will bear scrutiny by any strict criteria or even lenient ones in terms of the game they aim to claim."

Levy proceeds to lay down two challenges to the scientific student of politics:

> I challenge the supporters of the new literature not to tell me how difficult their problems are, not to tell me how energetic they have been, not to talk to me about the patience we must have because of a "pre-theoretical state of development," but to point out those things to which in terms of science we can point with pride.
>
> I would, rather, arrogantly challenge the whole field [those who regard themselves as playing the science game] of literature. Where in this material is either the article or the book in which are to be found highly generalized propositions with explicitly worked out deductive interdependencies among them? Where are these propositions to be found unmarred by the fallacies pointed to here or even marred but seldom by them?[14]

[12] "The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it. The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man—whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic conflict, or a scientific theory—may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge. This latter is concerned not with *questions of fact* (Kant's *quid facti?*), but only with questions of *justification or validity* (Kant's *quid juris?*). Its questions are of the following kind. Can a statement be justified? And if so, how? Is it testable? Is it logically dependent on certain other statements? Or does it perhaps contradict them? In order that a statement may be logically examined in this way, it must already have been presented to us. Someone must have formulated it, and submitted it to logical examination." Karl A. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York 1959), 31.

[13] Hedley Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 361-77; Morton A. Kaplan, "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations," *World Politics*, XIX (October 1966), 1-20.

[14] Levy (fn. 5), 90, 91, 104. Levy's article presents a detailed enumeration of several specific errors he has found in "theoretical" works of social scientists. It is worth reading and taking these mistakes to heart.

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Bull, Kaplan, and Levy have touched upon the major criticisms that can be leveled at students of international relations today. They may be summed up as follows:

1. The new scholars assume that facts speak for themselves and are not a product of theory and imagination.
2. The inductive identification of regularities has been misplaced as an end in itself.
3. There is no attempt at deductively worked-out explanations in any of the "new" quantitative works.

Arguments posed by these critics can be subsumed under the charge that international relations is impoverished by a lack of theory and an over-strong commitment to induction. For Francis Bacon as well as for many current students of international relations, science seems to consist of accumulating facts and generalizing from them. But both Bacon and present-day empiricists "missed the point of that kind of science which was to spring from Galileo. . . . [Bacon] regarded mathematics merely as the handmaiden of physics, and actually complained of the domination which it was beginning to exercise in that science. It was all very well to do sums on the results of one's experiments, but Bacon (and current inductivists) specifically disliked Galileo's method of turning the problem of motion . . . into the problem of geometrical bodies moving in geometric space."[15]

A theory is meant to allow us to imbed our concepts in a fine mesh of unobservable abstractions or statements that serve to explain observations. The power of Galileo's theory is that he found such a fine mesh in the analogy of geometric spaces. Hempel was one of the first to bring this before social scientists. In his words, "the theoretical apparatus which provides . . . predictive and postdictive bridges from observational data to potential observational findings cannot, in general, be formulated in terms of observables alone."[16] In reviewing the impact of this philosophy on the social sciences, Hempel attempted to discredit flanking efforts:

> In the contemporary methodological literature of psychology and the social sciences, the need for "operational definitions" is often emphasized to the neglect of the requirement of systematic import, and occasionally the impression is given that the most promising way of furthering the

[15] Herbert Butterfield, *The Origins of Modern Science* (New York 1956), 106.

[16] Carl Gustav Hempel, "Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science," in Otto Neurath, ed., *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* (Chicago 1952), Vol. II, No. 7, 36-37.

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> growth of sociology as a scientific discipline is to create a large supply of "operationally defined" terms of high determinacy and uniformity of usage, leaving it to subsequent research to discover whether these terms lend themselves to the formulation of fruitful theoretical considerations; indeed, it is precisely the discovery of concept systems with theoretical import which advances scientific understanding; and such discovery requires scientific inventiveness and cannot be replaced by the—certainly indispensable, but also definitely insufficient—operationist or empiricist requirement of empirical import alone.[17]

The critics seem to be arguing that all of the non-theoretical quantitative descriptive analyses are useless. In this paper, I take the position that their utility is pre-theoretic and therefore inadmissible evidence in support of the growth of a science of international relations. Their heuristic value, in leading others to ask questions of why or to attempt to explain regularities based upon formal theoretical concerns, must be recognized. It would be imprudent to suggest that this activity is frantic. It is fishing, however, and the advantages of such expeditions may well be serendipitous to the long-range development of a science of international relations.

Certainly the field is inundated with those to whom the above accusations are quite appropriate. The difficulty with the criticisms is the danger that they be taken to characterize the whole of the quantitative tradition. Unfortunately, the critics have assumed that all those who drank from the goblet filled with symbolic logic or mathematics were equally intoxicated by the new wine to the extent that brute empiricism replaced theoretical elegance. This is also a mistake. Indeed, some have taken up Levy's challenge and Rogowski's annoyingly modest proposal and dared to suggest new explanations for specific classes of international events.[18]

Our colleagues who criticize the field as being composed only of data collectors and raw inductivists have recognized that there are many squirrels in our flock.[19] But they have missed the undeveloped but nevertheless obvious evidence of theoretical growth. In part, this is because much of the current development of theory relies upon mathematics, the "language of science." Because the application of mathematics to international relations seems strange at first, many wish to

[17] *Ibid.*, 47.

[18] Thus, what follows is an attempt to blunt these criticisms by demonstrating the existence of theoretical work in international relations. It is not an assessment of the whole field of mathematical theory in international relations.

[19] The analogy to squirrels seems quite appropriate since there are many among us who would collect their data, store them for their private use, and even run the risk of forgetting where they stored them.

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use this lack of intuitive familiarity to argue against the growth of this form of theory. Margenau rejects this attack: "Ease of intuition is not a significant criterion of anything; it can be acquired by training and has as wide a range of familiarity from person to person as color vision."[20]

Most supporters of the young science we deal with have not referenced the truly theoretic material in response. This is due to a combination of a lack of understanding of the demarcation between science and non-science, and the limited scope of the explanations involved in these "mini-theories." The task set out here is twofold: first, to develop an understanding of theory and how to recognize it, and second, to review a selection of theories by the criteria that have been set out.

The Nature of Scientific Statements

There are a number of alternative approaches to specifying what a theory is or how to recognize it:

1. We may ignore the definition in the hope that it will become clear in retrospect. This is an approach frequently taken in the writings of the philosophy of science.[21]
2. We may provide a metaphysical discussion of the requirements and nature of science. For example, theories have been compared with maps, in that a cartographer chooses to note only those points he considers relevant to the task for which the map was designed.[22]
3. We may designate theories in a structural sense so that those who wish to become theoretic would know how to build a theoretic structure. This approach would identify axioms, primitive and derived terms, rules of correspondence, and the like.[23]
4. We may choose to provide a method of demarcation between science and non-science. In this attack we would not specifically define theory, as that may be impossible or irrelevant. We would rather provide a means of recognizing scientific/theoretic activities when they were encountered.[24]

[20] Henry Margenau, *The Nature of Physical Reality* (New York 1950), 150.

[21] For example, Karl Lambert and Gordon G. Brittan, Jr., *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1970).

[22] Stephen Toulmin follows this track in *The Philosophy of Science* (New York 1953).

[23] See Carl Gustav Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1966), or Richard S. Rudner, *Philosophy of Social Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1966), for this approach.

[24] Popper (fn. 12) prefers this strategy.

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The last approach is the most important in that we need to be able to recognize the intrinsic characteristics of science, but we also need some understanding of metaphysical and structural characteristics.

The central aims of science lie in the realm of intellectual creation. Other activities—diagnostic, classificatory, correlational, or predictive—are called "scientific" only when they have some connection with the explanatory ideas and ideals which lie at the heart of science. To *understand* in the scientific sense, we must have some clearly intelligible way of presenting the social phenomena that we study. Scientific discoveries are not a finding of high correlation between, for instance, Gross National Product and foreign conflict, but they are the intellectual understanding or the creative insight that leads one to expect such a correlation in the first place.

The work of a scientist consists of the putting forth and testing of theories, and in this respect the demarcation between science and nonscience need not take account of the metaphysical requirements of the aims of science. Others may wish to marvel over this creative activity; we will shift our emphasis to the organization of scientific activity, since the initial act of creating or inventing an explanation does not call for—nor is it susceptible to—logical analysis. Thus, we distinguish between the process of conceiving a new idea and the methods of examining it logically. Karl Popper is concise on this differentiation. "From a new idea put up tentatively, conclusions are drawn by means of logical deductions. These conclusions are compared with one another and with other relevant statements."[25] He suggests four lines for testing a theory:

1. We may look at the internal consistency of the statements. Contradictions are not acceptable.
2. We may investigate the logical form of the statements to ascertain whether they are empirical or tautologous.
3. We may compare the theory with other theories to see if it is in some sense an advance over current theories.
4. We may test the theory by way of empirical application of the conclusions that can be derived.

It is this last point that tentatively demarcates science from nonscience by setting up the criterion of falsification. "A scientist, in this field or any other field, is one who in offering explanations of phenomena provides the criteria by which others may refute his results. If he states a hypothesis, it is in terms which make it clear what evidence

[25] *Ibid.*, 32.

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would be sufficient to disprove it."[26] On the other hand, the criterion of falsification is only a "necessary" and not a "sufficient" criterion. Theories must be acceptable on all of the above criteria.

Several times in the above discussion I have referred to statements as the logical connections between concepts. Statements are basic units of theory, and we ought to be able to classify statements with regard to their formal properties.[27] The first property is the empirical applicability of the concepts in the statement. We have three choices:

1. Statements in which all concepts are empirically indexed are called *empirical* statements.
2. Statements in which some of the concepts, but not all, have an empirical referent are termed *semantical* statements.
3. Statements whose concepts have no empirical reference are *syntactical.*

Although this classification scheme is a partitioning of statements by the number of concepts in each that are considered to have empirical content, it is not meant to restrict inquiry; that is, it represents a short-term consideration of the theoretician. He may change his mind regarding the empirical content of a concept at any time, thereby changing the type of statements which include that concept.

Another formal property of statements is their logical order. They may either be *primary* statements in that they are not derived from any other statements in the theory, or they may be *derived* statements—the formally reduced conclusion of one or more statements. It may be pointed out that the derived statement may be a conclusion from a primary statement, one primary statement and one derived statement, two derived statements, or a number of other combinations.

The final formal aspect of statements is that they may be relative or universal. *Relative* statements are sometimes termed singular or basic sentences, in that they refer or are relative to a specific empirical referent at a specific point in time. Juxtaposed to these are *universal* statements, which apply to all points in time in which the initial conditions are met. Thus, a relative or singular sentence is either an existential sentence or a specific application of a universal sentence. Table I displays the three characteristics of statements in a theory. Some of the cells are meaningless and have been left blank. The other cells have

[26] Nigel Forward, *The Field of Nations: New Approaches to International Relations* (Boston 1971), 5.

[27] This argument follows closely that of Jack P. Gibbs, "The Identification of Statements in Theory Construction," *Sociology and Social Research*, LII (Fall 1970).

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Table I

A Typology of Statements

	Relative Statement (applies to a designated finite universe)		*Universal* Statement (applies to an infinite universe)	
	Primary Statement (not formally reduced)	*Derivative* Statement (formally reduced)	*Primary* Statement (not formally reduced)	*Derivative* Statement (formally reduced)
Empirical Statement (all variables subject to observation)	Type I Statement No conventional identification	Type IV Statement Hypothesis	Type VII Statement Proposition	Type X Statement Theorem
Semantical Statement (some variables subject to observation)	Type II Statement No conventional identification	Type V Statement No conventional identification	Type VIII Statement Postulate	Type XI Statement No conventional identification
Syntactical Statement (no variable subject to observation)	Type III Statement No conventional identification	Type VI Statement No conventional identification	Type IX Statement Axiom	Type XII Statement No conventional identification

Source: Gibbs (fn. 27).

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been interpreted. It is the requirement of a theory that hypotheses—Type IV statements—be produced. Type IV statements are empirical, derived, singular statements. They are test statements from which the theory is expected to be potentially falsified. This type of statement can be derived in a number of ways from the universal statements that are used to cover the specific test conditions. Ideally an empirical, primary, universal statement would be the simplest referent for a Type IV statement that we could make. In the normal test situation an example might be, "All water boils at 212°F." That is a universal statement. Since we have a thermometer and water is considered to have an empirical referent, it is an empirical statement, and in this case it is a primary statement as well.[28] The test condition would specify the existential sentences, "This is a glass of water" and "This is a thermometer."[29] That is, they are empirical, primary, singular sentences that are not contained within the theoretical system but are required by it in order to test the empirical singular, derived statement, "If we raise the temperature of the water in the glass to 212°F, it will boil." They are simply existential statements recording an agreed-upon reality. Here we have what is necessary to complete the circle of verification, that is, the three types of sentences necessary to test a theory.[30] It is, however, not often the case that our theories are structured so simply. Frequently, semantical and syntactical universal statements are combined to derive an empirical universal statement. Indeed, in the case we have examined, we can explain temperature and boiling by reference to change in the physical state of a chemical compound as it moves from a solid to a liquid to a gas. These additional statements make the web of our scientific theory. No matter how complex our theory is, the simple example is basic to all theories.[31]

[28] The choice of whether concepts have empirical content or not is the researcher's option. It is often much more difficult to be certain about the empirical content of concepts than it is in the case of the ones employed in this example.

[29] The need for these existential statements is often ignored. Indeed, much of the debate on reliability and validity references arguments over the acceptability of statements of this nature. See Popper (fn. 12), sections 27 and 28. For the necessary idiosyncratic aspects of these statements, see Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Toward a Post-Critical Philosophy* (New York 1958).

[30] For a full discussion of the circle of verification, see Margenau (fn. 20).

[31] For the type of conclusion necessary before a testable theory is considered adequate many arguments take this form:

"The deductive procedure is in full:

(i) observe a set of empirical facts in real life: call them collectively *A*;
(ii) construct the corresponding set of propositions in the model: call them collectively *a*;
(iii) deduce from them some new propositions in the model: call them *B*;
(iv) construct the corresponding propositions in real life: call them *b*.

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We began this section by dealing with the aims of science and by pointing out that the demarcation between science and non-science rests in the systematic attempt at demonstrating the manner in which statements of science can be refuted. We have finished it by laying out the formal properties of statements that enable one to make such tests. In the review of specific theories, we will look for the new imaginative or creative idea, the lightbulb which suddenly turns on in the back of the theoretician's mind, enabling him to see clearly, and we will ask whether or not he has structured his explanation so as to fulfill the falsification criterion of science. If this criterion is satisfied, and the statements meet the other tests of a theory, we have demonstrated an instance which would refute our critics' position: We would have found an island of theory. Although all of the theories presented in the following sections have relied upon mathematics to specify the functions that relate their concepts, this review of their work will deal with their natural-language statements in an attempt to communicate with a wider audience. Let us turn to some cases.

Field Theory

R. J. Rummel has attempted to link the international behavior of nations to differences and similarities in national attributes. Rummel's field theory states that nations interact in a social field. That field is analytically divided into two spaces: a behavior space and a space of attributes. The field is a system defined by analytical coordinates and by the properties, relations, and movements of the entities within these coordinates. The concept of field assumes that the characteristics of the field and the entities within it reciprocally influence one another.[32]

If the propositions *B* are not obviously true, and yet when tested against reality turn out to be right, then the model has a good mark and the theory has taken a step forward; if wrong, a bad mark and a step backward. If they are blatant tautologies, or if they are not in a form in which they can be verified, the model also has a bad mark because its use has not advanced matters." Forward (fn. 26), 53-54.

Although I am in agreement that this form is one way to proceed, I do not consider it as the only form since it does not allow for the test of one of the original statements by deducing directly from it an empirical, singular, derived statement as in our example. Rather it requires a prior step, one which would produce a test statement only by combining primary universal statements that are either semantical or syntactical to form a *derived*, universal, empirical statement from which we may derive a singular, empirical statement.

[32] "Field theory assumes, first, that international behavior and attributes form a social space—a field of complex and changing interrelationships between nations, their characteristics, and their behavior. Isolating a particular variable or two is not sufficient to understand behavior, then. Rather, the whole field must be specified to provide the context and causal environment of interaction. For example, knowledge that a country with a left democratic government is poor and Catholic will not generally be sufficient

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Description of the field, therefore, provides a basis for explaining the past, and in a measure, predicting the future.[33] Conceptualization of behavior in international relations as being located in a field begins with assumptions about time and space, within which nations exist and events occur.[34] Geometry and linear algebra are the language for rewriting natural views of the world as a field. This conception has an intellectual heritage in the physical sciences but it has also found supporters in the social sciences.[35]

For Rummel, nations are located within the attribute space in terms of their characteristics, such as economic development; within the behavior space, dyads (such as USA→USSR) are located in terms of their behavior such as trade. Then, "nation attribute similarities and differences are field forces creating social time-space motion; attribute distances between nations cause international behavior. Thus, for field theory, a sociological construct—attribute distance—is a basic force."[36] In other words, the location of dyads in behavior space can be treated as a weighted summation of the distances (forces) between nations on their attributes. These notions are formalized in three axioms:[37]

1. International relations is a field consisting of all national attributes and interaction and their complex interrelations through time.
2. The international field comprises a Euclidean attribute space, defining all national attributes, and a Euclidean behavior space, defining all national dyadic interactions.

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to explain a nation's international behavior. These characteristics have different behavioral consequences depending on their distribution in the system, behavioral expectations and norms, and on who is the behavioral object." R. J. Rummel, "A Status Field Theory of International Relations," *Dimensionality of Nations Project Research Report No. 50* (Honolulu 1971), 4.

[33] Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York 1955), 524.

[34] ". . . absolute characteristics are assumed outside of a nation's behaviorally relevant field and it is assumed that the principle of relative values governs nations: attributes and behavior must be understood by their interrelations, comparatively. Behavior cannot be explained in isolation and a nation's attributes become relevant only in relation to other attributes and to behavior."

". . . social time is assumed to be part of the international relations social space—the field. Nation behavior and attributes have extensional and durational relationships; the passage of time is relative to the nations and the context." Rummel (fn. 32), 4-5.

[35] Kurt Lewin in Dorwin Cartwright, ed., *Field Theory in Social Science* (New York 1964); Wright (fn. 33); Arthur F. Bentley, "Inquiry Into Inquiries," in Sidney Ratner, ed., *Essays in Social Theory* (Boston 1954).

[36] Rummel (fn. 32), 5.

[37] Although these axioms are considered formal, their mathematical implications will not be dealt with here. For a full treatment, see R. J. Rummel, "A Field Theory of Social Action With Application to the Conflict Within Nations," in *General Systems: Yearbook of the Society of General Systems*, x (1965), 197-204.

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3. The attribute distances between nations in attribute space at a particular time are social forces determining the location of dyads in behavior space at that time.[38]

Mathematically,

$$W_{k,A\to B,t} = \sum_{j=1}^{p} a_{j,A} d_{j,A\to B,t} \qquad (1)$$

where $W_{k,A\to B,t}$ = projection (as a vector) of a dyad $A\to B$ on behavior dimension k at time t.

d_j = distance vector between nations A and B on attribute dimension j in an attribute space of p dimensions of time t.

a_j = a parameter for dimension j.

Leaving mathematical considerations aside, Rummel's field theory says simply that nations will behave toward each other in terms of their social, economic, cultural, geographical, and political differences and/or similarities. Tests of the theory have so far been encouraging. In particular, one analysis of the linkage of behavior between nations to their differences shows different levels of economic development to be a specifically important force in influencing the direction of behavior.[39]

It is important to take stock of exactly what the mathematical representation of Axiom 3 asserts. It is not predicting or explaining the importance of specific differences, although it does solve for the importance of the weights (a_j's). Rather, it simply says that, given a set of distances and a set of behaviors organized in a particular way, we would expect that, either in the canonical or the regression representation of Axiom 3, there would be a strong relationship between behavior and attribute distances. The test of the theory in its simplest form, multiple regression, would call for defining a strong multiple correlation between each type of behavior and the multiple distances. It would not specify which distances are most important in each case, however. Referring back to our table of statements, this is the simplest of

[38] Rummel (fn. 32), 5-6. These three axioms are reduced from the original seven axioms published in 1965. The evolution of the theory can be traced by reference to Rummel (fn. 37), his "Field Theory and Indicators of International Behavior," *Dimensionality of Nations Project Research Report No. 29* (Honolulu 1969), and "Social Time and International Relations," *Dimensionality of Nations Project Research Report No. 40* (Honolulu 1970).

[39] Rummel, *ibid.*, "Field Theory . . . ."

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theories inasmuch as there is a direct relationship between Axiom 3 in the theory as represented by Equation (1) and any test statement. An empirical, derived, singular statement (Type IV) can be derived directly from the empirical, primary, universal statement (Type VII). The implications of the model and the direct reference between the empirical, singular sentence and the universal sentence are often overlooked.

Certainly the utility of this theory would be enhanced were other statements included which allowed derivation of specific weights associated with each distance in the prediction of different behaviors.[40] In an attempt to develop an explanation for the respective weights, two papers have demonstrated interesting possibilities. In the first, Rummel incorporated several hypotheses in the substantive literature into field theory.[41] He used attribute distances to operationalize these hypotheses and tested the results in U.S. foreign-relations data. The hypotheses thus incorporated were derived for Rosenau's Pre-Theory,[42] Organski's Power Transition Theory,[43] Wright's Distance Theory,[44] Russett's Integration and Regionalism Hypotheses,[45] Galtung's Status Theory[46] and Hypotheses about Geographical Distances. In the second paper,[47] Rummel treated the incorporation of status theory in detail. This incorporation has been helpful in defining status behavior associated with cooperation and conflict. Three theorems are reproduced from that development:

Theorem 6 (*Cooperative Theorem*): The higher the joint rank of nations i and j, the more cooperative their behavior. That is,

$$CO_{i \to j} = -a_{i1} d_{i-j,1} - a_{i2} d_{i-j,2} \qquad (2)$$

[40] A criticism often leveled at field theory is that it is not a predictive theory, in that attributes and behaviors must both be known before the relationship can be specified. The statement is true, but it is also true of most of the Darwinian theory of evolution. A student of policy may find little in field theory of direct application to forecasting; but the suggestion that distances are social forces influencing behavior is both enlightening and testable.

[41] R. J. Rummel, "U.S. Foreign Relations: Conflict, Cooperation and Attribute Distances," *Dimensionality of Nations Project Research Report No. 41* (Honolulu 1970).

[42] James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill. 1966).

[43] A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York 1960).

[44] Wright (fn. 33).

[45] Russett (fn. 6).

[46] Johan Galtung, *International Relations and International Conflicts: A Sociological Approach* (Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, 1966); "Rank and Social Integration: A Multi-Dimensional Approach," in Joseph Berger, Morris Zelditch, Jr., and Bo Anderson, eds., *Sociological Theories in Progress* (New York 1966).

[47] Fn. 32.

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where $CO_{i\rightarrow j}$ is a behavior space cluster of highly intercorrelated cooperation vectors.[48]

Theorem 8 (*Economically Developed Conflict Theorem*): For economically developed actors, status-dependent conflict behavior

$$CF_{i\rightarrow j} = \alpha^*_{i1} d_{i-j,1} - \alpha^*_{i2} d_{i-j,2}.^{49} \quad (3)$$

Theorem 9 (*Economically Underdeveloped Conflict Theorem*): For economically underdeveloped actors, status-dependent conflict behavior

$$CF_{i\rightarrow j} = \alpha^*_{i1} d_{i-j,1} + \alpha^*_{i2} d_{i-j,2}.^{50} \quad (4)$$

These theorems explain the relative weights of specific distances in their prediction of status-dependent behavior. They argue that economically developed actors are likely to have conflict with large nations, probably rich in natural resources but economically underdeveloped. On the other hand, underdeveloped actors are expected to have conflict with developed nations that tend to be weak in power or size.

Rummel is moving in the direction of increasing the number of axioms in such a way as to explain in more detail the relationship between behavior and attribute distances. But, as I have already made clear, his early work had produced a testable statement and prescribed the procedures for testing that statement which others could attempt if they desired.[51] Field theory began by producing a single Type IV statement or hypothesis directly from Axiom 3. Axioms 1 and 2 are Type VIII or IX statements, depending upon whether the analyst wishes to specify the subset of variables referenced there as behavior or attributes. The utility of these statements lies in the language system that they employ, linear algebra. They point out that there is a calculus which will be relied upon in specifying relationships in the system of statements that follows. In essence, they tell us that we can find a ready-made language

[48] $d_{i-j,1}$ represents status differences on the economic development dimension, and $d_{i-j,2}$ represents status differences along the power/size dimensions.

[49] The asterisks are employed merely to signal that all α's are not necessarily the same.

[50] I have chosen these theorems to show the direction of Rummel's work. They are only a few of the 13 theorems and 9 axioms in his current status field theory. To have dealt with the total set of statements would have been preferable but prohibitive.

[51] The theory has been tested with some success in Rummel (fn. 38); Richard Van Atta and R. J. Rummel, "Testing Field Theory in the 1963 Behavior Space of Nations," *Papers of the Peace Research Society*, XVI (1971), 23-46; Tong-Whan Park, "Asian Conflict in Systematic Perspective: Application of Field Theory (1955 and 1963)," *Dimensionality of Nations Project Research Report No. 35* (Honolulu 1969); Sang-Woo Rhee, "Communist China's Foreign Behavior: An Application of Field Theory Model II," *Dimensionality of Nations Project Research Report No. 57* (Honolulu 1971).

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for discussing international relations. But this language is bare of any substantive information. Thus, these two statements identify nations, dyads, attributes, and behavior. Then, Axiom 3, the proper or substantive axiom, uses the transitions made by Statements 1 and 2, together with Rummel's insight into the forces which lead to international behavior, to say something in the grammar of linear algebra: Equation (1).

As the theory has been developed, several Type X statements or theorems have been formally reduced from new axioms. These theorems should lead to testable hypotheses by simply specifying an empirical universe to which they apply.

When evaluating the field theory by the four criteria listed on page 163, it appears to contain empirical assertions that are not tautologies, to be internally consistent, and to lack empirical falsification. In comparison with other theories it would appear to emphasize a new point: that it is the differences and similarities between nations which are the forces leading to conflict and cooperation. One could certainly argue that the shift, from thinking about national attributes as absolute concepts to considering them as relational forces, is a potential theoretical advance in the sense that it is a new mode of thinking.

Rank Theory

The central concept of this theory developed by Johan Galtung is a rank dimension.[52] Rank dimensions are any attributes of a nation on which national actors tend to rank themselves. Much like field theory and its reliance on distances, rank theory relies on the concept of rank as a basic behavioral force. Galtung begins with a series of underlying assumptions:

A. There is a division of labor in the system, and elements (nations) will not carry out the same tasks all the time.
B. Elements tend to be ranked according to their position in the division-of-labor system.
C. Relative position (rank) has a certain stability, and disequilibrium means differential treatment.
D. Mobility in the system is only possible when the system is open (i.e., when nations perceive they have the ability to increase their rank).[53]

[52] In integrating Johan Galtung's Rank Theory, I have relied heavily upon three articles: "A Structural Theory of Aggression," *Journal of Peace Research*, 1 (1964); *International Relations and International Conflicts*; and "Rank and Social Integration" (fn. 46).

[53] *Ibid.*, "A Structural Theory of Aggression."

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The basic ideas of Galtung's rank theory are quite easily stated:

1. The higher the rank of two nations, the more interaction between them.
2. Status disequilibrium leads to stress and potential conflict.
3. The system has a certain dynamic, such that all nations seek to equilibrate their status positions upward.

Galtung poses the question as to where in the system, or for what social types of nations characterized by rank profiles, frustration is likely to accumulate and express itself as conflict. It is important to note that the question refers not to *when* conflict will occur but to *where* in the society of nations it is likely to occur. The answer depends upon a number of conditions dealing with concerns for an individual nation's total profile of ranks, expectations among pairs of nations with different or similar profiles, and finally in part upon characterizations of the whole system of actions. In order to understand the propositions Galtung has derived from these general concerns, we have to define seven rank-related concepts. They are: total rank, rank disequilibrium, total rank of the *M*-tuple, rank difference and rank inequivalence, rank incongruence, criss-cross, and rank concordance. The concepts are defined mathematically, beginning with the simple assumption of two rank statuses—top dogs and underdogs—on one dimension, and ending with multiple rank positions on a number of rank dimensions.[54] They are defined verbally as:

Total Rank: The sum of rank scores for an individual nation across rank dimensions.

Rank Disequilibrium: The degree to which the ranks of the nations along the rank dimensions do not correspond to each other.

Rank of the M-tuple: The sum of the rank scores across all status dimensions for two nations; thus, the total rank of the pair. When more nations are concerned, it is the sum of rank across all nations of the *M*-tuple.

Rank Difference and Rank Inequivalence: The extent to which the ranks of two units are not the same.

Rank Incongruence: The extent to which two units stand in the same or in different relations to each other on each of the rank dimensions.

Criss-Cross: The degree to which there are nations that can serve as bridges between rank-equilibrated groups in the system.

[54] *International Relations and International Conflicts*, and "Rank and Social Integration" (fn. 46).

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Rank Concordance: The extent to which all M nations are ranked the same way on the N dimensions.

These seven concepts are given theoretical structure in the following set of statements:

P_1: Units seek to maximize their ranks on all dimensions.
- $P_{1.1}$: Units seek to maximize their total rank.

P_2: Units try to avoid rank disequilibrium and obtain rank equilibrium.
- $P_{2.1}$: If efforts to obtain rank equilibration are frustrated, aggression will result.
  - $P_{2.1.1}$: The aggression will be directed to self if ascribed ranks are higher than achieved ranks.
  - $P_{2.1.2}$: The aggression will be directed to others if ascribed ranks are lower than achieved ranks.

P_3: The higher the total rank of a pair (or M-tuple), the more interaction there will be between the units in the pair (or M-tuple), and the more associative the interaction.

P_4: The lower the rank difference in the pair, the more interaction there will be between the units, and the more disassociative the interaction will be.
- $P_{4.1}$: The lower the rank inequivalence in the pair, the more interaction there will be between the units, and the more associative the interaction will be.

P_5: The higher the rank incongruence in a pair, the less interaction there will be between the units, and the more disassociative the interaction will be.
- $P_{5.1}$: If possible, interaction between incongruent units will be avoided.
- $P_{5.2}$: If interaction cannot be avoided, interaction between incongruent units will be aggressive.
  - $P_{5.2.1}$: In case of weak incongruence, the most aggressive will be the unit in strongest disequilibrium.
  - $P_{5.2.2}$: In case of strong incongruence, the most aggressive will be the unit in disequilibrium with highest achieved ranks.
- $P_{5.3}$: The higher the average rank incongruence in a set of units, the higher the probability of zero or aggressive interaction in pairs of units.
- $P_{5.4}$: The lower the dispersion of rank incongruence in a set of units, the higher the probability of institutionalizing the incongruence.

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P_6: The higher the criss-cross, the higher the probability of finding mediators and in-betweens in a conflict between two- or *n*-dimensional rank groups.

P_7: The higher the concordance, the higher the probability of the emergence of generalized rank roles.

Galtung's rules of correspondence for variables are delineated for rank concepts. He has defined aggression as the drive toward change, and associativeness as cooperative interaction. More recent work has attempted to spell out in more detail the meaning and implications for considering various forms of behavior.[55] One difficulty in these statements is that the functional form of the relationship between status concepts and behavioral interactions is not clearly spelled out. Others have specified that some behavior is linearly dependent upon status concepts. Both Gleditsch[56] and Rummel[57] impose linearity on status theory.

The reduction to testable statements is accomplished in the same vein as were Rummel's statements. For example, Statement 4 (the lower the rank difference in the pair, the more interaction there will be in the units and the more disassociative the interaction will be), is directly translatable into a Type IV statement or hypothesis by specifying an empirical referent. But it is possible to combine Statements such as 5 and 6 to produce new assumptions, as Galtung has done. In the case where there is no criss-cross in societies, "if conflict should arise, then the absence of criss-cross may lead to complete breakdown of the societal order. Correspondingly, the society we have called a welfare state [society with a good deal of criss-cross] is due to conflict because of the high frequency of disequilibrated status sets. But the thesis is that this type of society can stand it because of the criss-cross, and for that reason can harbor a sufficient amount of conflict for rapid change. Thus, it may be that the [status-disequilibrated] types play a double role, as innovators and revolutionaries, and as mediators/stabilizers, and derive prestige from both roles."[58] Because of the number of assumptions covering the relationship between status concepts and behavior, these

[55] Johan Galtung, "Europe: Bipolar, Bicentric, or Cooperative," paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting (Dallas, March 1972).

[56] Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Rank Theory, Field Theory, Attribute Theory: Three Approaches to Interaction in the International System," *Dimensionality of Nations Project Research Report No. 47* (Honolulu 1970).

[57] Fn. 32.

[58] Galtung, "Rank and Social Integration" (fn. 46), 160. Assumptions of this nature are imaginatively delineated in Galtung, "On the Future of Human Society," *Futures*, II, No. 2 (1970), and "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research*, VIII, No. 2 (1971).

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types of derivations, Type X and XI statements, are readily made with Galtung's axiomatic development. To date, tests of rank theory are more prevalent in sociology than in international relations, but at least two tests of a subset of these propositions have been published which show promising results.[59]

Rank theory would seem to meet the criteria specified previously for a theory in that the statements are empirical in nature, confirmed, and internally consistent. Some question has arisen as to how analysts are to interpret the joint effects of any pair of rank dimensions upon either associative or conflictual behavior, however. The question is whether ascribed and achieved status and status disequilibrium are affecting behavior equally, or whether one is more important than the other. Hernes points out:

> As to the rank-disequilibrium theory, the main point in the first half of this rejoinder was to show that *a priori* assumptions are necessary to make it identifiable. In other words, we need a *precization* before the theory can be *tested*. . . . What is necessary to make Galtung's theory testable, however, is that *which a priori* assumptions he wants to make, be made *explicit*. For the ascribed-achieved dimensions this means that the following questions must be answered:
>
> 1. What is the assumed direction of main effects?
> 2. What is the assumed constellation of interaction effects?
> 3. What additional restriction is imposed to make the model identifiable?
>
> Only after this precization has been made can the theory be tested—only then can data support or disconfirm it. And then further specifications can be made, e.g., about the *direction* of aggression (e.g., extrapunitive/intrapunitive), and they too can be tested.[60]

This problem affects some relationships more than others. Precision has been supplied by Gleditsch and Rummel.[61] The theory does imply a great advance in that it brings together much of the literature from sociology and applies well-founded propositions from that field to international relations.

With the exception of the incorporation of concepts and substantive assumptions into the language of linear algebra by Rummel and Gleditsch, rank theory has relied upon mathematics to define concepts,

[59] Johan Galtung, "East-West Interaction Patterns," *Journal of Peace Research*, III, No. 4 (1966); Gleditsch (fn. 56).

[60] Gudmund Hernes, "On Rank Disequilibrium and Military Coups D'Etat," *Journal of Peace Research*, VI, No. 1 (1969), 71; emphasis in original. Thanks to Patrick Callahan for bringing this point to my attention.

[61] Fns. 56 and 32, respectively.

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but not to specify precise relationships. Galtung[62] provides formal definitions for the seven concepts laid out on pages 173 and 174, but prefers to rely upon natural language to specify the relations *between* the rank concept and associativeness or aggressiveness. This decision has led to the recognition of the fact that Galtung is indeed dealing with a theory, but it has also led to confusion due to the lack of precision when one tries to combine assumptions in natural-language statements.

Arms Races

Lewis Fry Richardson can justifiably be called the father of the mathematical approach to theorizing in international relations. First published in 1960, but representing work that was begun as early as 1919, his ingenious examination of arms races[63] is so widely read and associated with his name that it overshadows his equally sophisticated attempts to explain war statistically.[64] In his arms-race model, Richardson argues that we should begin by representing nations by a single variable, its outward attitude of threatening or cooperating.[65] His basic assumptions are that feelings of fear, rivalry, grudges, and so forth between nations result in armament races.

> The various motives which lead a nation in time of peace to increase or decrease its preparations for war may be classified according to the manner of its dependence on its own existing preparations and on those of other nations. For simplicity, the nations are here regarded as forming two groups. There are motives such as revenge or dissatisfaction with the results of treaties; these motives are independent of existing armaments. Then there is the very strong motive of fear, which moves each group to increase its armaments because of the existence of those of the opposing group. Also there is rivalry, which, more than fear, attends to the difference between the armaments of the two groups rather than to the magnitude of those of the other group. Lastly, there is always a tendency for each group to reduce its armaments in order to economize expenditure and effort.[66]

[62] *International Relations and International Conflicts*, and "Rank and Social Integration" (fn. 46).

[63] Lewis F. Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War*, Nicholas Rashevsky and Ernesto Trucco, eds. (Chicago 1960).

[64] Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*, Quincy Wright and Carl C. Lienau, eds. (Chicago 1960).

[65] "This theory is about general tendencies common to all nations; about how they resent defiance, how they suspect defense to be concealed aggression, how they respond to imports by sending out exports; about how expenditure on armaments is restrained by the difficulty of paying for them; and lastly, about grievances and their queer irrational ways, so that a halting apology may be received as though it were an added insult" (fn. 63), 13.

[66] *Ibid.*

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He regards the preparation for war by the two groups as the rectangular coordinates of a particle in an international plane so that every point in this plane represents one conceivable instantaneous international situation. From this set of assumptions, he proceeds to delineate differential equations for representing the motion of a particle in this international plane. The equations are

$$dx/dt = ky - ax + g \tag{5}$$

$$dy/dt = lx - \beta y + h \tag{6}$$

where x represents one nation's defenses, y represents another nation's defenses, k and l are positive constraints representing a nation's sensitivity toward the opposite nation's defenses, α and β are positive constraints representing the fatigue and expenses of keeping up defenses and, finally, g and h represent grievance and ambition provisionally regarded as constants.[67] The equations specify three different effects on the rate of accumulation of arms—the positive effect of the strength of the opponent,[68] the negative effect of one's own strength,[69] and the effects of grievances presumably operating independently of the relative

[67] "The equations are merely a description of what people would do if they did not stop to think. Why are so many nations reluctantly but steadily increasing their armaments as if they were mechanically compelled to do so? Because, I say, they follow their traditions which are fixed, and their instincts, which are mechanical and because they have not yet made a sufficiently strenuous intellectual and moral effort to control the situation. The process described by the ensuing equations is not to be thought of as inevitable. It is what *would occur if instinct and tradition were allowed to act uncontrolled.* In this respect the equations have some analogy to a dream, for a dream often warns an individual of the antisocial acts that his instincts would lead him to commit if he were not wakeful." *Ibid.*, 12; emphasis in original.

[68] "The increase of armaments that is intended in each nation to produce consciousness of strength and a sense of security, does not produce these effects. On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear. . . . The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them—it was these that made war inevitable. . . . This is the real and final account of the origin of the Great War." Viscount Sir Edward Grey, *Twenty-five Years* (London 1925).

[69] Thus Mr. Winston Churchill, in *The World Crisis 1911–1914* (London 1923), records that on November 3, 1909, while he was President of the Board of Trade, he began a minute to the Cabinet with these words: "Believing that there are practically no checks upon German naval expansion except those imposed by the increasing difficulties of getting money, I have had the enclosed report prepared with a view to showing how far those limitations are becoming effective. It is clear that they are becoming terribly effective."

The German Chancellor, Prince von Bülow, in *Imperial Germany*, trans. by M. A. Lewenz (London 1914), wrote: "It is just possible that the effect of convulsively straining her military resources to the uttermost may, by reacting on the economic and social conditions of France, hasten the return of pacific feelings. . . . Should the three-year military service entail an income tax, this would also probably have a sobering effect." Richardson (fn. 63), 15.

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power positions.[70] The assumptions built into the equations, plus those for representing the international reality discussed above, represent Richardson's interpretation of arms races. The implications of Equations (2) and (3) are testable and indeed have been tested; the variables x and y of the linear theory were originally operationalized as annual defense budgets minus a constant. This assumption was reexamined when the constant was replaced by a variable measure of foreign trade. In both procedures, the linear theory was found to have good agreement with statistical tests. In an attempt to extend the theory from the period 1920 to 1940, discontinuities were observed. Richardson and others have attempted to demonstrate reasons for the discontinuity.[71]

One of the more exciting aspects of Richardson's theory is the ability to provide explanations of foreign politics with the help of deductions from the original equations. For instance, what would happen if mutual disarmament and dissatisfaction occurred? This is represented in the equations by allowing g, h, x, and y to equal zero (or the ideal condition of permanent peace would have occurred). The equations further imply that if mutual disarmament is accomplished by allowing x and y to vanish without "satisfaction," disarmament will not be stable, since the rate of growth in armaments will still be responsive to grievances. As soon as x and y are greater than zero, Equations (5) and (6) apply again. Similarly, according to the assumptions in Equations (5) and (6), unilateral disarmament is not permanent either. Unilateral disarmament corresponds to putting y equal to zero at a point in time. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} dx/dt &= -ax + g \\ dy/dt &= lx + h \end{aligned} \qquad (7)$$

Equation (7) implies that y will not remain zero if the grievance h is positive. When y has grown, it will cause dx/dt to grow as well, and the original equations will be applicable.

[70] "g and h represent any motives which, while affecting warlike preparations, remain constant independently of the amount of such preparations at home or abroad. From the psychological point of view such motives could include deeply rooted prejudices, standing grievances, old unsatisfied ambitions, wicked and persistent dreams of world conquest, or, on the contrary, a permanent feeling of contentment. The list is too long to be recited on every occasion; so, for short, g and h are still usually the 'grievances'—a name which indicates that g is a positive number when its side is dissatisfied and a negative number when the prevailing mood of that side is contentment." *Ibid.*, 16.

[71] See, for instance, Paul Smoker, "A Mathematical Study of the Present Arms Race," in *General Systems: Yearbook of the Society of General Systems*, VIII (1963), 51-60.

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Another set of conclusions derivable from the original development deals with the likelihood of war. If the sensitivity of an opponent's armaments k and l is positive and larger than the restraints of economy placed upon a nation's own armaments α and β, which are also assumed to be positive, then the system will show a continued arms race (termed a runaway arms race), which Richardson assumes to be war as the buildup of armaments approaches infinity. If, however, the restraints of economy are larger than a nation's sensitivity to its opponent's level of armaments, the arms race will reach a point of stable equilibrium in which no further growth of arms is likely.

Richardson proceeds to develop deductive implications for non-linear functions, which deal with changes in the strength of k, l, α and β over the length of the arms race. These changes in the theory are potentially quite provocative, since they could add more specificity to the explanation. In taking stock of the arms-race theory, Equations (5) and (6) are easily reducible to Type IV statements, or hypotheses. Richardson has done this on several occasions and in different ways, as mentioned. His derivations of other conclusions are of the nature of Type X statements, or theorems. Empirical tests of the theorems, by reducing them to Type IV statements, do not seem to be have been attempted. Criticism has been leveled at the simplicity of Richardson's empirical attempts to test his conclusions, but the real strength in this model is the deductive pregnancy contained in such a simple set of equations. This work is obviously a theory because it leads to testable statements; it is an advance because it leads easily to conclusions of a broader nature than the original assumptions.

The internal consistency of the statements has stood the test of repeated reviews very well. As to the empirical tests of the equations, it has been shown that simple linear assumptions will have to be replaced by more complex assumptions. But in general, the theory has held up well under several different extensions to varying empirical domains.

Notice that the assumption, "the preparation for war by two groups is regarded as the rectangular coordinates of a particle in an international plane . . . ," is a Type IX statement that performs the same function for Richardson as Statements 1 and 2 do for Rummel. It allows Richardson to use a mathematical language, differential calculus, to specify his assumptions of the relationship between motion in this plane and the preparations for war.

Conflict of Interest

Theoretical efforts to explain international relations in a decision-making framework are increasingly relying upon utility theory as it is

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applied to games. Robert Axelrod has developed a theory of conflict of interest based upon the participants' perceived utilities of various outcomes.[72] The power of Axelrod's development lies in the fact that it applies to all sorts of games, such as bargaining games and the Prisoners' Dilemma game. He has also shown how to relax the stringent requirements on players' utilities and still apply the models with which he is working. The basic theme of Axelrod's theory is that, other things being equal, the more conflict of interest, the more likely is conflict behavior. He begins by providing a formal definition of conflict of interest for numerous types of strategic interaction. Such a concept must satisfy certain properties. Let us first assume two players or groups of players. The indices of utilities or preferences of each player form a rectangular coordinate system. The points in this system represent the area of feasible outcomes, given both players' preferences. The properties that must be satisfied by any procedure for measuring conflict of interest are:

1. Symmetry: invariance with respect to interchanging the labels of the players.
2. Independence: independence with respect to the choices of representation of the players' utility schedules.
3. Continuity: if two games are almost alike, they should have almost the same conflict of interest and be exactly the same in the limiting case.[73]

Conflict of interest is formally defined by first normalizing the game, that is, by translating the no-agreement point to the zero-origin of the utility axes, calculating the area in the unit square that lies above and to the right of the region of feasible outcomes. Conflict of interest is then defined as the proportion of the unit square that is in this infeasible demand area. See Figure 1 for an example.

In order to apply the concept of conflict of interest to problems in political science, we first need a model of the strategic interaction; then we need to identify the participants' range of strategies—the outcomes that result when one has selected a specific strategy and the utility of various outcomes. We also need hypotheses that relate conflict of interest to behavior. These must be generated from the axiom, "the more conflict there is, the more conflictual behavior there will be." Then, by knowing the possible outcomes and a participant's utility for each

[72] Robert Axelrod, *Conflict of Interest* (Chicago 1970).

[73] In the special cases of bargaining games and the Prisoners' Dilemma game, Axelrod develops the properties in more detail, but for the general case these are the only properties he requires.

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

Source: Axelrod (fn. 72).

FIGURE 1. CONFLICT OF INTEREST MEASURED BY THE RATIO OF THE SHADED AREA TO THE TOTAL AREA WITHIN THE SQUARE

of these outcomes, we ought to expect certain types of behavior under different amounts of conflict of interest. Axelrod has applied these notions to political processes involving congressional conference committees, multilevel decision making in a bureaucracy such as the Department of State and Department of Defense, and conflict of interest in coalitions with an application to the Italian Congressional System.

It should be instructive to see how Axelrod applies the theory of conflict of interest to the formation of coalitions. The model of strategic interaction implies that a group of political parties controlling enough legislative votes to give a vote of confidence to a cabinet can determine

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foreign policy. The hypotheses relating conflict of interest to behavior are:

1. that the less conflict of interest there is in a coalition, the more likely it will form, and
2. the more likely it will be durable if it does form.

The possible outcomes are each of the possible combinations of political parties to form a coalition. The utilities are specified only in an ordinal dimension where utility loss is said to increase as the distances in one direction increases. That is, the less dispersion there is in the policy positions of the members of a coalition, the less conflict of interest there is. For example, given parties labeled *A, B, C, D, E, F,* and *G* in order of their position from left to right on a policy dimension (say conservatism/liberalism), there is less conflict of interest in a coalition composed of *A, B,* and *C* than in a coalition composed of *A, B,* and *D*. For this reason, a coalition consisting of adjacent parties, also called a *connected coalition*, tends to have relatively low dispersion and thus low conflict of interest for its size. From this, we can introduce a definition: A *minimal connected winning coalition* is a coalition that is connected (consists of adjacent parties); is a winning coalition (can give a cabinet a vote of confidence); and is minimal in the sense that if it loses a member party, it ceases to be connected and winning.[74]

The testable hypotheses derived from this are: In a parliamentary democracy in which the parties can be placed in a one-dimensional ordinal policy space, minimal connected winning coalitions

1. are likely to form more often than would be indicated by chance (even compared to just the other winning coalitions), and
2. once formed, are likely to be of longer duration than other coalitions.[75]

"[F]or example, if the seven major parties A, B, C, D, E, F, and G are all of equal size and a simple majority is needed for control, then a coalition of any four or more parties is a winning coalition. There are 64 winning coalitions out of a total of 148 coalitions. The connected coalition consists of its adjacent coalitions. There are 28 winning, connected coalitions. The minimal winning connected coalitions in this example are those coalitions with exactly four adjacent parties. There are only four of these: A, B, C, D; B, C, D, E; C, D, E, F; and D, E, F, G."[76]

[74] Axelrod (fn. 72), 170. [75] *Ibid.*, 171. [76] *Ibid.*, 170.

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Axelrod's work is the newest among the four authors cited; as yet there has been little attempt by others to develop his efforts. It differs somewhat from the previous works in that it is a system of assumptions which needs flushing out in specific empirical domains before it is testable, but Axelrod has shown that the axiomatic approach to conflict of interest has definite application to the political process. The beauty of his model is that he shows that the general hypothesis, "the more conflict of interest the more conflict behavior," when it is structured by the other axioms provided in his development, is extendable to a number of different political games under much less restrictive assumptions than in other gaming approaches. His work is testable as a theory in each of the applications he has portrayed.

In Axelrod's development we have an interesting and quite different approach to theorizing. He begins by spelling out a set of formal definitions for conflict of interest which are really Type VIII and IX statements. That is, they allow us to specify the amount of conflict of interest in a number of domains or games. They are not testable in and of themselves, however. What is needed is another set of statements—some that tie conflict of interest to substantive concerns in specific situations, and others that specify more assumptions about the nature of the situation in which conflict of interest takes place. As Axelrod points out, this should include definitions which link the situation to his axiomatic system as well as empirical statements of a Type VII or X nature. In the case demonstrated in this presentation, the concept of a unidimensional ordinal policy space had to be appended to the system of statements before Hypotheses 1 and 2 were derivable. Once the notion of a unidimensional ordinal policy space (a Type VIII statement) was produced, the hypotheses (Type IV statements) followed easily, however.

It is possible to conclude that Axelrod has provided empirically testable statements in this case. He has shown how he can provide similar statements in other areas of concern by adding Type VIII or IX statements. The internal consistency seems to be met in the case we have observed, and his work seems to be an advance over other decision theories relying upon game-theoretic development in the ability to relax assumptions about zero-sum games which have been required in other studies.[77] We will have to await more empirical tests before a true sense of confirmation of this theory, or others produced from Axelrod's system of original assumptions, is ascertained, however.

[77] William Riker, *Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven 1962).

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Conclusion

The four authors chosen to represent various theories in international relations are ample proof that, in international relations, there exist statements capable of meeting Levy's challenge, and that there are a number of scholars who have followed Rogowski's suggestion that we *begin*. Indeed, Richardson alone is proof that as early as the turn of the century we had begun theorizing about international relations with mathematics. The use of mathematics is foreign to many students of international relations, but it is rightly called the language of science. Richardson's justification for mathematics ought to make this point.

Humanist: Many people will distrust the application of mathematics to such a subject as foreign politics because they feel that political affairs are essentially very complicated and interwoven, whereas any mathematical hypothesis is, I suppose, comparatively simple, clear-cut and definite.

Author: I leave out all the details, as in landscape sketching, one might draw a complete wood without showing individual trees or leaves.

Humanist: But even so, does not the mathematics tend to an oversimplification and rigidity of conception: to drawing the wood as if it were a simple geometrical figure?

Author: Yes, it does. But that contrast occurs in greater or less degree in all applications of mathematics. It is not peculiar to foreign politics. A circle is a definite conception. We see many round forms: the sun, various fruits, some hats, most dinner plates. Very few, if any, are actually circular. Yet the circle is the standard idea.

Humanist: But is it worthwhile to be mathematically precise in your hypotheses and deductions when you foresee that there will probably be considerable misfit between your conclusions and the actual state of affairs?

Author: Yes, it is worthwhile. For when the theories that are obviously wrong have been rejected, the select few that remain begin to be used as standard ideas, by which actuality can be classified and named. If our theory of circles were inaccurate or confused, if for example, we believed the circumference to be three times the diameter or believed that a plane figure was necessarily a circle because all its diameters were equal, we should become entangled in contradictions when we tried to find out whether a particular wheel was circular.

Humanist: But still, you seem to be addicted to an extreme degree of precision, far beyond what is necessary.

Author: Many people prefer to have that somewhat irrelevant precision. A book would mean the same if its lines were set crookedly. A man who buys a house expects his banker to keep a record of the transaction to the precise penny, even if he would have been willing to pay £50

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more for the house. We relish our bacon, although the machine that sliced it need not have been so accurate.[78]

But the use of mathematics is certainly not justifiable as a mechanical and naive pursuit of success in physics. In comprehensive and thoughtful critiques, Sorokin[79] has pointed out the pitfalls of blind emulation and laid down a set of requirements that a theory must meet if its explanations are to help us understand international relations.

1. The theory must be deductively elaborated. In each case it has been demonstrated that statements of a Type IV nature are derivable and that they are testable. In some cases the statements are directly derived from a single universal. In other cases, the derivations are more elaborate.
2. Terms and concepts must be introduced only as needed and then tied to social phenomena. Here it has been demonstrated that the authors have chosen concepts with explicit substantive meanings; in some cases they have gone to great lengths to cite the literature that uses these concepts.
3. Measurement and testing procedures must be built into the theory so that its theorems can be tested. The measurement techniques involved in the four theories above have been shown to be factor-analysis utility matrixes, and 2 x 2 tables. In each case, they have been elaborated in the theoretical development of the theory.
4. The problem-relevant (rather than technique-relevant) historical and contemporary literature must be taken into account. Here we have seen a number of different ways in which this has been done. Rummel has attempted to relate field theory to the pre-theoretical works of several other authors. Galtung has relied extensively on sociological literature.[80]

The above authors have met these criteria in a number of interesting and imaginative ways, but it would be unfair to say that, from a sociological point of view, any of these theories have become more than an island of explanation in a sea of substantively rich concerns in international relations. Thus, while the critics of the field of international relations as a scientific discipline have missed the islands, they have been correct in asserting that much is as yet not explained by scientific

[78] Richardson (fn. 63), 145.

[79] Pitirin Sorokin, *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences* (Chicago 1956); *Contemporary Sociological Theories: Through the First Quarter of the Twentieth Century* (New York 1964).

[80] I am not arguing that there is no place for technique-relevant citations; rather, once these have been deleted, we must be left with a substantive problem.

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theories. In the same vein, early defenses of the scientific method have ignored the success of these theories in responding to the critics, but have been more right than wrong in suggesting that the future can hold nothing but further elaboration in the scientific vein. But what of the theories presented here? Are they coalescing to form a substantial region of theoretical explanation, or are they competing for the paradigm which in Kuhn's sense[81] will take over as the accepted paradigm? There appear to be signs that both coalition and competition is occurring. In one instance, rank theory and field theory seem to be coalescing,[82] complementing each other, and generally accepting the same paradigm by combining the explicitness in testing from Rummel's field theory with the deductive fullness of rank theory. In other cases, we can see clear competition between the process models of Richardson and the conflict-of-interest theory.

Since it would appear that there are a number of theories meeting the requirements of a scientific theory in a formal sense, what are the additional sociological requirements that, in general, lead the field to choose among theories? That is a difficult question, one which is not answerable directly by the philosophy of science. I believe that it underlies much of the conflict between the so-called logical positivists and those who are philosophic skeptics of the rise of behavioral science.[83] The reasons why an individual chooses one theory rather than another are probably idiosyncratic to that analyst's personal interests and values, but let me suggest the basis for rational choice that each of us might consider.

Let the choice be based upon the concept of utility.[84] How useful is a theory for the study of international relations? Or, the more useful a theory is perceived to be by the field, the more likely it is to be well received. It appears that there are four dimensions to the utility or usefulness of a theory:

1. The N/V ratio. Deutsch, Singer, and Smith[85] suggest that one criterion for evaluating theories is their "organizing effectiveness." That is, the ratio of the number of cases, N, which each

[81] Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago 1962).

[82] See, for instance, Rummel (fn. 32).

[83] See John G. Gunnell, "Deduction, Explanation, and Social Scientific Inquiry," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (December 1969), and A. James Gregor, "Gunnell on 'Deductivism,' the 'Logic' of Science, and Scientific Explanation: A Riposte," *ibid.*, for a look at the depth of this misunderstanding.

[84] I wish to thank Tom Milburn for the suggestion of this concept.

[85] Karl W. Deutsch, J. David Singer, and Keith Smith, "The Organizing Efficiency of Theories: The N/V Ratio as a Crude Rank Order Measure," *American Behavioral Scientist*, IX (October 1965).

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theory applies to the number of variables, V, which each theory must employ to explain relationships in the cases. The measure of usefulness here endorses the theory that requires very few variables but explains a great many cases. Ideally, we would like a theory with two variables which would explain all the cases relevant to international relations that we could imagine. That would indeed be a very parsimonious and useful theory. Since it is not likely that all imaginable cases be explained by a few simple variables, other forms of utility should also be developed.

2. Unexpected information. As a theory is deductively elaborated, it frequently leads to unexpected conclusions that may even seem contradictory to common sense. These unexpected, serendipitous conclusions are far more useful than expected information derivable from the theory, since they instantly expand the theory's scope to cover areas not originally anticipated.
3. Informational utility. In looking at two theories, the theory that is more relevant to currently important problems is perceived as having more utility than the theory that gives information about problems which cannot be handled. (The definition of the importance of a problem may be impossible to specify; it is nevertheless clear that we measure the utility of a theory in part by its potential application to present policy problems.)
4. Heuristic utility. If the theory or its concepts suggest interesting questions for research—questions which otherwise would not have been raised—that theory has heuristic utility, a fact which would argue for wider acceptance among scholars.

Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, and perhaps too early in the stage of theoretic development, for me to suggest which of the presented theories are most useful, the concept of utility and the multiple dimensions for measuring it may lead us out of the endless debate as to the scientific nature of our profession. It is a point of departure from the old debate on whether scientific theory exists in the field today. By reviewing four examples, this article has attempted to show that theory certainly does exist. It is time that we turn from the debate as to whether theory exists to the critical assessment of the utilities of present theories.

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WHY CHANGE?

Toward a New Theory of Change Among Individuals in the Process of Modernization

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INTRODUCTION

WHEN and why people abandon their old institutions, patterns of behavior, and even places of residence in favor of new ones that are associated with sustained economic growth and development is a question of central importance to social science. Increasingly, political scientists have associated these processes of change with the occurrence of disintegration of particular political units, groups, and systems, and with the integration of others.[1] The changing nature of social and cultural ties signals concomitant modifications in what people define as their community, where they place demands, and where they look for authoritative decisions to be made.

The process of abandonment of old ways for new ones has been copiously described and labelled during the last fifteen years. Various models using information theory, communication theory, personality theory, and other concepts have been employed to explain the process of change undergone by large numbers of individuals. Yet, surprisingly,

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[1] Samuel P. Huntington has talked of political institutionalization of states, which is closely connected to integration, and of political decay, which is a process involving disintegration. *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven 1968), esp. chap. 1. In a recent article, Walker Connor has linked social change simultaneously to the integration of national entities (ethnic groups) and to the disintegration of states. In "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics*, XXIV (April 1972), 319-55, he cites a long list of political scientists who relate social change to integration, and criticizes the lack of literature on the relation of change to disintegration. He is certainly right in criticizing this deficiency, but there are some recent works he does not cite. See, for example, Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," *American Political Science Review*, LXIV (December 1970), 1112-30. Other social scientists have also been concerned with the relationship between development and integration. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz wrote one of the first and most important articles on this subject, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States" in Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (Glencoe, Ill. 1963), 105-57. S. N. Eisenstadt, in *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1966), v, has spoken of "breakdown" or "regression" with respect to social change.

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the question of why people abandon the old patterns has been approached in very much the same manner throughout practically all the literature.

The key explanation offered (most often it is an assumption rather than an explicit explanation) is that exposure to the modern—what we shall call "culture contact"[2]—will lead people to abandon the old and attempt to garner the fruits of the new. Stated another way, this means that contact between old and new patterns leads to the triumph of the new. ("How you gonna keep 'em down on the farm once they've seen Paree?") In recent years there has been a growing body of literature pointing to weaknesses in the explanation, but there has been no development of an inclusive theoretical alternative.

The explanation that exposure and contact are the causes of change has at least three components: (1) The benefits of the modern far outweigh the benefits of the traditional.[3] (2) The individual is free from severe institutional restraints which would prevent his making a free decision. (3) Those individuals who select the new are rational and are optimizers,[4] and those individuals who do not accept the modern fail to do so because of "wrong" or nonrational values.

I will first examine this explanation and point out some of the difficulties in analysis which it raises. I will then offer a theoretical alternative to the question of why people abandon their old patterns. Although culture contact may be a necessary condition for change, I contend that it is in itself not a sufficient condition. The analysis will be focused specifically on change among peasants in Asia and Latin America.[5]

[2] Culture contact has long been in use as a term in anthropology; depending on the author using it, it has taken on various connotations. The emphasis here will be on the contact between traditional, village-based patterns and those associated with more urban styles. More specifically, we are talking of the contact by traditional villages with the patterns and values characteristic of modern societies. For a brief discussion on the various uses of the term, see Raphael Patai, "On Culture Contact and Its Working in Modern Palestine," *American Anthropologist*, New Series XLIX (October 1947).

[3] Hallowell makes explicit some of the points involved in this assumption. His subject of concern is the influence of European culture on the other parts of the world. He feels that acculturation is basically a learning process, and that European culture has spread so rapidly because the rewards outweigh the punishments for the individual. A. Irving Hallowell, "Sociopsychological Aspects of Acculturation," in Ralph Linton, ed., *The Science of Man in the World Crisis* (New York 1945), 171-200.

[4] In recent years, Alex Inkeles has been one of the few who has explicitly addressed himself to the question of why people become modern. He cites a variety of factors (the city, mass media, the factory), but states that one factor assumes pre-eminence: namely, education. The school ". . . serves as a model of rationality, of the importance of technical competence, of the rule of objective standards of performance, and of the principle of distributive justice reflected in the grading system." Inkeles, "The Modernization of Man," in Myron Weiner, ed., *Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth* (Voice of America Forum Lectures 1966), 159-60.

[5] The term "peasant" is used here in an inclusive sense to denote poor people who

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Asia has a long history of peasants living under the rule of a state; Latin America's peasants first faced such influence with the advent of Spanish and Portuguese rule. The strong added pressures of imperial penetration and state centralization in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, I will argue, affected the behavior of individuals in both Asia and Latin America.

Culture Contact and Change

In social science literature, particularly in anthropology, the emphasis on exposure to alternative modes of behavior as a prime cause of social change goes back at least to the early part of the century.[6] In 1934, Robert Redfield wrote, "The local differences in Yucatan that do strike the attention are those apparently due to the different degrees to which various communities have been exposed to what we often speak of as 'civilization'—schools, roads and economic exploitation. The towns and villages are in varying stages of a process of transition as a result of these influences."[7] Anthropologists have continued to rely heavily on the culture contact mode of analysis. For example, almost thirty years after Redfield's study on the Yucatan was written, George M. Foster suggested that the degree of contact with urban centers is the greatest determinant of change among peasants.[8]

Other branches of the social sciences have subsequently adopted the culture-contact mode of analysis. In *The Passing of Traditional Society*, the sociologist Daniel Lerner explicates the most complete and sophisticated model of culture contact. By focusing on why such change occurs, he attempts to go beyond the mere assertion that contact leads to

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live and work in rural, primarily agricultural communities; who participate to some degree in cash and commodity markets; and who are subordinate to other classes in the society. This article derives from a study which employed a content analysis of fifty-one cases in monographs on villages in Asia and Latin America, and also stems from field work in Mexico and India. In many areas, however, data are scarce and propositions remain hypothetical. For a list of the cases and a discussion of methodology, see Migdal, "Peasants in a Shrinking World: The Socio-Economic Basis of Political Change," unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Harvard University 1972); also Migdal, *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution* (Princeton, forthcoming).

[6] B. Malinowski is the pre-eminent scholar associated with this view in respect to tribal peoples. He holds that change in Africa is "the result of an impact of a higher, active culture upon a simpler, more passive one." *The Dynamics of Culture Change: An Inquiry into Race Relations in Africa* (New Haven 1945), 15.

[7] Robert Redfield and Alfonso Villa Rojas, *Chan Kom: A Maya Village* (Chicago 1962), ix.

[8] George M. Foster, *Traditional Cultures, and the Impact of Technological Change* (New York 1962), 25, 30. "The greater the range of novelty to which people are exposed, the greater the likelihood that they will adopt new forms. Contact between societies is the single greatest determinate of culture change" (p. 25).

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change. His model begins with the person who accepts change and becomes modernized[9]—"the mobile personality." Such a person is one who has a high capacity for identification with new aspects of his environment.[10] Thus, the key ingredient in the mobile personality is empathy, the ability to see oneself in the other fellow's situation. The question Lerner poses is how a society is able to produce many mobile personalities, for he perceives modern society as one consisting of people with the quality of empathy.[11]

Lerner's answer is that it takes an expansion of human communication to produce the modern man, the person with "psychic mobility," who is ready to participate in and accept new patterns. At first, this expansion of communication came through an increase in travel, but the media now obviate the need for physical displacement. The media accent "the psychic displacement of vicarious experience," and are, in fact, even better than travel, for exposure to them gives the person a more ordered sense of the whole.[12] After reaching a certain threshold of urbanization, literacy, mass media, and institutions of participation, a society has a sufficient apparatus to provide large numbers of people in its traditional sector with exposure and contact with the new, thus converting them into mobile personalities.[13]

The assumption that increased contact with and exposure to new patterns will lead not only to increased knowledge but also to new behavior is found in other theories as well. In political science, for example, F. Lamond Tullis has used Frank Young's information-processing theory to build a paradigm of political and social change in Peru.[14] Tullis defines "information-processing capacity" as the extent to which an individual can process a diversity of complex information

[9] There is no total consensus on the meaning of modernization. In fact, some scholars have spurned its use altogether. See, for example, Irving Louis Horowitz, *Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification* (New York 1966). In *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York 1958), viii, Daniel Lerner sees it primarily as a state of mind—expectation of progress, propensity for growth, readiness to adapt oneself to change. Later (p. 50), Lerner does identify modern society with behavior, calling it the "Participant Society." For a general and widely accepted definition of modernization, we can use David E. Apter's, in *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965), v. He refers to the rapid increase of roles that are functionally linked in a setting marked by rational, hierarchical organizations.

[10] Lerner (fn. 9), 49. [11] *Ibid.*, 50. [12] *Ibid.*, 53.

[13] "Traditional" is used here as a general term, referring to an institutional setting marked by diffuseness of roles and ascriptive values. It also refers to patterns that are "long-held" (i.e., have been employed by at least two generations but usually many more). In no way is it meant to denote homogeneity of structure, for traditional patterns vary widely.

[14] F. Lamond Tullis, *Lord and Peasant in Peru: A Paradigm of Political and Social Change* (Cambridge, Mass. 1970), esp. chap. 1.

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that transcends strictly localized symbolic nuances. He maintains that there is a direct link between such information-processing capacity in individuals and modernization. A peasant who goes to the city regularly, would, according to Tullis, probably develop a higher information-processing capacity and would adopt modern ways more quickly than one who stayed home.

The importance of culture contact as a cause of individual and social change is probably most obvious in the large and growing body of literature on the diffusion of innovation. Taking much from Lerner's approach, diffusion-of-innovation theorists have emphasized the crucial role of communication in determining the type of person who changes. Everett Rogers, the leading exponent of the theory of diffusion of innovations in political science, has emphasized the crucial role of communication in giving the individual the wherewithal to become modern. Again, the individual is the key unit of analysis, but Rogers attempts to identify the conditions under which the individual will be most likely to optimize—that is, to abandon the traditional for the modern. He asserts that the innovator among peasants has certain characteristics or antecedents which make him identifiable. These include literacy, exposure to the mass media, empathy, and achievement motivation, among others.[15] The underlying ingredients of modernization, however, do not differ significantly from those of Lerner's model. The process of change is basically one without severe discontinuities, as the term diffusion itself connotes; the more the differing sectors come into contact with one another, the more individuals will gain the attributes associated with change.

In short, change is most often seen in terms of incentives for the *individual* to adopt the new over the old. Culture contact, either personally or through media exposure, presents the individual with the ability, the empathy, the information-processing capacity, etc., to relate personally to alternative life-styles. He then can weigh his present patterns and commitments against the modern, and there is little doubt among most authors that he will accept the modern. Barriers to change are seen as being internal to the individual—his personal orientation—and little note is given to the strength of traditional, parochial institutions and their ability to affect the individual's choice radically.[16]

[15] Everett Rogers, *Modernization Among Peasants: The Impact of Communication* (New York 1969), 292.

[16] Although many scholars pay lip service to the role of "individualization" in the process of modernization, the conceptual lenses used to study *who* changes and *when* lead researchers to impute a high degree of individualism to traditional societies as well. On individualization, see, for example, Alexander Eckstein, "Individualism and

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I will come back later to the question of the use of the individual as the key analytic unit. First, let us turn to the weaknesses of the culture-contact explanation.

Difficulties in the Concept of Culture Contact

Two interesting monographs have highlighted cases where there has been a degree of culture contact, but little abandonment of the old patterns.[17] In the Peruvian village of Hualcan, numerous men left the village each year for temporary work outside. A large proportion of these men went to work in modern agricultural-industrial plantations on the coast of Peru, far from their Andean village. These plantations presented a world culturally distinct to these men, and some worked there for up to two months at a time. Yet, according to William W. Stein, these contacts were "acculturationally irrelevant."

That is not to say that no changes in village life resulted from the plantation work. Men returned with impressive sums of cash which affected the social stratification of Hualcan. Yet, interestingly, the men did not adopt the patterns they encountered. Their clothes changed little. Their money was invested in land and fiestas, the long-accepted way to dispose of surplus.[18]

Much the same set of events occurred among the men of Buarij, Lebanon. There, almost all the adult males left the mountainous village during the slack winter season to work elsewhere. Many of their jobs put them into contact with very different and very modern sectors of Lebanon. Although, once again, changes in village life occurred, the striking factor discovered by Anne H. Fuller was the stability of attitudes, institutions, and behavior despite these yearly forays.[19]

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the Role of the State in Economic Growth," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, VI (January 1958), 81-87. Also see Jack M. Potter, *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant: Social and Economic Change in a Hong Kong Village* (Berkeley 1968), 3, where he speaks of a change from a "collectivity orientation" to an "individualistic orientation."

[17] By simply looking at cases in which the degree of contact was high and economic growth was quite low, Everett E. Hagen has rejected explanations of national economic growth that are based on the degree of contact with the West: "How Economic Growth Begins: A Theory of Social Change," in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds., *Political Development and Social Change*, 2nd ed. (New York 1971), 73-74. Although I do not feel that a theory is disproved by citing such cases, I am immediately led to question why the theory did not explain the particular events.

[18] William W. Stein, *Hualcan: Life in the Highlands of Peru* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1961). See also his "Outside Contact and Cultural Stability in a Peruvian Highland Village," in Verne F. Ray, ed., *Cultural Stability and Cultural Change*, Proceedings of the 1957 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Society (Seattle 1957), 15-16.

[19] Anne H. Fuller, *Buarij: Portrait of a Lebanese Muslim Village* (Cambridge, Mass. 1961), 97.

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These examples are representative of a growing number of cases that have been turned up by researchers in recent years in which the objective conditions of high culture contact were not followed by the widespread behavioral changes associated with the process of modernization. In one sense, the adherents of the concept of culture contact as an explanation of change turn it into an axiom beyond disproof. Since one of the elements of the concept is belief that certain people may not select the benefits of modernity because of their value structure or ethos,[20] one can always attribute the lack of change in specific instances to the people's particular values. In short, values become a gigantic residual category which "explain" all cases, such as Hualcan or Buarij, in which significant change does not take place despite high culture contact.

Serious doubts must be raised about such undifferentiated concepts as value structures or ethos. For example, very near the Peruvian village of Hualcan is another Indian, freeholding village called Recuayhuanca. There, too, peasants left the village during the off-season to take jobs on agricultural-industrial plantations on the coast. The results of their experience were much different from those of Hualcan's peasants, however. The young people adopted Western dress, and education went up in value. Some villagers followed their work on the plantations with temporary jobs in Lima, and almost all joined labor unions between 1945 and 1948. Many opted for permanent migration from the village, and others, while not yet able to migrate, held the goal of eventually living in Lima.[21]

If values do in fact explain why some reject change and others accept it, how do we account for peasants in two villages so close to one another and structurally similar (both were freeholding villages, in contrast to the nearby *hacienda* of Vicos), who reacted so differently to culture contact? Can we assume that value structures are so different for the two?[22]

A further problem in regard to the reliance on values or ethos stems from the numerous cases in which individuals change some patterns

[20] In respect to the failure of peasants to change, the word "ethos" has been employed by Edward C. Banfield in his study of a southern Italian village, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York 1958).

[21] Joan Snyder, "The Changing Context of an Andean Community," in Ray (fn. 18), 20-29.

[22] An interesting criticism of Banfield's reliance on ethos is made by Sydel F. Silverman, pointing to *structural differences* in southern Italian villages, "Agricultural Organization, Social Structure, and Values in Italy: Amoral Familism Reconsidered," *American Anthropologist*, LXX (February 1968) 1-20.

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and commitments but not others.[23] Here, too, there is a rather extensive literature which documents such cases of syncretic change and points to the weakness of the culture-contact explanation.[24] An example of such partial change is found in the Jaunpur district of Uttar Pradesh, India, where university-educated sons still have their marriages arranged by their parents, many of them returning to live in the joint household. Others commute to the city to work as doctors or government clerks while their wives and children remain in the village and the joint household. In Latin America, social scientists have noted the persistence of village-based patterns of behavior, both socially and politically, among people who have left the village to live in *barrios* surrounding the city.[25]

Are these people innovators? Do they or do they not have empathy? Do they have high information-processing capacity or not? Why have they rejected many of the modern patterns they have witnessed? The questions become even sharper when we consider those who travel to

[23] Gusfield, Whitaker, and others have begun to argue that modernity and traditionalism are not mutually exclusive. But they have not provided an alternative theory to explain why men accept some changes and not others. See Joseph R. Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXXII (January 1967), 351-62; and C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change," *World Politics*, XIX (January 1967), 190-217.

[24] Whitaker, *ibid.*, 191, has argued that "today's student of 'modernization' has inferred what in effect is a hypothesis about how non-Western people generally will react to the kind of institutions yielded by change in the West. This hypothesis in essence is that ultimately all non-Western peoples will either accept or reject these institutions, more or less wholesale." He maintains that among those theorists who see change as "eurhythmic" (change in one area occasioning changes in all others) are Parsons, Levy, Hagen, Sutton, Shils, Redfield, Riggs, Millikan and Blackmer, Sinai, the Etzionis, and Apter, and that the number of empirical studies employing this assumption are too numerous to list. Whitaker goes on to say that there are those who have expressed dissatisfaction with the dichotomous doctrines of "modernization" analysis: Bendix, Black, Deutsch, Eisenstadt, Hoselitz, LaPalombara, W. E. Moore, Pye, Sanger, and Ward and Rustow. In the more recent anthropological literature (see, for example, the Rhodes-Livingstone Papers) a case has been made for "dysrhythmic" or syncretic changes which are directed against the culture-contact explanation. But no one has yet constructed an alternative inclusive theory. Malinowski (fn. 6, p. 39), himself recognizes the problem of syncretic change: "Can we analyze more fully the problem why certain elements survive and others disappear . . . ?" He also acknowledges the problem of reactions against "Westernization" in times of "transition," speaking of compatibility, adaptability, and conflict. Unfortunately, no satisfactory solutions have come forth from the literature. It is not enough to say that contact disorganizes the old culture. One must explain how and why.

[25] Urban migrants often keep their politically passive orientation, the contrary assumption by some notwithstanding. Often, the weakness that has caused political inefficacy is repeated in the city. See Wayne Cornelius, "Urbanization as an Agent of Latin American Instability: The Case of Mexico," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (September 1969), 845-54; also, Joan Nelson, "The Urban Poor: Disruption or Political Integration in Third World Cities?" *World Politics*, XXII (April 1970), 393-414.

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Europe or the United States to study, yet maintain many of their old patterns and commitments.[26]

Finally, culture contact as an explanation of change fails to take account of the differentiation between two distinct concepts—social mobilization and modernization. Social mobilization is the breaking down of old social, economic, and psychological commitments,[27] whereas modernization is the actual adoption of new commitments and patterns, resulting in the use of new levels of technology and in structural differentiation. Given the assumption that culture contact causes change, it is easy to see why this merging of the two concepts should occur, for why abandon the old (social mobilization) if not, simultaneously, in order to adopt the new?

If we rely on the culture-contact explanation, we face a difficulty in understanding the numerous cases in which there has been a process of abandonment of traditional patterns and commitments (social mobilization), without *necessarily* leading to the adoption of the ways and processes associated with modernization.[28] Thus, S. N. Eisenstadt has spoken of the "post-traditional" society, one in which long-held practices and beliefs are discarded, but in which new roles are not characterized by specificity in a setting marked by rational hierarchical organizations, nor by the adoption of new levels of technology.[29] The growth of certain millenarian movements may be an example of social mobilization without modernization.[30]

[26] Richard D. Robinson tells of Turkish workers in Germany who reverted to their old patterns upon returning to Turkey. "A View of Five Decades of Turkish Development," address presented at Harvard University, November 24, 1969. Some literature contends that the retention of certain old social patterns may facilitate acceptance of modern economic habits. See Gusfield (fn. 23).

[27] Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, LV (September 1961), 493-514.

[28] Even Deutsch's measures of social mobilization, for example, highlight not only the erosion and breakdown of the old, but such changes as urbanization, growth of the nonagricultural sector, increases in literacy, and growth in GNP—all of which reflect an adoption, by large numbers, of new patterns associated with modernization. In such cases, it is difficult to differentiate social mobilization from modernization itself. The two seem to be so closely tied that the existence of one presupposes the existence of the other. *Ibid.*

[29] One scholar writes on Latin America, "The intrusion of the market economy destroyed ancient civilizations, handicrafts, and agriculture, but it did not bring modernization." Robert I. Rhodes, "The Disguised Conservatism in Evolutionary Development Theory," *Science and Society*, XXXII (Fall 1968), 402.

[30] "The persistent vitality of groups that are neither traditional nor modern nor transitional poses one of the most stubborn conceptual and practical problems of political development." Frances R. Hill, "Millenarian Machines in South Vietnam," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XIII (July 1971), 325. Mrs. Hill goes on to say that tribes, castes, or millenarian movements cannot simply be considered aberrant vestiges.

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Understanding Change: An Alternative Explanation

Guy Hunter has written that the peasant village historically was a place that harbored suppressed minority feelings—feelings which, when given the proper opportunity, could translate into significant behavioral changes.[31] Two questions immediately come to mind. First, why and how were these feelings suppressed? Second, who in the village had such feelings? To answer these questions, one must refer to two distinct types of historical villages:[32] those in which the rule of lords[33] predominated, and the freeholding villages[34] in which there was no immediate rule of local lords.[35]

In villages where lords were strong, the why and how of suppression are fairly clear. A lord put barriers against the involvement of peasants with individuals and institutions outside the village, because it was on the outside that the peasants might have found alternatives to the services he provided. Peasants, even if they desired new tools or methods, simply could not risk going against the lord's desires. He controlled the vital resources, and his sanctions included withholding the land, water, or services the peasants so badly needed. Whether through the institution of serfdom in feudal Europe or labor debts on Latin America's haciendas,[36] lords bound peasants to an existence which shut off any possibilities of escape from parochialism. The larger the scope of the lord's resources, the greater the primacy of those resources to the peasants; and the more monopolistic his control over those resources, the more difficult was it for the peasants to risk seeking alternatives.[37]

[31] Guy Hunter, *Modernizing Peasant Societies: A Comparative Study in Asia and Africa* (New York 1969), 31.

[32] The two are ideal types and are used to indicate a spectrum ranging from a village ruled by a single powerful lord to a village inhabited entirely by independent peasant families.

[33] The lord is differentiated from the peasant in that he did not need to work the land but could live completely off the work of others through rents, interest, and profit.

[34] Freeholding villages could consist entirely of small farmers on private or communal lands, but could also be villages in which only a portion of the families had control of or access to cultivable land. In any case, however, no one person or group of persons in a freeholding village had the extensive control a lord did.

[35] There is a rough correlation between lord-ruled villages and a patrimonial domain, and freeholding villages and a prebendal domain, but certainly both types of villages existed in both domains. For a discussion of domains in which peasants lived, see Eric R. Wolf, *Peasants* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1966), 50-59.

[36] "The hacienda is not just an agricultural property owned by an individual. The hacienda is a society, under private auspices. It is an entire social system and governs the life of those attached to it from the cradle to the grave." Frank Tannenbaum, *Ten Keys to Latin America* (New York 1962), 80.

[37] An important literature has begun to grow in political science on the question of patron-client relations. Three of the best articles are René Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis," *Comparative Politics*,

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The question of why and how minority feelings oriented toward change were suppressed in a freeholding village is somewhat more complex. The fact that there were no lords directly governing these villages does not mean that the peasants were not subject to the rule of classes above them. The state represented these classes and ruled through what F. G. Bailey has called *imperium*.[38] Harumi Befu has written of the hostility toward ruling elites that was common among peasants in such states.[39] The state allowed the village to govern itself internally, but extracted a high price through taxation.

Peasants in these freeholding villages suffered from their vulnerability: their contact with outside institutions meant high taxes and exploitation, and, as a result, the peasants felt that the world outside the village was fraught with danger and hostility for them. Communities lived within their "bamboo hedge" and had institutions to prevent, as much as they could, further interference in their affairs which the hostile world outside might bring about by means of alliances with peasants desiring change.[40]

Such freeholding communities had various mechanisms, for example, to consume or redistribute the surplus of the wealthier peasants. Fiestas, ceremonies, gift procedures, and so forth served to prevent the accumulation by anyone of resources that could be used to form alliances with outside individuals or institutions.[41] The fear was that such alliances could form the basis of an even more direct and severe domination of the peasants. Sanctions such as gossip, refusal of cooperative labor, beatings, ostracism, and banishment served to insure compliance with the demands of local institutions.[42]

IV (January 1972), 149-78; John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LXIV (June 1970), 411-25; and James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change," paper presented at the American Political Science Association meetings (Los Angeles 1970). For a concise discussion of the lord-peasant relationship in Brazil, see the beginning of Benno Galjart, "Class and 'Following' in Rural Brazil," *América Latina*, VII (July-September 1964).

[38] F. G. Bailey, *Caste and the Economic Frontier: A Village in Highland Orissa* (Manchester 1957), 255.

[39] Harumi Befu, "The Political Relation of the Village to the State," *World Politics*, XIX (July 1967), 601-20.

[40] See, for example, John T. McAlister, Jr., and Paul Mus, *The Vietnamese and Their Revolution* (New York 1970).

[41] See, for example, *ibid.*, 33; Eric R. Wolf, "Closed Corporate Peasant Communities in Mesoamerica and Central Java," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, XIII (Spring 1957), 4; Manning Nash, "Political Relations in Guatemala," *Social and Economic Studies*, VII (March 1958), 69; and Sol Tax, *Penny Capitalism: A Guatemalan Indian Economy* (Chicago 1963).

[42] See Melvin M. Tumin, *Caste in a Peasant Society: A Case Study in the Dynamics of Caste* (Princeton 1952), 31; Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change:*

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Who were those in the minority with suppressed feelings? Most probably, they were those peasants who contributed disproportionately to the maintenance of village institutions.[43] Although they received honor and prestige within the community, they were aware of other, larger reference groups outside the village. Because of their resources, they were in a much less vulnerable position than their neighbors. They recognized instances in which economic investment was foolish because of instability outside, but at other times they felt that outside investment would be worth the risk if internal restraints did not exist. The severe internal sanctions meant, however, that there was no cushion in case of failure—rejection in the outside world would mean total isolation.

In sum, there were twin forces at work in traditional peasant villages.[44] There was the lure of the reference groups outside the village,[45] which was counteracted by the functioning of the community. The peasant was not a "free" economic individual who could choose between differing life-styles and opportunities. Rather, he operated within a set of institutions—institutions that gave him protection and other services, while at the same time placing severe constraints on his behavior. Whether these institutions centered around lords or freeholding communities, their corporate nature put the individual in a position of little flexibility. Personal orientation to change mattered much less than the institutional guards against employing the means to change.

Since the orientation to abandon village ways in favor of the patterns outside the village was always present among some,[46] an explanation of when change occurs should focus on the *conditions* under which such an orientation could express itself. Under what conditions was this balance in the tension of outward- and inward-oriented forces and

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How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood, Ill. 1962), 66; and Hunter (fn. 31), 40. Hunter also mentions the use of witchcraft. These sanctions were not always fully effective; some peasants managed to establish outside links and become masters over their former peers.

[43] See Mehmet Beqiraj, *Peasantry in Revolution* (Cornell Research Papers in International Studies, 1966, V), chap. 1.

[44] Wilbert E. Moore states that it is most useful to see social systems in terms of intrinsic strain. *Social Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963), 67-68.

[45] See Charles Tilly, *The Vendée* (New York 1967), 59-65, for a discussion of the growth of the influence of outside norms.

[46] Besides Hunter (fn. 31), see Eric R. Wolf, "Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico," *American Anthropologist*, LVIII (December 1956), 1065; F. G. Bailey, "The Peasant View of the Bad Life," *The Advancement of Science*, XXIII (December 1966), 403-4; and Michael Moerman, *Agricultural Change and Peasant Choice in a Thai Village* (Berkeley 1968), 77.

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institutions changed? In other words, when were the costs of outside participation lowered?

In villages dominated by lords, the change in conditions involved the inability or unwillingness of the lords to continue restraining peasants from making alliances with outsiders. There were two interrelated reasons for the loosening of their grip, both stemming from the effects of state centralization and imperial penetration. The first was that the lords came under significant competition from the centralizing institutions of the state.[47] This de-monopolization of the lords' power lessened their ability to apply effective sanctions against their clients, since alternative sources of resources and services were on hand for the peasants.[48] The second reason also stems from this centralization. As the criteria for prestige and success changed in the state, the lords often changed their behavior to maintain their social position.[49] In many cases this meant a move to the city, leaving the lands in an administrator's hands. Peasants no longer received the lords' personalistic services, such as fiestas or burial expenses, but those with sufficient resources (a distinct minority, as we shall see) found that the new businesslike relationships with the lords' administrators allowed them much greater choice of action. That is, the forces that had prevented their adoption of new tools and methods became much less imposing than they had previously been. Wesley W. Craig reports such a case of lowering of barriers. On the haciendas in the La Convención Valley in Peru, the decreased vigilance of the lords led to their granting a request by the peasants to grow coffee. The decision was crucial, for coffee was an export crop that put the peasants into new relationships with outside middlemen and business firms. "Once engaged in a commercially-oriented agriculture," Craig writes, "the campesinos found themselves involved in a chainlike sequence of needs and demands."[50]

The answer as to when and why the balance between the inward and outward forces was tipped in freeholding villages is more complicated. G. William Skinner explores one historical set of conditions

[47] Scott (fn. 37), 20.

[48] See, for example, the statement by William H. and Charlotte Viall Wiser, *Behind Mud Walls 1930–1960* (Berkeley 1964), 20.

[49] Hagen (fn. 42), 192, sees "withdrawal of status respect" as a key element in precipitating social change.

[50] Wesley W. Craig, "Peru: The Peasant Movement of La Convención," in Henry A. Landsberger, ed., *Latin American Peasant Movements* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1969), 293-94. For a further reference to the stratification under lords and the ability to seize opportunities, see Charles J. Erasmus, "Agrarian vs Land Reform: Three Latin American Countries," in Philip K. Bock, ed., *Peasants in the Modern World* (Albuquerque 1969). Erasmus writes of the *reconsolidation* of holdings after the blockage of *hacendados* disappears.

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which resulted in the "suppressed minority's" precipitation of widespread change. In China, a long-term stabilization of outside institutions led to numerous new alliances between peasants and outsiders. Such stabilization could reduce the insecurity of outside participation enough to make some peasants take the risk of being left without the community's protection.[51]

Yet, political stabilization of the outside is a long-term process that by itself cannot explain the universal and rapid process of modernization. In the last two centuries, there has been one precipitant of a change of conditions which has weakened the ability of the freeholding village to prevent some members from making new alliances. This precipitant was an economic crisis that was felt differentially within the peasant villages—some households being struck very hard and some not at all. I believe that it was this type of crisis which, by undermining the conditions under which local institutions could effectively restrain the minority with suppressed feelings, broke the corporate strength of traditional institutions.

Economic crises in peasant villages in Latin America and Asia stemmed, as did the change in lord-dominated villages, from the effects of worldwide imperialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[52] In a variety of ways, imperialism set in action a chain of events that made it increasingly difficult for many village households to keep their income equal to their expenses. Population growth is one of the most important causes of the economic crisis that can be attributed to imperialism. The exact processes involved in the tremendous rise in

[51] Skinner, "Chinese Peasants and the Closed Community: An Open and Shut Case," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XIII (July 1971), 270-81.

[52] The imperialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries came primarily through the mechanism of colonialism. I have used the word imperialism, however, to convey the idea of a transfer of wealth from the rural areas to outside centers. This need not come only through the dominance of occupation. It is also important to note that, as Galtung points out, imperialism is not merely an international relationship but a combination of intra- and inter-national relations. The center of the colony, for example, served as a bridgehead for the colonialists. Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research*, VIII, No. 2 (1971), 81-117. One can also think of a case of such transfer from the peripheries to the center as being almost wholly internal (Japan) without the international element to fit it into the rubric of imperialism. Nevertheless, I have used the word imperialism because of its effect in uniting the various peripheries (albeit in what Galtung calls a feudal interaction) and causing such crises universally and simultaneously. For a collection of interesting articles on the effects of imperialism, see Robert I. Rhodes, ed., *Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader* (New York 1970). Also see Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," *American Economic Review*, LX (May 1970), 231-36. For an opposing view on the role of imperialism, see Carol Ann Cosgrove, "Colonial Legacies and Development Prospects in the Third World (Part I)," *International Relations*, IV (May 1972), 52-77.

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natural increase are complex and not yet fully understood, but the effect was to burden many (but not all) families with more members than they could support. Another cause of such crises, as bureaucratic centralization proceeded, was an increase of demands on the peasants. Many were now forced to find the rare commodity of cash to pay taxes rather than the share of the crop they had always given. Moreover, the taxes were demanded from individuals and not from the village as a whole, preventing internal redistribution prior to paying taxes.[53] Finally, the industrial products of the imperialists often destroyed markets for peasant handicraft, which had been an important source of income.[54]

All three factors—population growth, increased state demands, and erosion of the handicraft market—placed numerous freeholding households in severe financial straits. The solution they sought was very much along traditional lines. Without ties to outside institutions (and fearing that such ties would mean only increased exploitation), the needy turned for help to others in the village who had escaped the crisis.

In the past, upward and downward mobility within the village's status system had been shaped by the ill fortune of one family and the good fortune of another. Selling land and giving loans from one household to another raised the status of some and lowered that of others. The persistence, severity, and scope of the economic crises stemming from the three factors described here had the effect of continually strengthening the position of those who had not been affected, and of widening the gap between them and those in need. The social structure was no longer marked by the fluidity of the past;[55] instead, it became polarized—an increasing proportion of the village's resources coming into the hands of the few who had escaped the crisis. While some sold land and went deeply into debt, others built their power position to the point where they no longer had to fear the sanctions of the community. The effectiveness of sanctions had previously depended on fairly equal reciprocity; now, those in control of many vital resources did not need to fear those whose survival depended on these re-

[53] McAlister and Mus (fn. 40), 36, 41, 73-74, note the devastating effect these changes in tax policy by the French had in Vietnam.

[54] See, for example, Zekije Eglar, *A Punjabi Village in Pakistan* (New York 1960); Henry Orenstein, *Gaon: Conflict and Cohesion in an Indian Village* (Princeton 1965); Peter J. Wilson, *A Malay Village and Malaysia: Social Values and Rural Development* (New Haven 1967); and Shu-ching Lee, "Agrarianism and Social Upheaval in China," *The American Journal of Sociology*, LVI (May 1951), 517-18.

[55] A Chinese proverb states, "Nobody stays rich for three generations; nobody stays poor three generations." McAlister and Mus (fn. 40), 33.

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sources. Simultaneous to the weakening of sanctions, those peasants who had not been affected by the economic crisis found that their new wealth, achieved through the misfortune of others, gave them the means to form outside alliances.[56] Once involved in a significant number of outside institutions, they had an even stronger base from which to fortify their positions in the village.[57] External ties were now used more than ever before to shape the village's internal power structure.

Conclusions

The processes described here to explain change emphasize the historical weakening of institutions that had suppressed the feelings of peasants who were oriented toward mobility in the world outside the village. They also help us to understand at least two different sets of reasons for abandoning traditional patterns and commitments. The first was the desire, on the part of those with sufficient resources and wealth, to achieve recognition and success in a system wider than that of the village. When the restraints against new modes of behavior were no longer as formidable as they had been in the past, they made their move. Their desire for upward mobility in the wider status system, and their possession of sufficient resources to play the game outside, led them to adopt the patterns of behavior of the outside. For them, social mobilization, the abandonment of the old, meant the simultaneous adoption of the new ways associated with modernity.

A second set of reasons for abandoning the old concerns that group of people who had relied on the functioning of the traditional institutions to protect and serve them, and who lacked the resources to advance in the wider status system. After the land consolidation and the economic centralization by the fortunate few, they found that they were left not only without resources but also without community protection. The sanctions and customs that had called for redistribution within the village were no longer operative. The barriers against outside alliances, which could lead to increased economic exploitation, had fallen. But their skills for advancement in the wider system were negligible.

[56] In Thyagasamathiram, Madras State, India, as restrictions imposed by the Brahmin caste eased, those in the non-Brahmin castes who had more resources increased their wealth. Their land accumulation reduced opportunities of others to acquire more land. Dagfin Sivertsen, *When Caste Barriers Fall: A Study of Social and Economic Change in a South Indian Village* (New York 1963), 101-2.

[57] See, for example, T. S. Epstein's discussion of the village of Wangala, India, as an illustration of how those who are better off use outside ties to solidify and strengthen their position. *Economic Development and Social Change in South India* (Manchester 1962).

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These peasants became the landless laborers who make up an increasing portion of rural society;[58] many of them are part of the vast worldwide migration from countryside to cities and towns.[59] They have undergone social mobilization, but they are not prepared to abandon their long-held patterns. They have neither the resources nor the orientation to change. For them, social mobilization has not been at all coincidental with modernization. When they can, they do utilize aspects of the modern world.[60] Some learn the rules of the game and adapt their economic behavior to the realities they face.

However, the world outside the village remains a hostile arena to them. They feel weak and vulnerable, and, as a result, maintain as many of their old institutions as they can for their protection.[61] Despite the decline of the corporate village and the lord, many peasants continue to use small kinship and neighborhood groups as a means to protect the individual against outside exploitation and as a corporate means to move upward in the wider status system.

[58] For example, in India between 1911 and 1931, there was an increase of 53.4% in agricultural laborers—from 21.7% to 33.3% of the total agricultural population. M. C. Dantivala, "Problems in Countries with Heavy Pressure of Population on Land: The Case of India," in Kenneth H. Parsons, Raymond J. Penn, and Philip M. Raup, eds., *Land Tenure* (Madison, Wis. 1956), 136. The green revolution in the 1960's seems only to have accelerated the process of land consolidation at the expense of the weakest. In the Indian Punjab, they seem to have suffered an absolute economic decline. Francine R. Frankel and Karl von Vorys, "The Political Challenge of the Green Revolution: Shifting Patterns of Peasant Participation in India and Pakistan," (Policy Memorandum No. 38, Center of International Studies, Princeton 1972). In the Sahiwal District of Pakistan, the income of the 70% of the population hovering near subsistence has declined relatively in the 1960's, and a good portion has declined absolutely as well. Carl H. Gotsch, "The Distributive Impact of Agricultural Growth: Low Income Farmers and the 'System' (A Case Study of Sahiwal District, West Pakistan)," paper presented to the Seminar on Small Farmer Development Strategies, The Agricultural Development Council and The Ohio State University (Columbus, September 13-15, 1971), 52. One study on Pakistan has shown that, between 1959 and 1969, those with less than 10 acres and those with 10 to 25 acres lost 12.2% and 6.9% of their land respectively. Shahid Javed Burki, "Development of West Pakistan Agriculture: An Interdisciplinary Explanation," paper read at the Workshop on Rural Development in Pakistan, Michigan State University (East Lansing, July 16, 1971), 28.

[59] On this phenomenon, see, for example, James P. Grant, "Marginal Men: The Global Unemployment Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, L (October 1971), 112-24.

[60] An interesting example of such syncretism occurs in an African tribal dance. Here, low-status urban workers seek to express their traditional tribal solidarity but use prestige-creating European clothes—a sign of their recognition of the new rules in the status system. "Those who by virtue of their position in the community can command little prestige in everyday life, on Sundays don the symbols and outward marks of rank and display these in front of the admiring spectators at the dance arena." J. Clyde Mitchell, *The Kalela Dance: Aspects of Social Relationships among Urban Africans in Northern Rhodesia*, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No. 27 (Manchester 1956), 15. Also see his discussion of worker-management relations and tribalism, 33-34.

[61] "What appears to the outsider as backwardness can thus be seen as a rational response to an erratic market and exploitative credit and market mechanisms." Rhodes (fn. 29), 403.

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Culture contact alone is not a sufficient condition of culture change.[62] In the peasant villages of Asia and Latin America, where economic crises have hit *differentially*, the old institutions have weakened sufficiently to allow the outward-oriented forces to triumph. Once that point has been reached, the response of villagers depends on their economic position within the village.

The focus, in social science, on the individual in the process of change rather than on traditional institutions and people's relation to them, has led to a tendency to over-aggregate in studies of change.[63] Depending on their position in the village, there were some who welcomed the breakdown of the old and readily accepted the new patterns. But there were also some who were forced into patterns and institutions where they would remain weak and vulnerable. For them, syncretic change meant salvaging from the old institutions every bit of protection that they could.

[62] Based on the explanation presented in this article, one can speculate on the different reactions, by the peasants of Hualcan and Recuayhuanca, to their working experience on Peru's agricultural-industrial plantations. For those with resources to make outside alliances, there must have been a lessening of internal restraints as well as a sufficiently secure "outside" in which to risk participation. Two elements seem to be important. First, lacking highland grazing pastures, Recuayhuanca had much less agricultural potential than Hualcan. Second, Peru's caste system made upward mobility for Indians into creole or even mestizo society impossible. Thus, in the case of Hualcan, even with a high degree of culture contact those with adequate resources did not find a sufficiently hospitable and secure outside environment in which to invest and make alliances. The continuing viability of the Hualcan economy and prestige system may have made it the best place for an Indian to invest for prestige. Recuayhuanca's poverty and lack of agricultural potential, however, may have made investment for prestige there even less inviting than trying to break the larger societal caste barrier. There are interesting stories of how Indians in such cases adopt a mestizo self-identity, dress, etc., but are still considered lower-caste Indians by the mestizos themselves. Severe poverty, and a lack of viability of community institutions stemming from that poverty, may make even an inhospitable environment more attractive for those with resources to invest.

[63] See Burki's charges against sociologists and economists who studied Pakistan (fn. 58), 24 and *passim*.

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THE URGE TO COMPETE:

Rationales for Arms Racing

By COLIN S. GRAY*

Scope

THE contemporary arms-control community was born in the years 1958–1960, but now—thirteen years later—that community has still failed to confront its fundamental subject matter, arms competitions, in any systematic and rigorous fashion. Elsewhere, I have explored definitions, the ways in which an arms race could be analyzed, and arms-race strategies, outcomes, and dynamics.[1] Here, the cartographic exercise is extended so as to provide a systematic discussion of the fundamental question: Why do states race (or renew a race) in armaments?

The provision and illustration of a list of propositions should be superfluous after so many years of competitive endeavor in the nuclear age, but this is not the case. For example, the defenders and detractors of the package of agreements that emerged from the first phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) felt free to choose partial and exclusive explanations of Soviet behavior, with no more than a passing bow being accorded to less palatable possibilities.[2]

The Urge to Compete

Competitive armament may be a crime, as the *New York World* proclaimed on December 19, 1920,[3] but its prevalence in the interna-

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[1] "The Arms Race Phenomenon," *World Politics*, XXIV (October 1971), 39-79.

[2] Determined advocacy of a particular explanatory hypothesis should be disciplined by the realization that an arms race is waged for many reasons—by different parties, on both (or more) sides, of the competition. This article is in no sense intended to be policy-prescriptive. However, much of the analysis does run counter to what might be termed the present "orthodox wisdom" on arms control and deterrence theory. I believe that because systematic effort has not been expended by social scientists upon the arms race phenomenon, strong advocates of arms control have felt intellectually comfortable with arguments that really address only a small number of the propositions that pertain to motivation and are worthy of consideration. If aid and comfort is unintentionally given to "conservative" arguments on defense policy, then it is up to the "liberal" advocates—who do, after all, dominate public discussion—to broaden the intellectual base of their position.

[3] Cited in Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918–1922* (Princeton 1943; first pub. 1940), 117.

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tional politics of the twentieth century suggests that it is an instrument of policy which governments deem essential. The cause of international peace and security is not advanced by platitudes supported by much emotion. To be *for* arms control and disarmament does not excuse the analyst from investigating the motivation of those functionaries who seem to be resistant to obvious moral, economic, political, and military arguments.

Definitions of the term "arms race" are as rare as they tend to be unconvincing. In my previous article, I defined an arms race as a relationship in which "there should be two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a *rapid* rate and structuring their respective military postures with a *general* attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behavior of the other parties" (p. 40).

The demonology that surrounds the term is as unhelpful as the euphoric cloud that tends to settle around the idea of arms control. An arms race is not the worst of all possible worlds. For example, one obvious alternative to an arms race can be a situation wherein only one party is "racing." History is not unduly eloquent on the benefits to the general security of an imbalance of military power (though the character and foreign-policy aims of the state that is racing unilaterally clearly are crucial).

Given the propensity of human beings to err and occasionally to be less sane than the norm, and given the possibility that important items of technical equipment could malfunction disastrously, it could be argued—with many *caveats*—that an energetic race by the current superpowers to develop and deploy the means for effective defense would hold more promise for mankind than does the present multiplication of the instruments of mass destruction.

The aspirations of those who emphasize defense may be condemned to irrelevance by the technological and strategic ingenuity of defense communities compelled by the logic of weapons development (and by political prudence) to see where ideas for and of offensive use take them. However, there is a growing community of scholars as united in their fundamental concern—that the horrific possibilities *necessary* for the effectiveness of a system of mutual deterrence resting upon the reciprocal promise of assured destruction are unacceptable for the long term—as they are disunited on the means by which the present theology of mutual assured destruction may be overturned (heavy population antiballistic missile [ABM] defenses, revised targeting doctrines).[4] To

[4] One escape from the murderous implications of mutual assured destruction would

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these scholars, the arms race *per se* is no more the enemy than arms control, of almost any variety, is necessarily the answer.

An arms race may lead the competitors into more stable regions of military technology; arms control—if valued shortsightedly as an end in itself—may serve both to legitimize a weapons competition and to fuel one of its most important engines, research and development (and possibly deployment) in the region of technologies left uncovered by inter-state agreements. By way of illustration, one might refer to the cruiser competition in the period between the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty of 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930,[5] and to warhead technology and missile accuracy after SALT I.[6] A proposition concerning state behavior that is verifiable by reference to every major negotiating endeavor on the subject in the twentieth century is that the imminence of agreement stimulates competitive arming.

The prefatory thoughts submitted above suggest that a systematic

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be to stress the counterforce option. Such an option may or may not be linked with deliberate attempts of varying degrees of endeavor to ensure the sanctuary status of the urban civilian population. See Michael M. May, "Some Advantages of a Counterforce Deterrence," *Orbis*, XIV (Summer 1970), 271-83; Arthur Lee Burns, *Ethics and Deterrence: A Nuclear Balance Without Hostage Cities, Adelphi Papers*, No. 69 (London 1970); Bruce M. Russett, "Short of Nuclear Madness," *Worldview*, XV (April 1973), 31-37; and Edmund O. Stillman, "Civilian Sanctuary and Target Avoidance Policy in Thermonuclear War," in "How Wars End," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, No. 392 (November 1970), 116-32. Without straining the evidence too far, it may be noted that a functional alliance is being forged by the moderate Left and the moderate Right (both categories containing only small numbers of analysts active in the journal literature) against the large "muscular liberal" center, on the issue of deterrence theory and a desirable defense posture. The Left may deplore large-scale ABM deployment (because of the corporate "rip-off" that could be presumed to follow, and because arms are "bad"), but it agrees with those of the more conservative analysts who are highly critical of the criterion of assured destruction for an adequate deterrent. For example, the forceful assault on SALT I by Senator Buckley (New York) should touch a responsive chord in many analysts far to the left of center who also reject the idea that civilians *should* be hostages. For an example of Buckley's critique, see particularly U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, Hearings*, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington 1972), 256-71.

[5] On the cruiser competition of the 1920's, see Raymond G. O'Connor, *Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930* (Lawrence, Kansas 1962); Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars, I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919–1929* (London 1968); Hedley Bull, *Strategic Arms Limitation: The Precedent of the Washington and London Naval Treaties*, Occasional Paper, Center for Policy Study (Chicago 1971), particularly 14-18, 31. Bull notes (p. 31) that "the 1922 Treaty channelled competition into the field of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Within two years of its conclusion all signatories were laying down cruisers up to the maximum treaty limits, and in 1927–29 the Anglo-American cruiser race became a source of serious friction."

[6] On the consequences of SALT I, the data are, of course, still missing. However, all the evidence available thus far—supported by historical reflection—suggests that SALT I has encouraged the technological arms race. See Francis P. Hoeber, *SALT I: The Morning After*, RAND Corporation P-4867 (Santa Monica 1972).

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exploration of the motivations that are at the basis of the urge to compete is long overdue. As a contribution to understanding, this article offers seven non-exclusive propositions concerning the *why* of competitive armament.

(1) DETERRENCE: A STATE MAY ENGAGE IN AN ARMS RACE IN ORDER TO DETER INIMICAL MILITARY BEHAVIOR—A THREAT IS PERCEIVED.

Si vis pacem, para bellum. Systematic empirical investigation of the worth of this ancient maxim has revealed that it is not beyond challenge. Indeed, one important work has offered the following partial conclusion: "This study, like the parallel cross-cultural survey . . . , indicates that, in the very long run, preparation for war does not make peace more likely. It does not seem to make much difference either way; but, if it does make any difference at all, it is slightly in the direction of making war *more* likely than peace."[7] (Italics in original).

Studies such as that from which the above quotation derives are empirically suspect in the extreme; they offer no useful propositions on which any prudent politician would stake his reputation, life, and country.

Underlying this first proposition is the idea that a rational opponent (that is, one who is likely to assess the prospective costs and benefits of his activities) will be deterred from military adventure by prohibitively high losses. This notion is the very bedrock of contemporary deterrence theory and practice. In the form of a promise of assured destruction (the massacre of civilian hostages), this idea has been well expounded in the chilling prose of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. "In the case of the Soviet Union, I would judge that a capability on our part to destroy, say, one-fifth to one-fourth of her population would serve as an effective deterrent. Such a level of destruction would certainly represent intolerable punishment to any 20th-Century industrial nation."[8]

The doctrine of assured destruction presents a number of problems that have yet to penetrate the theoretical armor of many analysts. Not the least among these are the strictly military appraisal of military forces so encouraged, and the faith placed in (a) the rationality of adversaries, (b) the security of the command and control procedures of

[7] Raoul Naroll, "Deterrence in History," in Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder, eds., *Theory and Research on the Causes of War* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1969), 163.
[8] *The Fiscal Year 1969–73 Defense Program and the 1969 Defense Budget* (Washington 1968), 50.

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all present and future nuclear powers, and (c) the assurance that the indefinite future will be free of "disastrous accidents."

An arms race may be viewed as the best of a number of unattractive national policy options. Furthermore, an arms race may seem to require bearable costs only, may seem to yield no very obvious political disadvantages (such as tension spiralling to a point of spontaneous combustion into war), and may well seem more manageable over time. The learning curve of wise management of the arms race may not rise steadily, and certainly not exponentially, but it is reasonable to expect the competitors to gain some skill over time. The relevance of this first proposition to the present day is quite clear. Political competition between the superpowers, a shortage of powerful potential allies, entrenched bureaucratic interests, and a dynamic military technology would all seem to render a measure of military competition inevitable. On the evidence at hand, the nuclear arms race does not appear to be a prescription for an inevitable World War III, and the alternatives to sustained competition look distinctly unpromising.

The first proposition is silent on the nature of the competitive endeavor to be undertaken. Military competition may be for retaliation only, for some degree of reasonably assured defense, or for some mix of the range of possible counterforce options; all are sustainable under the umbrella proposition of *si vis pacem, para bellum.*

(2) DEFENSE: A STATE MAY ENGAGE IN AN ARMS RACE IN ORDER TO ATTAIN A MORE FAVORABLE OUTCOME IF WAR SHOULD OCCUR.

The few political scientists who have ventured into the field of arms-race analysis have tended to inquire whether arms races have caused or significantly contributed to the outbreak of war. Reversing the order of attention, the intriguing question arises as to whether—or to what degree—wars and rumors of wars precipitate and sustain arms races.[9] Estimates of the likelihood of armed conflict, rather than the anxieties created and sustained by arms competition, could well be the villain. Indeed, under some conditions, an arms race will *reduce* anxiety. It is certainly true that competitive sporting ardor with respect to battle cruisers or ICBM's may harmfully interdict the policy-making processes of the other side(s), thereby turning a possibility of war into a proba-

[9] This same thought has occurred to John Mueller: see Mueller, ed., *Approaches to Measurement in International Relations* (New York 1969), 11-12. Persuasive analysis along very similar lines may be found in Evan Luard, *Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System* (Boston 1968), 223.

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bility.[10] However, if war is perceived to be likely in the short- or medium-term future, energetic racing may well be the most prudent course of action. For this situation, one may postulate a strategic context wherein one party to a political conflict is believed to be beyond deterrence. Alternatively, all parties may realize that war is not merely a distinct likelihood, but that various degrees of "victory" should be obtainable—depending on the quantity and quality of weapons procured and the nerve of the political leaders, guided by an imaginative strategic doctrine.

There are a number of possible reasons why the "war and fear of war produces an arms race" line of investigation has been accorded less attention than its "arms races cause wars" counterpart. The most important of these is that arms races, to the extent that they have been studied at all, have tended to be studied by analysts who adhere to the conviction that because some arms races have been prominent correlates of a crisis slide[11] into war, endeavors at arms control should have some important impact upon the arms race nexus binding crises and wars.[12] Arms-control research and practice appears in a new, much

[10] The view that arms control both begins and (for most purposes) ends at home leads to the conclusion that transnational effort is required in order to "interdict" the policy-making processes of the racing states. Public focus upon the apparently endless sessions of the formal inter-state type at Geneva, Helsinki, or Vienna is really attention devoted to the "small change" of arms control. In this view, public policy and private endeavor should be directed toward the encouraging of "friendly" forces within the arena of domestic defense policy of the other side(s). The most comprehensive presentation of the need for and possible rewards of "political interdiction" is to be found in the writings of Franklyn Griffiths. See "Images, Politics, Arms Control: Aspects and Implications of Postwar Soviet Policy Toward the United States," unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Columbia University 1972), esp. 484-509; "The Political Side of Disarmament," *International Journal*, XXII (Spring 1967), 293-305; and "Transnational Politics and Arms Control," *International Journal*, XXVI (Autumn 1971), 640-74. The arms control community would do well to focus its analytical attention upon an area of analysis created by a fusion of bureaucratic political and transnational participatory interests. Illustrative of the lacunae in the past (and present) study of arms control are the following two statements: "[I]t is common in seeking arms limitations to find that neither side really has any deep understanding of the motivations of the opposing bureaucracy" (Jeremy Stone, *Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitations through Dialogue* [New York 1967], 15); "Each power is aware that its actions have some impact within the other systems, and speculation about the nature of that impact is an unspoken—or seldom spoken—question in the decision-making processes of presumably both Moscow and Washington. But, to judge by the public evidence, this question has relatively little effect upon policy. . . ." (Lawrence T. Caldwell, *Soviet Attitudes to SALT, Adelphi Papers*, No. 75 [London 1971]).

[11] The term "crisis slide" is borrowed from Coral Bell, *Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management* (London 1971), 14-15. Dr. Bell identifies "crisis slides" in the periods 1936–39 and 1906–14. Of more immediate relevance, the author seeks to explain why such a slide has not occurred since 1945.

[12] The fact that a particular arms race ends in war *proves* nothing (except possibly that the competitors may well have been wise to seek to improve their relative military postures). Drawing up a list of arms races and identifying those which had war as an "outcome" has so far not proved to be a very valuable exercise. Balanced, though brief,

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more negative light if it is true that states very often race in armaments because they fear war.

This second proposition merely suggests that states will race in order to be as well prepared as possible for a war that is believed to be imminent. A "rational actor" assumption such as, "a state will go to war because it believes it will win," is pure historical fiction.[13] The political leadership of a state may choose to fight because it feels that it has no better alternative, or—as Fred Iklé has persuasively argued—a state may elect to wage war without having given significant attention to events beyond the initial phase (for example, Germany in 1939 and 1940, Japan in 1941).[14]

Soviet adherence to the implications of proposition (2) has been widely and roundly denounced in Western arms-control circles.[15] However, there is the beginning of a school of thought in the United States which holds that to race, walk, or crawl in armaments at a speed and in modes directed solely by the standard tenets of mutual deterrence through assured destruction is profoundly irresponsible.[16] Deter-

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commentaries upon the connection between arms races and war are in Michael Nicholson, *Conflict Analysis* (London 1970), esp. 133-36; and Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (London 1973), 135-41. The listing of arms races most often reproduced is that of Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Pre-Requisites and Results," in Carl S. Friedrich and Seymour G. Harris, eds., *Public Policy, 1958* (Cambridge, Mass. 1958), 43. Mueller (fn. 9, p. 12) has taken Huntington to task for contending that Anglo-German naval rivalry ended in 1912 and thereby indicating a "non-war" outcome, whereas a good argument could be made for extending this competition, for purposes of analysis, to 1914.

[13] One may argue that in 1914 the political leaders of each of the major continental powers expected their side to win. It is, however, a considerable analytical leap to assert that those leaders went to war *because* they thought they would be victorious.

[14] *Every War Must End* (New York 1971), esp. 2-8. "Since war plans tend to cover only the first act, the national leadership, in opting for war, will in fact be choosing a plan without an ending" (p. 8).

[15] The acceptance by well-meaning American arms controllers of a *mission civilisatrice* in strategic theory has led to profound disappointment and to the erection of a barrier to the views of strategists from other cultures, defending different interests. See William T. Lee, "The 'Politico-Military-Industrial Complex' of the USSR," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXVI, No. 1 (1972), 73-86. "If we would listen to what the Soviets are saying, cease to lecture them and to belittle their achievements as only emulations of earlier U.S. developments, we might even learn something about strategy and force development in the nuclear age" (p. 86).

[16] Comprehensive justification for granting first call on United States resources for strategic forces to the assured-destruction mission may be found in McNamara (fn. 8), 41-54, 56-61; also, Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969* (New York 1971), 165-242. In the 1960's the criterion of assured destruction did provide a bureaucratically exploitable "yardstick of sufficiency" (the title of Chapter 6 in Enthoven and Smith): 400 one-megaton equivalents were deemed to be "sufficient," from the perspective of economic theory, but the theory has foundered upon the political rocks of both domestic defense politics and inter-state competition. The operation of the law of diminishing returns (to effort) is demonstrated in the Table in Enthoven and Smith, 207.

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rence is certainly preferable to defense, provided there is no prospect of situations developing wherein (a) deterrence might fail; (b) deterrence would be irrelevant; or (c) some flexibility of use with regard to strategic forces would be desirable.[17]

The arms-control community has tended to stress only two of the three fundamental duties of arms control: namely, to reduce the risk of the outbreak of war and to reduce the burden of peacetime military preparation. The third duty is to seek to reduce the damage that would be caused if war should occur. The active and passive defense of population and the provision of a range of counterforce targeting options may be denounced as measures preparatory to waging war; but they may also be embraced as ways in which many millions of civilian lives might be saved.

Unfortunately it is true not merely that intentions are often inferred from capabilities, but also that a prudential implementation of the minimax principle in strategic preparation may be assumed to encourage a shift in foreign policy intention. The minimax criterion holds that one should employ a strategy that seeks the maximum gain consistent with the minimization of potential loss; in other words, one should seek the best of the worst. Arms-race activity for deterrent effect alone violates this principle in fundamental fashion. If the system of mutual deterrence through assured destruction were to fail, one could be held to an unlimited liability.

In the brief discussion of proposition (2) I have sought to argue that preparation for war is no more evidence of a *desire* to wage war than is the production and filing of contingency plans. Therefore, one perspective that must be admitted in any analysis of why states compete in armaments is simply that war could occur.

(3) DIPLOMACY: A STATE MAY ENGAGE IN AN ARMS RACE IN ORDER TO INCREASE ITS DIPLOMATIC WEIGHT.

Arms races have been and are run between states that have neither the desire to submit their inventories to the test of battle, nor the expectation that events are likely to impose such an empirical test of relative strategic weight upon them. A commentator obsessed with the notion that an arms race signifies a condition wherein the future probability of war is widely accepted would profoundly misread much of

[17] President Nixon has expressed a desire for just such a flexibility in *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace*, Report to the Congress (Washington, February 25, 1971). "I must not be—and my successors must not be—limited to the indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians as the sole possible response to challenges" (p. 58).

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the data of weapons competitions in the twentieth century. The contemporary arms race between the superpowers is not a competition for the acquisition of an arsenal that would guarantee victory. Rather, the analyst must explore the diplomatic and domestic bureaucratic meanings widely believed—though not by many arms-control experts[18]—to be attached to different states of strategic balance.

A crucial distinction must be made in the examination of the translation of military might into political influence. First, armed forces may serve as an instrument of foreign policy by means of their coercive potential. Armed forces serve many functions; prominent among them is the duty to effect a beneficent change in the calculations of an adversary—preferably before extensive damage has been wreaked upon domestic or foreign allied values. Hence, it could be and has been argued that the strategic forces of the United States have lent weight to United States diplomacy in that—until very recently—they could deliver a fair prospect of intra-war deterrence. A central disarming blow of a limited nature against the Soviet Union could leave the Soviet Union with no strategic option short of initiating a city exchange.[19] Some counterforce capability does *not* yield an option to disarm, but it does promise to make most unenviable the decision on how, if at all, to respond.

The second meaning that attaches to diplomatic weight is to the effect that a state should obtain a measure of political consideration not unrelated to its relative strategic capability. Militarily meaningless weapons are significant politically if political leaders believe them to be important. To race successfully for a state of balance identifiable as parity or "parity-plus" may reflect a bid to attain an inventory believed appropriate to one's self-esteem or *hubris* rather than any desire to impose a *pax ballistica*. But an increase in self-regard is very likely to be accompanied by the conviction that others should share, or be induced to share, in a *common* assessment of one's enhanced status.

Protracted neglect of proposition (3) by the leadership of the Johnson Administration and by the arms-control community at large resulted

[18] See the testimony of Paul C. Warnke in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, *National Security Policy and the Changing World Power Alignment, Hearing-Symposium*, 92nd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington 1972), 108.

[19] With the United States occupying the role of defender "with a civilian target only" option, William Van Cleave has outlined a scenario with implications critical of SALT I; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Hearings*, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington 1972), 578-79.

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in the degree of surprise and extended alarm occasioned by the momentum in the deployment of Soviet strategic forces after 1965. The arms race is, among other things, an exercise in symbolic politics. An arms race may be viewed as a substitute for war. Accordingly, the sense of the logic impelling stockpile acquisition should not be judged solely, or even very significantly, in terms appropriate to an assessment of the likely outcome if war were to occur. An arms race may be approached as a manipulable instrument of foreign policy in peacetime, as well as being a preparation for possible armed conflict.

(4) THE FUNCTIONAL "THREAT": A STATE MAY ENGAGE IN AN ARMS RACE BECAUSE AN EXTERNAL "PACER" OF MILITARY ENDEAVOR IS BOTH CONVENIENT AND NECESSARY TO THE RACING "AGENTS."

This interpretation of the urge to compete is very close to the central tenets of the paradigm of bureaucratic politics.[20] Essentially, domestic institutions seeking to maintain or enlarge their budgetary and influence bases need to enlist or harness the functional hostility of an external rival. If an enemy (or, preferably, enemies) cannot be specified, if graphs of extrapolated enemy capabilities cannot be produced, then it is a little difficult to insist upon improvement in weapons, or system replacement, let alone quantitative increase. General references to an uncertain future tend not to be persuasive to budget officials or to politicians insistent upon there being specific dangers against which a defense effort must be provided.

From the point of view of institutional health, the armed forces are organizations in search of external enemies so as to overwhelm domestic enemies.[21] A good example of this has been offered by Perry Smith in his analysis of the postwar planning conducted in 1943–45 by the United States Army Air Force (AAF). The Soviet Union was specifically identified as a future enemy for the first time by AAF planners

[20] The most fully developed exercises in an analysis of bureaucratic politics are by Morton H. Halperin: see *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, unpub., The Brookings Institution (Washington 1972); and "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration," *World Politics*, XXV (October 1972), 62-95.

[21] For the various agencies of the United States Department of Defense, the Soviet Union (at present) provides a general legitimizing function for the *real* contest: between "sister services," with the Office of Management and the Budget, etc. That *the strategic arms race* is really a form of analytical shorthand for both international and transnational arms-race systems has long been appreciated—in principle. For example, in his foreword to Donald G. Brennan, *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security* (New York 1961), Jerome Wiesner writes: "One of the most ironic aspects of the situation in which the United States and the Soviet Union find themselves is that each is running an arms race with itself" (p. 14).

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on January 14, 1945: "the problem of post-war enemies was solved by identifying Russia as the one long-range post-war threat, based on its assumed airpower capability. Apparently, enemies were to be identified on the basis of what states had large air forces or might be expected to develop them."[22]

It is important to recognize that Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Zumwalt, for example, are in vital functional alliance against domestic interests which argue for lower levels of defense expenditures and for a more benign interpretation of the forward naval deployment of the other side.[23] However, one cannot reasonably dismiss the Soviet-American arms race as being sustained solely by the complementary interests of parallel organizations in the two countries. Because an arms-race adversary is helpful in the promotion of fleet replacement or augmentation, it neither follows that there are indeed no adversary capabilities worth marking or offsetting, nor that adversary capabilities would assuredly decline if the arms race were to slacken.[24]

Elsewhere, I have advanced the proposition that the alleged driving mechanism of the arms race, widely labelled "action-reaction," is descriptive of a general condition, but does not proffer any specific explanation.[25] Of recent years, this proposition has come to be accepted by individuals of such different opinions as Dr. John Foster and Professor Abram Chayes.[26] The definition offered at the beginning of this article refers only to a "general attention" being paid to the military and political developments of the adversary. The external *pacer* of competitive effort does not dictate any direct or specific response. Eliz-

[22] Perry McCoy Smith, *The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943–1945* (Baltimore 1970), 69; also see 51-53.

[23] Soviet-American naval interaction has been a subject covered only very sparsely in the literature. An excellent recent review of the various schools of thought concerning, for example, the question of whether Soviet naval deployment of an increasingly forward character is reflective of essentially strategic defensive requirements, or whether it betokens a bid for attainment of a blue-water fleet for the open ocean, is in Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States and its Influence on Soviet Naval Development*, RAND Corporation P-4913 (Santa Monica 1972).

[24] This last point may be true, but it rests upon assumptions concerning the working of the adversary's defense bureaucracy that may not be sound. Attention, in the contemporary context, is at last beginning to be focused upon this problem. See Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr., *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race* (New York 1972).

[25] Fn. 1, 71-78.

[26] For Foster's critique of the dominant action-reaction model, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, *Arms Control Implications of Current Defense Budget, Hearings*, 92nd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington 1971), 46-47. Abram Chayes' analysis is in "An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements," *Harvard Law Review*, LXXXV (March 1972), 910-19.

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abeth Young's felicitous identification of a "ripening plum" syndrome provides greater illumination on decisions respecting the deployment of a weapon system than do efforts to trace the tortuous paths of strategic *yin* and *yang*.[27]

A "bureaucratic political" scalpel for surgery upon the anatomy of strategic competition, if applied very rigorously, is likely to prove distorting and is unlikely to advance knowledge very far beyond a general sensitizing of the defense community to the fact that *the adversary* does comprise a wide variety of interests that are often opposed to each other. The distinctively American weaknesses in the paradigm of bureaucratic politics have yet to be accorded their full due.[28] Writings on bureaucratic politics, pro and con, are pre-eminently American contributions to the understanding of foreign policy behavior.

In the Anglo-Saxon tradition in foreign policy, defenses are not prepared in accordance with the general precept of prudence; instead, the expenditure of the taxpayer's money must be justified, and justifiable, in terms of a specific threat. Large-scale military preparations are deemed incompatible with *peace*—unless, that is, a fairly proximate danger of war is retailable to a sceptical Cabinet and Legislature.

From the point of view of convenience, it is extremely difficult to design and deploy weapon systems unless some prior decision (even if only for reasons of administrative rationality) has been taken as to the identity and nature of the adversary—and, preferably, of the proba-

[27] *A Farewell to Arms Control?* (London 1972), 195. Mrs. Young's incisive book should make bitter reading for many of America's leading arms controllers. Cries of *mea culpa* are perhaps better late than never, but the most vociferous and apparently tireless critics of, for example, the Safeguard ABM system, were precisely those individuals most closely associated—in both executive and advisory positions—with the Administrations that put the United States' arms-race effort into very high gear in the early and mid-1960's. Herbert York's excellent book, *Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race* (New York 1970), epitomizes the dilemma of the sympathetic reader. "What took you so long?" is not an unfair question to ask. Mrs. Young has been so unkind as to state that "the Kennedy academics stood fast against their President's Minuteman purchase of 1961 by opposing Nixon's Safeguard purchase of 1969" (p. 221).

[28] Even if bureaucracies do function according to similar laws at different times and places, not all bureaucracies are as open to Cartesian investigation as is the bureaucracy in Washington, D.C. Hence the quality of the analysis is certain to vary to a degree that is fatal to confidence in the conclusions, should a hopeful analyst seek to crack open the games played by arms-racing bureaucrats in different capital cities. Also, the amount of "baronial power" enjoyed by department heads and chairmen of congressional committees is unlikely to be reflected in different structures of government—particularly those with a more directive form of political leadership. Indeed, it is very possible that the degree of bureaucratic freedom (to play games for subnational stakes) suggested by the "bureaucratic politics paradigm" has been exaggerated.

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ble field of combat.[29] These elementary truths do not explain why a state elects to compete in armaments, but they do illustrate how it is that the identification of an adversary is supported and possibly sustained by the administrative and political necessities of interested domestic organizations.

(5) VESTED INTERESTS: A STATE MAY ENGAGE IN AN ARMS RACE BECAUSE ITS DEFENSE POLICY IS ESSENTIALLY THE CAPTIVE OF DOMESTIC INDUSTRIAL, BUREAUCRATIC (OFFICIAL), AND LEGISLATIVE INTERESTS—ALL OF WHICH SHARE IN THE SPOILS OF A HIGH RATE OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURE, AND ALL OF WHICH THEREFORE NEED AN EXTERNAL THREAT.

Competitions in armaments do create vast domestic constituencies for a high level of defense expenditure. Two illustrations are here offered; temporally they are over sixty years apart, but in political meaning they are identical. In 1896, at the Cutlers' Feast in Sheffield, Mr. Balfour stated that "Sheffield lives by the Navy, more or less."[30] In a work published in 1969, the following familiar sentiment was quoted from Mr. Edward J. Lefevre, vice-president of General Dynamics: "Our future planning is based on visible contracts. One must believe in the long-term threat."[31]

Analyses of the military-industrial complexes of the Soviet Union and particularly of the United States have abounded in recent years.[32]

[29] Discussion of the desirable relation of forces to be maintained vis-à-vis useful *pacing* states is a prominent feature of the defense politics (or at least of the rhetoric offered in partisan debate) of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, as the recent debate in the United States has demonstrated, a variety of "numbers games" may be played with (at least) two far from homogeneous strategic arsenals. The classic example of the fixed standard of military strength was the two-power standard, formally enshrined for the Royal Navy in the Naval Defence Act of 1889. The timeless flavor of debates concerned with the maintenance of a fixed relationship of strength to one or several external "pacers" may be savored in Arthur J. Marder, *The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880–1905* (Hamden, Conn. 1964; first pub. 1940), 105-16; E. L. Woodward, *Great Britain and the German Navy* (London 1964; first pub. 1935), 455-73.

[30] Marder (fn. 29), 31.

[31] In Abram Chayes and Jerome Wiesner, eds., *ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile System* (New York 1969), 145.

[32] On the Soviet Military-Industrial Complex, see Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex—Does it Exist?" *Journal of International Affairs*, XXVI, No. 1 (1972), 1-28; and Lee (fn. 15). Military-industrial complexities in the United States may be approached through such committed yet informative works as Richard J. Barnet, *The Economy of Death* (New York 1969); and Seymour Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War* (New York 1970). For an intelligent critique of this literature, see Stephen J. Cimbala, "New Myths and Old Realities: Defense and its Critics," *World Politics*, XXIV (October 1971), 127-57. The lack of novelty in recent studies is easily demonstrated by reference to the "merchants-of-death" controversies

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These analyses have demonstrated the rather obvious fact that defense is an essential business for individual corporations and for some States of the Union (for example, Georgia and California), and—in the words of an earlier era—"Warship-building means bread to the workingman."[33] What has not been demonstrated is the validity of either of the following crucial propositions: that an arms race has been initiated, or renewed, because of the economic spoils created thereby, or that the prospects for the termination of an arms race have been fatally compromised by the activities of domestic interests determined to maintain the momentum of military preparedness for reasons of economic gain. Nor has any convincing evidence been produced that would lead to the conclusion that the "merchants of death" or the military-industrial complex have been a critical factor in any decision for war. Man is no more a rational economic than a rational strategic animal.

Recent probings of the political economy of war or Pentagon capitalism have been of great value. Graft, inefficiency, and monopoly practices have plagued the defense effort of the United States over the past two decades, but the important question is, what influence have these demonstrated malpractices had upon arms-race (mis)management?

The forging of a domestic consensus for a particular arms-control agreement is, as Abram Chayes has convincingly demonstrated,[34] a long, arduous process. The bureaucratic histories of the SALT I exercise, when and if they are written, will no doubt sustain this argument. Contrary to the implications of Graham Allison's Models II and III (foreign policy behavior may be explained as, respectively, the outcome of organizational processes and the resultant of bureaucratic politics), the forging of a bureaucratic consensus for SALT I, or indeed for the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, demonstrates the "clout" that may be wielded by a determined political leadership.

It should be noted that the "national-security managers" are subject to some role conflict. "Engine Charlie" Wilson notwithstanding, the interests of Litton Industries are, in a different era, not necessarily the interests of the United States Department of Defense. Signals and indices received from the external environment, reinforced by very dis-

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of a previous generation—*plus ça change*. . . . See H. C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen, *Merchants of Death* (New York 1934); and George Seldes, *Iron, Blood and Profits: An Exposure of the Munitions Racket* (New York 1934). For useful recent comment, see Clive Trebilcock, "Legends of the British Armament Industry 1890–1914: A Revision," *Journal of Contemporary History*, v, No. 4 (1970), 3-19; and Robert H. Ferrell, "The Merchants of Death, Then and Now," *Journal of International Affairs*, xxvi, No. 1 (1972), 29-39.

[33] Marder (fn. 29), 30.

[34] Chayes (fn. 26), 919-35.

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tinct institutional interests—and possibly diluted by a personal interest in staying "on the President's team"—will reduce the inclinations of an individual officeholder (role-player) to represent the economic interests whence he came, and whither he intends to return.

Here again, a limited focus besets an American analyst of arms races. Only in the United States is a prominent corporate executive able to perform a temporary public duty by serving in high government office.[35] Other political cultures require an aspiring manager of the nation's security to serve as a bureaucratic *apparatchik* or a lowly backbencher prior to his assumption of office. American arms-race experience is an example of, but not synonymous with, arms-race experience *per se*.

This strain of analysis tends to explain the detail, but not the shape of the broad canvas of arms-race behavior. Graham Allison has sought to remind analysts that "[w]here you stand depends on where you sit."[36] But where does a man sit who is, for example—currently—Deputy Secretary for Defense, but who was—until yesterday—an executive vice president of a major corporation dependent upon defense contracts for its existence, and who expects to return to "private" life after two years at the most?

In no arms race that I have studied thus far, has a (functionally interdicting) military-industrial complex significantly determined the initiation, the conduct, or the termination of a race. It is beyond dispute that an arms race which is gathering momentum also acquires growing domestic constituencies. What is not beyond dispute is that an arms race is conducted by the economically and (narrowly) politically "interested," along lines profitable to those interests, without due attention being paid to the full complexity of variable clusters that must be considered.

According to the paradigm of bureaucratic politics, "by their interests shall ye know them." However, the ABM Treaty of 1972 is a little difficult to explain by this paradigm, given "the cast of thousands" known to be interested in Safeguard and Hardsite in the United States, and given a Soviet military-industrial complex numbering approximately ten million in direct employment.[37] Analysts of Soviet policy making on the ABM must cope not merely with the cluster of ministries in the defense-industrial sector of the economy, but also with a long-standing doctrinal predilection for a force mix of a bal-

[35] It is not implied here that vested interests are not in existence everywhere. However, some structures of government facilitate "exploitable access" to special-interest pleadings to a greater degree than others do.

[36] *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston 1971), 176.

[37] This estimate of the "total number of Russians directly engaged in running and supporting the Soviet military-industrial complex" is provided in Lee (fn. 15), 75.

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anced offense-defense nature. Proposition (5) would seem to have a strictly limited explanatory utility.

The validity of this proposition is both supported and subverted by the record of SALT. It is true that SALT I has not braked the strategic arms race, and SALT II is not seriously expected to. Meanwhile, protracted negotiations offer a whole new range of arguments to those interested in maximum preparedness. Aside from arguments such as "ripening plum" (the logical next step), normal replacement, product improvement, and "countering enemy threat [capabilities]," a whole variety of strongholds of assertion of the "bargaining chip" type are erected around weapon systems already deployed or under development. The "assurances" required by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff for their endorsement of SALT I could be (and have been) held to be subversive of the entire SALT exercise, thereby illustrating the validity of proposition (5).[38]

Although the record on arms control since 1945 is of inconsequential achievement in braking or reversing the numerous interlocking competitions that are collectively termed the nuclear arms race,[39] the systemic perspective for weapons management yielded by arms-control approaches has certainly taken root in the United States Government. The 1920's and 1930's offer evidence of the lack of validity of proposition (5). The parity agreements on capital ships and cruisers at Washington and London (1922 and 1930 respectively) were opposed by many of the domestic naval and industrial interests within all signatory states, but they were signed.[40] The "merchants of death" were not in control of public policy.

[38] The three "assurances" may be located in U.S. Congress, *Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements* (fn. 4), 69-70. Senator Fulbright's concern (expressed for example on p. 71) is easily comprehended, considering such provisions as: "*Assurance II*—'Aggressive Improvements and Modernization Programs.' Maximize strategic capabilities within the constraints established by the ABM Treaty and the interim offensive agreement. Plan for rapid augmentation of strategic forces beyond the constraints of the treaty and agreements to be made in the event of abrogation, withdrawal, or collapse of negotiations. *Assurance III*—'Vigorous Research and Development Programs.' Maintain weapons systems technological superiority" (p. 70).

[39] Incredible though it may seem, no case study exists of the Soviet-American arms race, its structure, development, and dynamic functioning.

[40] The SALT parallel is a compelling one. For example, two commentators upon the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty have stated, "Professional naval opinion among the signatory nations unanimously condemned the Five-Power Naval Treaty. Almost as one, these naval officers concluded that their nations' interests, honor or military security had been sacrificed by politicians in quest of a popular delusion—peace through disarmament." Richard Dean Burns and Donald Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements Between the World Wars, 1919–1939*, Vol. III, *Limitation of Sea Power*, ACDA/RS-55 (Washington 1968), 65.

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It could be argued that since 1945, disarmament proposals have never seriously threatened vested industrial and service interests. The so-called arms-control measures, beginning in the late 1950's with the Antarctica Treaty through to SALT I, have really been measures to support the process of détente. Important challenges to the makers of strategic weapons have stemmed neither from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency nor from the Harvard-M.I.T. Arms-Control Seminar (now defunct). The former proved to be anything but a bureaucratic lion, while the latter did not provide a forum for the advocacy of drastic disarmament (such a proposal was scorned in the arms-control literature of the 1960's).[41] It is only to be expected that the armed services, the weapons makers, and some legislators will defend their interests. What analysts have yet to demonstrate for the contemporary (or any other) period is that opportunities for a reversal of the arms race have been subverted by self-interested groups. Strict adherence to the presumed spirit of self-restraint required for the success of a treaty régime —an argument very familiar from the 1920's and 1930's and now central to policy debate over the question of how the United States should conduct its defense policy in support of SALT II—is very unlikely to be effective with arms-race adversaries competing along autonomous though roughly parallel paths.

Shorn of its conspiratorial implication, proposition (5) is a partial truth, relevant to all arms-race activity. There are vast interests served by an arms competition, and very often a coalition of these interests will win bureaucratic victories (and hence capture the government, in a functional sense, for a limited period, over a particular issue). But guilt by association must be eschewed. Because a missile-maker advocates the contemporary version of an arms-race strategy requiring the laying down of "two keels for one," it does not follow that his argument is invalid. There are no disinterested voices speaking on national security. Arms controllers may be convinced that they represent virtue or the world at large but, at least in bureaucratic terms, they have a vested interest in arms control that is as potentially subverting of balanced analysis as are the pleas for more missiles by corporation executives.

[41] For an impressive example, see Arnold Wolfers and others, *The United States in a Disarmed World* (Baltimore 1966). Indeed, the principal thrust of the "new" arms-control thinking of the late 1950's and early 1960's was that arms control was to be thought of as an adjunct, rather than as a competitor, to national defense policy. For the classic statement of this position, see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York 1961). Unfortunately, in the 1960's strategy has been recorded in plenty, but arms control to only a marginal degree.

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(6) REPUTATION: A STATE MAY ENGAGE IN AN ARMS RACE IN ORDER TO PRESERVE OR ENHANCE THE MEASURE OF DIGNITY OR PRESTIGE IT DEEMS APPROPRIATE (OR ESSENTIAL).

In contrast to proposition (3), which argued that a state may race for the diplomatic leverage it believes to be yielded by greater relative military weight, proposition (6) maintains that a state may race in part for the sake of its reputation. It is here presumed that war is not anticipated to be likely, and military power is not intended to serve any very precise diplomatic ends. The armed forces do not serve the state only as instruments of defense, deterrence, or national development; they also serve (in the eyes of others), to identify the state's estimate of its relative standing in the world.[42]

The legitimacy of different modes of reasoning supportive of requests for defense expenditure is subject to alteration over time. For example, a United States Secretary of Defense would today invite derision if he argued that the United States needed a particular weapon system "for the general purposes of her greatness," a rationale for the luxury of a high-seas fleet offered by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in Wilhelminian Germany of 1912.[43] In a strategic theoretical climate dominated by the idea of "sufficiency"—rationalized essentially as sufficiency for assured destruction plus insurance—individuals and organizations have to be extremely careful to clothe any personal desires they may have for the United States to be *first*, for no clear and specific strategic reason, in garments of familiar and acceptable strategic logic. Many analysts who are devotees of the theory of assured destruction would admit that appearances are reality and must be taken seriously—if adversaries are likely to believe that gross asymmetries in military postures have military or diplomatic meaning.[44]

[42] The arguments of prestige or self-esteem (and, more dangerously, the esteem expected to be accorded by third parties) are frequently scorned by states in competition with adversaries who are believed to be partially motivated by them. In the early 1900's, and from 1918 to 1922 (and possibly to 1930), Great Britain accepted the fact that its principal contemporary rivals (Germany and the United States, respectively) had no immediate belligerent intent. But in British eyes the bids (or apparent bids) for naval supremacy were reflective of general expansionist desires and could easily become serious security threats. After all, the distinction between a "prestige" and a "fighting" fleet is not easily drawn. In British perspective, the German naval challenge was frivolous, because it stood no prospect of success; the challenge of the United States after 1918 was frivolous because it was not reflective of an American interest that required a navy equal to that of Great Britain. The reaction of British authorities provides eloquent proof of the sensitivity of a leading power to challenges primarily significant in terms of prestige.

[43] Quoted in Woodward (fn. 29), 10.

[44] For examples of advocates of the assured-destruction theory paying some very limited attention to the question of appearances, see U.S. Congress, *Military Implications* . . . (fn. 19), 211 (Jerome Kahan), and 302 (George Rathjens).

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A belief in proposition (6)—that armaments yield satisfactions worth purchasing for the good of national morale—will often be expounded in terms of proposition (3): that a rise in position on the measurable hierarchy of military capabilities will yield political gain. It is nearly impossible to separate the two propositions with any assurance of precision. As temporary guardians of the state's values, officeholders do not wish to preside over a slippage in the international rank of their country.

The degree of greatness believed to pertain to a particular state-actor is not dependent upon the quantity and quality of its artistic life (past or present) or of its achievements, for example, in the field of medical science. Military capabilities may not be a sufficient basis for judging between respective national reputations, but they are a necessary one. By common consent, a great power must be a great military power. In the 1970's, a superpower must—as a symbol of its status—maintain at least one of the sites for the token ABM deployments permitted under SALT I.[45] Great powers today, including barely great powers, almost lapsed great powers, and aspiring superpowers, must also be nuclear powers. The congruence of the five nuclear powers and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council is more than a coincidence. Statesmen are strongly motivated to race so as not to be thought inferior to the group of state-actors that serve as the prestige reference group.

Prestige weapons may be camouflaged by reasons of strategy. For example, in the 1920's and 1930's, Italy's persistent demand for parity with France in naval armaments was, from the point of view of France, offensive to her national honor and a strategic absurdity, given France's separate coastlines, her far-flung colonies and, eventually, her specific concern with German naval rearmament.[46] Franco-Italian competition, however half-hearted, had repercussions upon British naval building programs (geared, in part, to a two-power standard in Europe),[47]

[45] The entry fee to a particular international rank is established by the power or powers already enjoying that rank. The much-advertised new global reach of Soviet maritime capabilities was a requirement for a continental (really a regional great) power to bid seriously for the status of a world superpower. On the meaning of great-power status, see Michael Howard, *Studies in War and Peace* (London 1970), 254-55. The standard definition is a power capable of standing alone against any other great power.

[46] See Burns and Urquidi (fn. 40), 55-56, 63-65, 105-11, 156-64.

[47] The refusal of France to accept Part III of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 led Italy to follow suit. This refusal also encouraged Great Britain to insist upon (and the United States to accept) the inclusion of an escalator clause, permitting the High Contracting Parties to increase their naval construction so as to counterbalance construction underway in countries not signatory to the treaty. For the details surrounding the London Naval Conference, see O'Connor (fn. 5).

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which in turn influenced the building programs of the United States and Japan. Italy's protestations of a strategic character were widely appreciated to be the legitimate arguments shrouding a concern for national honor, dignity, and reputation. Jet, and particularly supersonic jet, interceptor "crawls" in Latin America in the 1960's may similarly be attributable more to considerations of national honor—or "emulate my neighbor" (as well as to civil-military and more generally bureaucratic politics)—than to considerations of national defense. A concern with national honor or national self-esteem can prove to be an expensive state of mind.

The sophistication of contemporary strategic analysis in the United States, and its growth in the Soviet Union, complemented by problems of allocation of critical resources, by healthy bureaucratic diversity, and by the relative openness (in the United States) of the policy process, ensures that quantitative or qualitative considerations which are not strategically relevant are inadvisable as key arguments in debate. Given the prevailing doctrine of mutual deterrence enshrined in SALT I, and given the acceptance of a rough equality by an assessment of all factors making for relative strategic value, the advocacy of an "ICBM force, first and forever superior" would be beyond the boundary of the acceptable. Senator Jackson was widely considered to have stepped beyond the legitimate bounds of rational strategic debate when, in his amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 241, he urged the President to accept for SALT II "a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union."[48] The Senator was accused of reducing the sophisticated reasoning of deterrence theory to a crude numbers game.[49] A quantitatively inferior but qualitatively superior weapons inventory would, in the view of unsympathetic commentators, provide an appropriate level of honor, dignity, and prestige to the United States.[50] These relative judgments were actually of little (if any) sig-

[48] U.S. Congress, Senate, *S. J. Res. 241, Amendment No. 1406*, Calendar No. 929, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, August 7, 1972). Press coverage of SALT in August and September 1972 was dominated by the Jackson Amendment. For examples, see the *New York Times*, August 10, 1972, p. 10, and September 15, pp. 1, 11.

[49] The Jackson Amendment could provide material for many scholarly analyses of strategic debate and defense politics. Thus far, however, no such analyses have appeared. For a reasonable defense of the Senator's position, see Amoretta Hoeber and David McGarvey, "Jackson Amendment and SALT II," *Washington Post*, November 30, 1972.

[50] The viability of a comparative analysis of arms races is illustrated by reference to the following comment upon the Washington Conference, offered by Burns and Urquidi (fn. 40), 31: "The British Empire's larger number of ships and greater tonnage was off-set by American qualitative superiority." For the view that comparisons be-

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nificance, because the United States had and would maintain "sufficient" weapons to devastate the Soviet Union. The prestige proposition was a fairly strong undercurrent in Senator Jackson's exposition of his views, but he and his supporters did not employ a pure sporting analogy in their arguments. They did not contend that the United States should be first, or at least *primus inter pares*, simply because it feels good to win—and Americans are a very competitive people. Motivations of prestige or self-esteem may not always be prominent upon an arms-race landscape, but they are nearly always present to some degree.

(7) TECHNOLOGY: A STATE MAY ENGAGE IN AN ARMS RACE BECAUSE A RAPID SUCCESSION OF GENERATIONS OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES ENSURES BLOC OBSOLESCENCE IF A UNILATERAL SLACKENING OF QUALITATIVE EFFORT IS NOT RECIPROCATED ABROAD.

As Bernard Brodie has suggested in the case of the late nineteenth century, it may be argued that, during periods of particularly rapid technological change, it is wise to allow a weapons competition to run its course, unhindered by limitations that must, of necessity, be only partial.[51] Each competing power would be free to pursue whichever technologies it desired, with its rivals perceiving the new developments in time to take any offsetting measures they deemed essential. In the nineteenth century, secrecy was not imposed on naval building;[52] in the 1970's, to suggest a limited parallel, unilateral means of gathering intelligence would give adequate warning time for an appropriate response.[53] Treaty making certainly creates a considerable commitment by the participants in the process, but the rigidities, the problems of third parties, and the political consequences of possible regime breakdown, among other reasons, raise the question of whether arms control is not

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tween arms limitation talks in the 1920's and the 1970's "would distort rather than clarify our understanding of the arms limitation process," see Roger Dingman, *Statesmen, Admirals and SALT: The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922*, California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar (Santa Monica 1972).

[51] *Sea Power in the Machine Age* (Princeton 1941), 252-57.

[52] See Bernard Brodie, "Military Demonstration and Disclosure of New Weapons," *World Politics*, v (April 1953), 281-301.

[53] Clause 2 of Article XII of the ABM Treaty of 1972 contains the vital provision that "Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party. . . ." The texts of the total SALT I package may be located in U.S. Congress, *Military Implications* . . . (fn. 19), 87-97. This does not mean that satellite-killing or -impeding capabilities have ceased to be relevant or of concern. Treaties may be broken or abrogated through formal withdrawal procedures. For recent analyses of "the national technical means of verification," see Philip J. Klass, *Secret Sentries in Space* (New York 1971); and Ted Greenwood, *Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Arms Control, Adelphi Papers*, No. 88 (London 1972).

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more useful as a state of mind than as a formal policy. "Perhaps the truest statement that can be made about the interwar arms control pacts is that, singly or collectively, they can be used to provide historical precedent for nearly any sophisticated argument one chooses to advance."[54]

Given the shortage of events in the population of arms control agreements between the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 to SALT I of 1972, it is unfortunate that the record of the 1920's and 1930's offers so much valuable illustration but so little guidance. The record of the interwar years would seem to demonstrate that arms control tends to be subverted by politics rather than by technology. New technological possibilities will induce weapon designers to improve upon the state of the art, but—given the political will—a special or a regular reconvening of an arms-control conference should be able to accommodate new weapon potentials.

The above remarks are not intended to dismiss the role of technological innovation as a stimulant to arms competitions. In the 1950's and particularly the 1960's, new technologies were developed and deployed when they were ready (the "ripening plum" syndrome identified by Elizabeth Young) and also—a complicating factor—when the ideas implicit in contemporary strategic planning indicated the need for them. Public policy, strategic doctrine, and military technology influence each other in complex ways. As a generalization, Herbert York's point that "the technology actually preceded the doctrine in most cases, if not in all cases" (talking of United States missile programs in the 1950's and 1960's) is probably correct.[55] Certainly, it is more persuasive than is the reverse argument, that a racing state acquires only the weapons that strategic doctrine indicates to be useful.[56]

The anxiety potential inherent in the confrontation of two dynamic technology mixes is not automatically, or even necessarily, appreciated by political decision-makers. Technological possibilism in a context of

[54] Burns and Urquidi (fn. 40), Vol. IV, *Conclusions*, 1.

[55] In U.S. Congress, *Arms Control Implications* . . . (fn. 26), 83.

[56] This is an example of the world view provided by the rational-actor model. The importance of strategic doctrine in the determination of defense posture is as yet untilled as an analytical field. See David Holloway, "Strategic Concepts and Soviet Policy," *Survival*, XIII (November 1971), 364-70. Two recent examples of public official and private academic analysis reveal the same pervasive rational-actor belief. Henry Kissinger *apparently* believes that only those arms-control agreements which enhance the security of both sides are ever signed. U.S. Congress, *Military Implications* . . . (fn. 19), 122. This view of rational strategic men, infallibly charting the arms-control course of their ships of state, is also to be found in Joseph I. Coffey, *Strategic Power and National Security* (Pittsburgh 1971). "Which arms control measures (if any) are actually put into effect depends on the strategic objectives and the national interests of the powers concerned" (p. 142).

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bureaucratic diversity certainly serves to explain why and in what manner the United States came to acquire its deterrent triad, but it does not serve to explain variations in the political tenor of superpower relations. Stability, like arms control, would seem to be more a matter of a state of mind than it is of a sober appreciation of possible interactions among weapon inventories.[57] Fear in the minds of men, stemming from a (mis)perception of the possibly hostile intention of others, is a more potent engine for an arms race than are succeeding generations of weapon technologies. German fears in the first decade of this century that "Fisher is coming" to sink the high seas fleet as it lay peacefully at anchor—in the tradition of the Royal Navy and after the fashion of Britain's Japanese ally in its surprise attack on Port Arthur—did fuel anxieties that were all too relevant for German naval development.[58] The launching of the *Dreadnought*, a new round in the naval competition, was of far less significance to the effort expended by Germany upon its navy than was the belief that the British were sufficiently motivated, and ruthless, to launch an attack without warning.[59]

An arms competition may be viewed as autonomous or autarkic to the extent that there is a logic—an incremental common sense—inherent in technological development. Policy-makers and strategic theorists may find that their country has purchased not a complementary mix of systems, but rather a succession of redundant systems that re-

[57] As Hedley Bull has commented: " 'Stability' is a vogue word which in common parlance has become meaningless. By the stability of the strategic nuclear balance we mean its built-in tendency to persist. . . ." (fn. 5), 5. Considerable enlightenment on different models of arms-control stability may be gleaned from Thomas A. Brown, *Models of Strategic Stability*, California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar (Santa Monica 1971). "Stability" embraces a confused mix of concepts, norms, and specific policy prescriptions that is much in need of systematic attention. See Gray, "Arms Races and Their Influence upon International Stability, with Special Reference to the Middle East" (unpub.).

[58] See Jonathan Steinberg, "The Copenhagen Complex," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1, No. 3 (1966), 23-46. Also see Gerhard Ritter, *The Sword and the Sceptre: The Problem of Militarism in Germany*, Vol. II: *The European Powers and the Wilhelminian Empire, 1890–1914*, 2nd ed. (London 1972, first pub. 1965), 137-91.

[59] Why Germany's leaders should have chosen, as early as 1898 (and certainly by 1900), to make a "not incredible" bid for naval supremacy is a question still unsettled among historians. To take a quite negative view of Anglo-German naval competition, it is certain that fault must have lain in the area of politics rather than technology. Bids for "a place in the sun," for an enhanced alliance value, for a useful diplomatic lever (to be applied in the hope that Britain would agree to remain neutral in a war on the Continent in return for a German acknowledgment of Britain's maritime supremacy), and, eventually, for a "fleet in being" that would cramp Great Britain's imperial policies and protect the German coastline (and keep the Baltic a German lake)—all of these factors have greater explanatory power for an attempt to comprehend the German urge to compete than the factors of changes in naval architecture, or fuel and gun/armor technologies.

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flect the interests of the separate baronies of the national security bureaucracy.

Technology may prove benign in at least one respect. If Roman Kolkowicz's convergence theory is accepted, then technology may prove —indeed, perhaps has already proved—to support rather than to subvert inclinations toward political détente.[60] By racing very hard indeed, the Soviet Union has attained a relative strategic position wherein strategic arms-control negotiations could be undertaken seriously and, equally important, parallel lines of technological development have encouraged a growing similarity of strategic doctrines. This development has been reflected in the unprecedented and (until 1969 at least) unexpected acceptance by both superpowers of a treaty that forbids the defense of superpower homelands against missile attack. However, the evidence for doctrinal convergence is not yet totally convincing.[61]

The logic of technology does suggest that the Soviet Union will exploit the possibilities left uncovered by SALT I, and will seek to place MIRV's on the SS-11 and SS-9 (and will replace these systems). However, such a development would seem to be explicable as being motivated by a desire to enhance its diplomatic leverage for bargaining in SALT II, a desire to make the best preparation possible for the waging of a war (a prudential concern with defense), and bureaucratic defense politics.

If proposition (7) were to be very strictly interpreted, its limitations would rapidly become apparent. Arms races are not run *because* product improvement is always possible in weapons. Such reasoning would focus upon a symptom rather than a cause—though the existence of some feedback cannot be denied. If improvement in weaponry were impossible, thereby eliminating the relevance of proposition (7), states could still engage in quantitative competition, or in qualitative competition in speed of mobilization or ingenuity of strategic doctrine.[62]

[60] See the following examples: Roman Kolkowicz and others, *The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma* (Baltimore 1970), 21-69, 181-202; Kolkowicz, "Strategic Parity and Beyond," *World Politics*, XXIII (April 1971), 431-51; and "Strategic Elites and Politics of Superpower," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXVI, No. 1 (1972), 40-59.

[61] *Parity* is not a concept enjoying much currency in Soviet defense politics; the Soviet Union still has no recognizable equivalent to the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. Contrary to the expectations and hopes of many people, the SALT exercise would not seem to have yielded any very clear picture as to the nature of Soviet thinking on deterrence theory. See the testimony of Gerard Smith, in U.S. Congress, *Military Implications* . . . (fn. 19), 383.

[62] Competition in ideas is an ineradicable feature of an arms competition. If we accept Huntington's proposition (fn. 12, 27) that a qualitative arms race will tend to re-

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Technology has long been unduly regarded as the villain in the arms race. Such a belief has encouraged gross oversimplification in the analysis of arms races, focussing in effect upon a single factor of a phenomenon that is sustained by very many driving impulses.

Arms-Race Analysis

This article has been designed to help persuade analysts that the problems of arms-race motivation must be taken seriously. At some risk of appearing as a counsel for arms-race behavior, I have sought to demonstrate that arms races need not necessarily be viewed solely as foolish, costly, dangerous, and fundamentally irrational exercises. States, in best rational-actor fashion, may and do choose to compete in armaments for reasons which to them appear good and sufficient. The record of achievement of the arms-control community from 1958 to the present day suggests that the very real incentives for continuing competition have yet to be confronted.[63]

The urgent need is for a series of case studies of particular arms races. These case studies should be rich in historical detail, yet disciplined by a rigorous attention both to the testing of promising propositions generated by others, and to the generation of new propositions that can be utilized in further inquiry.[64] That way, a cumulative wisdom will replace the present state of arms-race analysis at the level of anecdote and illustration.

In order to provide some discipline among the chaos of arguments pertinent to arms-race motivation, this article has sharpened and isolated arms-race rationales in the form of seven propositions. I have accepted the danger of setting up straw men. Social science should aspire to be value-free; however, this is a burdensome requirement in a region of international politics where policy analysis and disinterested academic investigation have interpenetrated to the possible detriment of the objectives of both. Indeed, if the central tenets of the postbehavioral revolution in political science were accorded some

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sult in an equality of relative power, it follows that war-waging success will most likely be the consequence of the more intelligent employment of the weapons-mix acquired in the competition. Furthermore, because of distinct national military doctrines, different states will elect to purchase qualitatively dissimilar arsenals.

[63] For the most convincing obituaries upon the first phase of the "new arms control" of the late 1950's and early 1960's, see Hedley Bull, "Arms Control: A Stock-taking and Prospectus," in *Problems of Modern Strategy, Part 2, Adelphi Papers*, No. 55 (London 1969), 11-20; and Young (fn. 27).

[64] See Gray, "Social Science and the Arms Race," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXIX (June 1973), 23-26.

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obeisance, then a value-neutral analysis of arms races should be discouraged.

Unfortunately for those who consider wars, crises, arms races, and conflict to be *problems* that are soluble, a disinterested (at least in aspiration) analysis of arms races does not suggest unequivocally that education following upon serious academic attention is at all likely to bring about a *solution*. No analysis of the arms-race phenomenon can help but be impregnated with its author's values concerning desirable defense postures—given the systemic parameters as he understands them (for example, the continuing legitimacy, even necessity, of the role of force in the maintenance of a particular conception of a condition identifiable as international order). All too often is it apparent that the analyst has come to bury arms races, not to understand them.

Present lacunae in the understanding of arms-race phenomena have received direct illumination in a Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations. The Report states that "the arms race inevitably exacerbates international tensions and inevitably undermines the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter."[65] The consequences of arms races for international peace and security, international stability, and international order (all terms requiring systematic attention for satisfactory definition) may be both positive and negative.

An arms race may serve: to adjust power short of crisis and war (no better means may be at hand); to satisfy a potentially aggressive state with a (none too clear-cut) arms-race victory (the arms race as a cheaper substitute for war); to enable the international political system to accommodate a very rapid rate of military technological change (a fairly general race will ensure that no one state is able to exploit a unilateral, if only temporary, advantage); to buy time for techniques of conflict resolution to take effect (the arms race as a war-prophylactic exercise);[66] to ensure the continued dominance of status-quo powers.[67]

[65] *Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and Its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security*, A/8469, UN General Assembly (New York 1971), 37.

[66] An arms race may continue, even though its driving political antagonisms have been substantially ameliorated by time, growing symmetries (or functional asymmetries), or new challenges. Bureaucratic lag (or the limited control exercised over government organizations by the political leadership) is likely to ensure that political and military policies are kept out of phase to some degree. Even if an arms race were sustained by mutual aspiration for the attainment of a particular measure of military (im)balance that would offer good prospects for a knock-out blow, the protracted absence of war contributed by the arms race might yield an eventual non-war outcome.

[67] From time to time, states do emerge whose apparent aspiration for local, regional, or global hegemony ought to be discouraged. An arms race, vigorously waged, is one instrument by which such discouragement may be effected.

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These suggestions should not be read as an apologia for costly and dangerous foreign policy behavior. Of a number of unpleasant alternatives, a rearmament program could be the least harmful both for national security and international order.

The costs of arms competition are all too obvious. One could cite the diversion of financial and scarce human resources; the habituation of a generation or more to the fear of instant annihilation (with its attendant social consequences, the brutalizing of the population and the encouragement of political apathy); the promotion of political anxieties that are catalyzed by the perception and anticipation of the capabilities of an adversary; the possible intensification of the risks of war; the promotion of very large domestic defense constituencies; and the encouragement of belief in military roads to national and international security.

A serious commitment to the study of arms races as a class of events in international (and domestic) politics, deserving of considerable analytic attention, should serve to expose the deadwood of tired axioms and half-truths that surface with a depressing regularity. Advocacy of arms control tends to hinder the balanced analysis of arms competitions.

I concluded a previous article by asserting that arms races need to be rescued from the analytical embrace of strategic logicians committed to a focus on action-reaction.[68] As a variation and advance upon that suggestion, I would now assert that arms-race analysis needs to be rescued from the near-exclusive attention of the arms-control community as it is today. Arms-control values tend to structure analysis in an unbalanced fashion. Arms races should be approached as a far from atypical feature of international and domestic politics, not necessarily waged by fools or by those pursuing private advantage.

[68] Fn. 1, 79.

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Review Articles

ASSESSING PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER

By ALEXANDER L. GEORGE*

James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1972, 479 pp., $10.00.

I

SHORTLY after James Forrestal resigned as Secretary of Defense in late March 1949, the nation was shocked to learn that he was under treatment for a severe mental illness. Within a few months Forrestal committed suicide. This tragic occurrence, coming after Forrestal's highly successful career in government, directly challenged the long-standing mental-health mythology prevalent in Washington. The essence of the myth, as noted by Albert Deutsch at the time,[1] was the belief that "no Very Important Person, under any circumstances, can possibly suffer from a psychosis." The denial of this possibility in official Washington was of a piece with widely shared beliefs that to suffer a mental illness was a disgrace that automatically and permanently rendered one unfit for public office.

It would go much too far to say that a new set of attitudes has replaced the mental-health mythology prevalent twenty-five years ago. Nonetheless, there has been some change in this respect, partly as a result of a better understanding of the nature of mental illness and mental health, and wider acceptance of modern preventive and therapeutic approaches. In addition, the disposition to challenge the mental-health mythology has been strengthened by concern over the possibility that an unbalanced political or military leader might trigger thermonuclear war.[2]

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For extensive and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this review I am indebted to Fred Greenstein. I remain solely responsible, of course, for the contents. In addition, James David Barber kindly offered an extensive and useful critique which enabled me to clarify many points and to avoid inadvertent misrepresentations. However, on a number of important issues we have not been able to reach agreement.

[1] Deutsch's remarks, delivered at a meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, are quoted in Arnold A. Rogow, *James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy* (New York 1963), 44.

[2] The possibility that mental illness could strike political or military leaders in the era of push-button warfare has been dramatized in films and novels such as *Dr. Strange-*

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The possibility that major psychiatric impairment in an important official may not be detected or controlled in time to prevent a policy disaster is a matter for legitimate concern; nonetheless it identifies only a part—some would say only a small part—of the problem. There remains the broader and murkier question of the adverse effects that the personalities of leaders who are not ill may exert on public policy and the conduct of the affairs of state. Thus, paradoxically, the conventional wisdom that "every man has his breaking point" serves to obscure from view the fact that few political leaders actually break down under the stress of making difficult decisions or under the even greater stress of having to cope with the adverse consequences of decisions already made.

Certainly we need to know more about psychological and institutional coping mechanisms that help political leaders to remain emotionally intact, enabling them to continue functioning despite acute or persistent stress of various kinds. Narrowly construed, an individual who copes with stress without breaking down can be said to enjoy adequate mental health. But since we are concerned here with individuals who occupy high political office, we cannot limit attention to the consequences of a leader's performance under stress solely for his own emotional well-being. We must be at least equally concerned with the consequences for others of the ways in which he copes with latent or actual personal stresses of policy making and other tasks. Coping devices that are functional for the individual may sometimes have a dysfunctional impact on policy and political outcomes.

For this reason, broader criteria are needed than those traditionally applied by psychologists and psychiatrists in judging whether an individual copes adequately with stress. But to develop and apply broader criteria is not, as we shall see, an easy task. For one thing, the investigator's own political values can easily color his judgment as to whether a leader copes successfully with stressful tasks *from the standpoint of the polity*. Thus, for example, when the investigator disagrees with the policy a leader continues to pursue despite evidence of its mounting

love, Seven Days in May, and *Night of Camp David*. A sober statement of this stark possibility was also offered by political scientist Arnold Rogow in his perceptive biography of Forrestal (fn. 1), 346. In a later publication Rogow noted that the serious consequences of illnesses such as Forrestal's for policy decisions tend to be checked by various built-in safeguards of officeholding in a hierarchical, bureaucratic form of government: "Most key policy decisions are distributed over a number of persons and a variety of agencies," and there is a tendency within the bureaucracy "to remove or reduce the decision-making authority of the sick official while leaving him in office." "Private Illness and Public Policy: The Cases of James Forrestal and John Winant," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, CXXV (February 1969), 1096.

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costs, he is more likely to judge that leader as rigid and stubborn than when he supports that policy. Similarly, a leader who takes a firm stand and draws the line in disputes with political opponents may be judged to be engaged in highly adaptive behavior by an investigator who believes that such behavior is required by the situation; but the same behavior may be judged to be irrationally aggressive by a different investigator whose system of values leads to a different perception of the requirements and dangers implicit in the same situation.

The intrusion of the investigator's own political values can distort both the validity and reliability of his judgments regarding a political leader's psychological fitness for office. This was all too evident in the responses psychiatrists made to a poll by FACT magazine during the presidential campaign of 1964. Among the questions asked was the following: "Do you believe Barry Goldwater is psychologically fit to serve as President of the United States?" The questionnaire, sent to all 12,356 psychiatrists in the United States, as listed in the current directory of the American Medical Association, was returned by 2,417 (about 19.5 per cent). Of these, 1,189 said he was not fit and 657 said he was fit. On the other hand, almost 600 indicated they were unable to answer because they did not know enough about Goldwater.

In addition, comments were volunteered by some 162 of the psychiatrists who responded to the mail survey. In his analysis of these comments (as reproduced in FACT magazine), David Ray notes that there was virtually no agreement among the psychiatrists in question about what qualities would make a leader psychologically fit or psychologically unfit. Moreover, there was evidence in the comments that evaluations of Goldwater's fitness were influenced by the diagnosticians' own political values. In quite a few cases, psychiatrists explicitly or implicitly linked their judgments about Goldwater's psychological fitness to endorsements or repudiations of the political values they attributed to Goldwater.[3] It is sobering to recall, as Ray reminds us, that almost 2,000 psychiatrists were willing on this occasion to claim and express professional expertise in a situation in which they were clearly unjustified in doing so. It should be noted that FACT's survey was repudiated by both the American Medical Association, which referred to it as "an example of yellow journalism," and the American Psychiatric Association, which dismissed it as "a hodge-podge of personal political opinion rather than professional diagnosis."[4]

[3] David Ray, "The Psychiatric Screening of Political Leaders: The Goldwater Case and Beyond," seminar paper, Political Science Department, Stanford University 1972. See also the brief account in Arnold Rogow, *The Psychiatrists* (New York 1970), 125-27.

[4] Despite these admonitions, Ralph Ginzburg (publisher of FACT, which had since

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We are confronted, therefore, with the question whether it is feasible to assess the personalities of candidates for political office and to predict their performance in ways that will satisfy the criteria of objectivity, reliability, and validity. Consideration of this question must deal with both the *scope* of such evaluations and the adequacy of *procedures* for making such judgments. In discussing the scope of psychological assessments, a useful distinction can be made between detection of major mental illness on the one hand and assessment of psychological fitness for a particular office on the other. To focus evaluation exclusively on detection of a current mental illness makes the task of diagnosis more manageable, but it leaves the door open to lesser personality disturbances or characteristics that may entail high political risks. Although it is increasingly questioned whether mental illness can be regarded as an entity, the manifestations of at least some severe illnesses are relatively clearcut and more easily identifiable than the wider range of personality characteristics that may make a person unfit for high political office.

The distinction between *screening* candidates for office and *monitoring* the health of officials is also one to keep in mind. If an official suffered a disabling mental illness, the problem would be to obtain a competent medical certification and either to persuade the official to resign or to put into effect provisions for removing him from his official duties, either temporarily or permanently. So far as a President is concerned, such a procedure would be much more difficult than for a lesser official, and it is problematical whether the 25th amendment offers a satisfactory solution for such a contingency.

The screening of candidates for elected office encounters special difficulties. The question to be asked about candidates is not merely whether they currently suffer major mental illness, but also whether they are likely to develop one later in office. But prediction of a major mental illness is not only more difficult and more uncertain than its diagnosis; it also raises very difficult "decision rule" problems: what *degree of risk* of a future mental breakdown should be regarded as unacceptable and as grounds for disqualifying a candidate, and *who* should make this judgment? Since very few persons are likely to be certified as altogether

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expired, and now publisher of *Avant Garde*) announced four years later that more than 2,000 psychiatrists had responded to questions about the psychological fitness of President Johnson. The results, however, were never published, perhaps because of Johnson's announcement that he would not be a candidate for reelection. Rogow (fn. 3), 128. Also, in 1968 Senator Goldwater sued the publishers of FACT for libel and was awarded a judgment of $75,000 in punitive damages by a Federal District Court. The judgment was subsequently upheld on appeal.

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invulnerable to the risk of future mental illness, a conservative decision rule would eliminate most candidates, whereas a more permissive one would accept many candidates for whom some risk of a future mental breakdown could not be excluded. Where should the line be drawn? And by whom? Because of these several difficulties, few observers go further than to suggest that candidates should voluntarily subject themselves to appropriate medical examinations and release the results to the public so that it can vote in whatever way it deems appropriate.[5]

The task of designing valid and acceptable procedures for screening candidates becomes appreciably more complicated if the scope of the evaluation is broadened to cover psychological fitness and detection of character flaws. It would be extremely difficult to judge whether motivational structures and coping patterns imbedded in the personality of a candidate will turn out to be acutely dysfunctional in performing the duties of an office. Whether given personality characteristics will be disruptive of rational decision making or affect performance adversely in other ways is likely to be a matter of degree as well as of circumstance. For a leader's performance, the disruptive potential of certain personality patterns is likely to be highly situation-specific, and a coping strategy that tends to produce adverse political consequences in certain situations may be quite functional in other situations. It would be all the more difficult, therefore, to draw a line as to the level of risk judged to be acceptable (the problem of decision rule already alluded to).[6] Additional observations on problems of screening and monitoring will be presented in the concluding section of this review.

II

With these considerations in mind, we turn to James David Barber's effort to devise means for predicting performance in the Presidency well enough to assist in the evaluation and selection of candidates to that office. Barber acknowledges that "this kind of prediction is not easy" and recognizes that "predicting with even approximate accuracy is go-

[5] Public discussion of this possibility was triggered by the disclosure, after his nomination as Vice President on the Democratic Party ticket, that Senator Eagleton had been treated for depression on several occasions earlier in his career. See, for example, Michael J. Halberstam, M.D., "Who's Medically Fit for the White House?" *New York Times Magazine*, October 22, 1972, pp. 39ff; James Reston, "The Need for a System of Health Checks," reprinted in *San Francisco Sunday Herald Examiner and Chronicle*, August 6, 1972.

[6] The preceding paragraphs draw in part upon the seminar discussion of David Ray's paper in which Dr. Rudolf Moos and Dr. John Adams, M.D., of the Psychiatry Department, Stanford Medical Center, participated.

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ing to require some sharp tools and close attention in their use" (p. 6). Barber does not claim to have produced a finely honed theory for this purpose. Nonetheless, he published his book, which contains a hundred-page analysis of Richard Nixon entitled "The Nixon Prediction," early in 1972 for possible use in the presidential election; and he followed it up, after Senator McGovern's nomination by the Democratic Party, with a brief analysis of his personality and expected performance in the Presidency.[7] Barber justified his decision to do so not only on practical grounds, but also with reference to the possibility that attempts at prediction can serve to sharpen the theory (p. 6; also p. vii).

Barber has been criticized for introducing the unfinished, as yet untested results of his scholarship into the political arena. This is a criticism with which I happen to sympathize, and which I will discuss further in the concluding section. At the same time, however, Barber's critics must come to grips with the serious intellectual effort and considerable research that has gone into the construction of his theory. For, in marked contrast to the pseudo-scientific, indeed antiscientific character of FACT's muckraking approach to assessing Goldwater's psychological fitness in 1964, Barber's book reflects the many years of intensive research he has devoted to developing a rich and complex theory of the ways in which the personality of political leaders can express itself in their political behavior.

Besides, it is possible that Barber's theory, its limitations notwithstanding, enabled him—or at least encouraged him—to make a prediction in his book regarding the likelihood of a major political catastrophe if Richard Nixon were reelected which may turn out in some respects to be a correct prediction. Certainly the Watergate scandal and the other illegal activities undertaken by members of the Administration, which have come to light since March, 1973, constitute a political catastrophe of the first magnitude. The question remains, however, whether this was the kind of catastrophe Barber predicted; additionally, whether and to what extent the events in question can be explained in terms of Nixon's character; and, if so, whether in terms of Barber's theory of character, some modification of it, or some other personality theory. These are likely to be difficult questions for qualified, objective psychohistorians to answer even at some point in the future, when the crisis engendered by Watergate has run its course and the historical record is fuller and

[7] "The Question of Presidential Character," *Saturday Review of the Society*, LV (October 1972), 62-66. In this article, Senator McGovern is diagnosed as exemplifying one of Barber's four character types, the active-positive, which presents him in a favorable light; however, Barber also noted possible limitations in McGovern's performance if elected President.

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more accessible.[8] We must also keep in mind that Barber's prediction of a character-induced tragedy for Nixon is an open-ended one, and that it may receive confirmation in the remainder of the President's second term.

I shall attempt to provide as coherent an exposition of Barber's work as possible and to strike a balanced appraisal. If I focus on the weaknesses of his theory as I see them, it is in order to try to show how this kind of research can be put on a more solid, cumulative footing. It must be said at the outset that the task of evaluating Barber's theory is rendered more difficult by the way in which he has chosen to present it in this book. In order to reach a broader public during the election year, Barber apparently decided to popularize the presentation of his theory somewhat. In any case, the book is not as tightly argued and certainly not as adequately documented as it would have to be in order to persuade a specialized professional audience of the merits of his theory. Rather, the book reflects an effort to combine sensitive clinical-literary insights with strong normative impulses toward finding a rather immediate handle—the process of selecting a President—for dealing with some of the dilemmas of our era.

Barber's study is better understood and more fairly judged when viewed in the context of his earlier work, to which he calls the attention of the reader (p. 455). Barber is among those scholars who have demonstrated that attempts to absorb all political leaders into a single personality type—which followed from a misreading of Harold Lasswell's earlier writings—were unjustified and should be abandoned. In *The Lawmakers* (1965), to which we shall return later, Barber skillfully differentiated a variety of motivational patterns that led a diverse group of individuals to enter the Connecticut state legislature. He identified four types of legislators—"Lawmaker," "Spectator," "Advertiser," and "Reluctant"—and offered insightful speculative analyses of the way in which the distinctive personality configurations associated with each type affected their orientation to and activity in the role of legislator. This set of hypotheses, with important adaptations to be noted later, was carried over and applied in Barber's work on presidential leader-

[8] Speculation on these matters in mid-July of 1973, when I had an opportunity to revise an earlier draft that had been written before the Watergate scandal began to unravel in March of 1973, seemed not only hazardous and premature, but also necessarily of limited value to those who would read this review some six or more months later. Accordingly, in revising the manuscript I decided to make no alterations in the substance of my earlier assessment of Barber's book which might benefit in some way from Watergate hindsight. However, I have permitted myself to *add* a few observations that have come to mind since then in reflecting on the emerging Watergate scandals.

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ship, in which he has been engaged for almost a decade. The origins, development, and empirical-theoretical foundations of Barber's study of presidential character are more amply reported in his earlier publications; these should be consulted by readers who wish to understand better, and to evaluate, the scholarly base on which the present book rests.

This is not to say that the difficult problems of theory and methodology, on which Barber has relatively little to say in *Presidential Character*, have been adequately dealt with in his earlier publications, enabling him to move easily and comfortably to the task of making his findings available for a more general audience. Indeed, *Presidential Character* is entirely explicit in acknowledging the tentative, uncertain nature of the theory. Barber recognizes that the ambitious task he has set for himself carries with it a most complex and difficult set of requirements. Let us turn, therefore, to the way in which he attempts to define and meet these requirements.

In keeping with the emphasis in modern theories of personality, Barber avoids a narrow preoccupation with unconscious needs and ego defenses, and instead opts for a broader ego-psychological view of personality. In his Preface, Barber indicates that he has eschewed "psychoanalytic interpretations at the symbolic level" and has employed an approach that is "much closer to the psychology of adaptation" (p. vi). He defines personality in terms of three components: "character," "world view," and "style." All three of these components of personality —especially "world view" and "style"—highlight the developmental and adaptive facets of personality. In addition, for Barber (and others), "character" provides at least a link to, and a reflection of, unconscious needs, ego defenses, and psychodynamics.

To employ personality variables for explaining or predicting a President's political behavior requires *situational analysis*—or, more specifically, some way of analyzing or anticipating the complex, two-way interplay between personality and situational factors. But situational factors affecting presidential performance are numerous and complex, and they include variables as well as constants; so the task of assessing the interaction between personality and situation cannot be easily accomplished. The investigator must assess not only the ways in which situational factors constrain the behavior of a President, but also the ways in which the President's personality and behavior shape the situation over time. Barber does make at least general provision for situational factors in his theoretical framework. He postulates that a President's personality interacts with (a) "*the power situation*" (i.e., "the support he has

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from the public and interest groups, the party balance in Congress, the thrust of Supreme Court opinion" [p. 8]), and also with (b) "*the climate of expectations*" (i.e., "the predominant needs thrust up to him by the people," focusing around needs such as the demand for reassurance, a sense of progress and action, and a sense of legitimacy from, and in, the Presidency [p. 9]).

However suggestive and rich in its implications, this conceptualization of situational constraints on presidential performance is, as Barber recognizes (p. vii), only a starting point for developing the kind of rich typology of the variety of situations within which presidential performance takes place.[9] And, indeed, the description of both power situation and climate of expectations is elaborated in the individual profiles of the Presidents.

The way in which Barber defines and operationalizes each of the three components of personality must be discussed further. The most visible part of a political leader's personality is his "style," which Barber defines as his "habitual way of performing three political roles: rhetoric, personal relations, and homework" (p. 7). A clearer explication of this important facet of personality is provided in Barber's earlier publications. An individual's style is a creative adaptation that emerges from a confluence in late adolescence or early adulthood of his *motives* (or needs), the *resources* (skills and competences) he possesses, and the *opportunities* the unfolding situation offers him, somewhat fortuitously, to make something of himself, to find something that "works" for himself and infuses self-confidence and a sense of competence. The discovery of a style provides the individual with a way of relating selectively and productively to the environment in a manner that is expected to yield satisfaction. Thus understood, Barber's notion of style and his related notion of "first independent political success" is reminiscent, as he has noted earlier,[10] of parts of Erik Erikson's conception of identity crisis and of what I have called the process of defining, carving out, or discovering a sphere of competence for performance as an adult.

Barber's concept of style provides a particularly useful way of bridging role and personality variables in studying a leader's behavior in *any* position. One of the limitations of traditional role theory from this standpoint has been that typologies of role orientations (and/or role

[9] With Watergate hindsight, I would emphasize this point even more. Some aspects of Nixon's behavior which appear to have contributed substantially to the crisis of his Presidency occurred in situational contexts other than those that Barber singled out as being most germane.

[10] Barber, "Classifying and Predicting Presidential Styles: Two 'Weak' Presidents," *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIV (July 1968), 62, 78.

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definitions) have been couched with reference to the tasks or functions of a particular position.[11] Thus the various functions, or role tasks, of a President have been traditionally described in terms of chief-of-state, commander-in-chief, party leader, etc. Much more useful for studying the interaction between personality and role is Barber's ingenious way of identifying role functions in more general terms, independent of the idiosyncratic features of any particular position. The three general role demands or functions that Barber identifies—*rhetoric* (words), *business* (work), and *personal relations* (people)—arise, as he notes, in some way in any political position.

By defining style as the personality's acquisition of a characteristic way of utilizing words, work, and/or people for adapting to environmental demands and opportunities, Barber provides us with an incisive but flexible starting point for assessing the "fit" between one aspect of personality (i.e., style) and the specific role demands of a given position. Since different political positions generate different role demands, it is possible for the investigator to note whether a leader's style, which has been highly adaptive in one position, is likely to be equally adaptive —or perhaps even maladaptive—in a different position.

Collective biographical analyses employing a theoretical framework are rare. Barber's trenchant analysis of the styles of the eleven Presidents discussed in his book (and, in an earlier essay,[12] of Andrew Johnson's style) contributes much to an understanding of their different approaches to the Presidency and their behavior in that office. Clearly, the analysis of style is also relevant for assessing some aspects of the expected performance of candidates for the Presidency. A style such as Lyndon B. Johnson's, which was highly adaptive to the role of Senate Majority Leader and resulted in a brilliant performance by him in that position, was predictably less suited to the different role demands of the Presidency. The resulting strain, or lack of fit, helps to account for serious deficiencies in LBJ's performance in the Presidency.[13]

[11] See, for example, the well-developed typologies of the various functions in the role of legislator, and the typologies of the ways in which each of these functions can be defined by the role-incumbent. J. Wahlke and others, *The Legislative System* (New York 1962).

While useful for a differentiated study of the variance in role orientations adopted by legislators, these typologies are not relevant for study of the role definitions of other political positions; nor do they provide a direct and useful way, as Barber's concept of style does, for assessing the interaction between role and personality in the incumbent's performance in the legislature.

[12] Barber, "Adult Identity and Presidential Style: The Rhetorical Emphasis," *Daedalus*, XCVII (Summer 1968), 938-68.

[13] This point is emphasized particularly by Philip Geyelin, *LBJ and the World* (New York 1966); see also Nelson W. Polsby, *Congress and the Presidency* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1971), 33-41, 64-66.

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The possible lack of fit between an individual's personality and the demands of his role has long been recognized as one of the sources of "role strain," but it has not been easy to find satisfactory ways of studying it and assessing its actual or expected impact on performance and political outcomes.[14] Barber's conceptualization of style is therefore an important theoretical contribution. Even though the notion of style remains simple and undeveloped, each of the three modes of adaptative activity—toward words, work, and people—is capable of elaboration. (I shall defer, for the moment, discussion of the need for a substantial elaboration of Barber's concept of style.)

"World view," another component of personality in Barber's theory, consists of the individual's "primary, politically relevant beliefs, particularly his conceptions of social causality, human nature, and the central moral conflicts of the time" (pp. 7-8). World view refers to the fundamental philosophical and ideological beliefs and premises held by political leaders that shape their behavior. But only a few of these are listed and employed by Barber.

For Barber, the core of personality lies in "character." He defines it as "the way the President orients himself toward life—not for the moment, but enduringly" (p. 8). Character has its main development in childhood (whereas world view emerges in adolescence, and style in early adulthood) and remains relatively stable thereafter. "The stance toward life I call character," Barber explains, "grows out of the child's experiments in relating to parents, brothers and sisters, and peers at play and in school, as well as to his own body and the objects around it" (p. 10). Further, of the three components of personality, "character provides the main thrust and broad direction—but it does not *determine*, in any fixed sense, world view and style" (p. 11; Barber's emphasis). What Barber appears to be saying—and certainly it is justified—is that one's character will *constrain* the world view and style he will adopt later, but that there is still room for variation in the world view and style that will emerge as *congruent* with a given type of character.

Barber's theory requires an understanding of the interplay between these three components of a leader's personality in shaping his behavior. Although he emphasizes this and disavows reductionist explanations in terms of character, the core of his theory and its use in explanation

[14] Particularly useful approaches for conceptualizing the relationship between personality and role are to be found in Edwin J. Thomas, "Role Theory, Personality, and the Individual," in E. R. Borgatta and W. Lambert, eds., *Handbook of Personality Theory and Research* (New York 1968); R. C. Hodgson and others, *The Executive Role Constellation: An Analysis of Personality and Role Relations in Management* (Boston 1965).

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and prediction of the most important aspects of presidential performance comes to rest upon the special significance he attributes to the role of character. Thus, as he announces at the beginning of the book, "the core of the argument (which organizes the structure of the book) is that Presidential character . . . comes in four varieties. The most important thing to know about a President or candidate is where he fits among these types. . . ." (p. 6).

The concepts of style and world view, as they stand in Barber's theory, provide only the most general indications of the propensities of choice an individual brings into decision-making situations. It would be particularly useful from this standpoint to enrich Barber's concept of style by linking it with those developments in cognitive psychology which view personality as, among other things, an information-processing system. It would also be useful to replace "world view" with the broader concept of "belief system" (to include cognitive maps of politics and operational codes as well as ideology). The resulting enrichment of Barber's concept of personality would enable the investigator to undertake more refined and more specific analyses of a President's decision-making behavior.

A President's belief system influences both his diagnosis of situations and the way in which he responds to them. A President's cognitive style, on the other hand, influences the way in which he attempts to provide for his cognitive *and* emotional needs as a decision-maker. Decision making can be stressful in a variety of ways. In addition to noting how a President provides for his cognitive needs, the investigator will want to note how the executive provides for the emotional needs generated by his decision-making activity. Both will influence the way in which he organizes and uses channels of information, analysis, and advice, and the kinds of persons he relies upon for satisfying cognitive and emotional needs. The concept of cognitive style is particularly germane for understanding the role of personality variables in the performance of Presidents and, indeed, of executives generally. It is by employing the concept of cognitive style, and by working within the framework of the particular cognitive style displayed by the subject, that the investigator can identify and assess the interaction among the psychodynamic patterns, ego defenses, and constructive coping resources available to the individual.

Working with the variable of cognitive style will facilitate the important task of moving from the study of the executive *qua* individual to a study of his interactions with other individuals in small-group contexts, and with representatives of the larger organization over which

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he presides. In the most general sense, a President's cognitive style constrains the nature of his participation with others in small-group decision making and shapes his orientation to the organizational processes of search, evaluation, and choice, and to the phenomenon of bureaucratic politics within the organization. Use of the concept of cognitive style will facilitate what Harold Lasswell referred to many years ago as "impact analysis"—the technique of studying the kinds of men with whom a leader surrounds himself and the ways in which they serve his various needs.[15]

In sum, both belief system and cognitive style are aspects of personality that play an important role in determining performance in the Presidency. These variables and their influence are not ignored in the biographical profiles of Presidents that comprise the bulk of Barber's book, but they are dealt with in an impressionistic and fragmentary way. Moreover, there is no explicit provision for dealing with such important personality variables in Barber's framework. His conceptualization of personality, therefore, in terms of character, world view, and style, remains incomplete. The emphasis on "character" in his theory does not make up for the neglect of belief system under "world view" and the additional neglect of cognitive style in his otherwise admirable and highly useful notion of "style." Instead of amplifying and elaborating his concept in these directions, however, Barber began several years ago to shift from his earlier emphasis on style to stress on the importance of character as a basis for explaining and predicting Presidential performance.[16]

In shifting emphasis from style to character, Barber does not have the advantage of inheriting from the work of personality theorists a firm, well-established handle on character. The concept is not at all well defined or consistently defined within the realm of personality theory.

[15] Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York 1948), 101-4. The adverse impact small-group dynamics can have on political decision making is intensively explored by Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston 1972).

[16] The shift of emphasis from style to character can be seen by comparing the two articles Barber published in 1968 (both of which focus on style with hardly any mention of character) with his paper, "The President and His Friends," given at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York, September 1969, in which the importance of character begins to be stressed. A further shift in emphasis from style to character—and the conversion of his earlier typology of style into the present one of character—took place during the revision of this APSA paper, for subsequent publication under a new title, "The Interplay of Presidential Character and Style: A Paradigm and Five Illustrations," in Fred I. Greenstein and Michael Lerner, eds., *A Source Book for the Study of Personality and Politics* (Chicago 1971), 384-408. See also Barber's "Some Consequences of Pluralization in Politics," in Harvey S. Perloff, ed., *The Future of the United States Government: Toward the Year 2000* (New York 1971).

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Although intended to refer to a fundamental or core component of personality, the term "character" in practice is applied loosely and means many different things.

It is not surprising, therefore, that though apparently influenced by Karen Horney's writings in particular, Barber avoids leaning too heavily or explicitly on any of the extant character theories.[17] Rather, he formulates an eclectic conceptualization of character that is ostensibly quite parsimonious. Barber chooses to settle for four character types of his own which he evolves from two dimensions—"*activity-passivity*" and "*positive-negative affect toward one's activity*." These two dimensions (which he sometimes refers to as variables or "baselines") refer to how much energy an individual invests in his activity and how he feels about what he does (p. 11). I shall return later to some of the ambiguity and other difficulties associated with the two dimensions.

Barber defends his conceptualization of character by asserting that his two dimensions tap what is essential and common to most theories of personality.[18] But neither in *Presidential Character* nor in his earlier writings does he attempt to show how his two dimensions are grounded in the specialized literature on personality.[19] Moreover, it is very much to the point that as his work has progressed, Barber has modified the definition of one of his two dimensions,[20] and also has moved from an

[17] One can sympathize with his desire to avoid becoming drawn into the quagmire of competing and unsatisfactory theories of character. Barber is not the first (nor will he be the last) political scientist to discover that the task of borrowing responsibly from the neighboring field of psychology cannot be discharged by attempting to find a single, neatly packaged, authoritative book or article written by a psychologist that tells you all you need to know about the problem.

For a review of developments in psychoanalytic conceptions of character, see chap. 2 of Ernst Prelinger and Carl N. Zimet, *An Ego-Psychological Approach to Character Assessment* (New York 1964).

[18] "Why might we expect these two simple dimensions to outline the main character types? Because they stand for two central features of anyone's orientation toward life. In nearly every study of personality, some form of the active-passive contrast is critical; the general tendency to act or be acted upon is evident in such concepts as dominance-submission, extraversion-introversion, aggression-timidity, attack-defense, fight-flight, engagement-withdrawal, approach-avoidance" (p. 12).

[19] The brief statement in Appendix A of *The Lawmakers* (New Haven and London 1965) was cautious, carefully qualified, and, it must be said, only a small step in this direction. In it, Barber suggested that one can find "some reflections, some common themes" similar to his own types in the accounts of those "who have observed humans acting in similar circumstances." He referred the reader to specific portions of some thirty studies where "relevant evidence or theory" could be found. However, limitations of space did not permit Barber to quote, summarize, or analyze these materials; thus the reader was left to pursue the matter for himself.

[20] The second dimension ("positive-negative affect toward one's activity") constitutes a significant reformulation of what Barber called "commitment to the office" (or "willingness to return") in *The Lawmakers*, *ibid.*, 18, 212. This reformulation and reconceptualization of the second dimension, as Fred Greenstein suggests [personal communication], was apparently necessary in order to accommodate to the fact that the

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initially modest employment of the two dimensions in *The Lawmakers* for describing merely the phenomenological layer of behavior to the present, much more ambitious use of them for tapping underlying facets of character.

In *Presidential Character*, Barber acknowledges that his two dimensions "are crude clues to character." Nonetheless, he asserts that "they are leads into four basic character patterns long familiar in psychological research" (p. 12). Not only does the statement lack documentation; no effort is made to argue that the familiarity of the character patterns in the literature vouchsafes for their validity and the use to which he will put them.

By crossing and combining the two dichotomous dimensions, Barber obtains four character types: the *active-positive*, the *active-negative*, the *passive-positive*, and the *passive-negative*. At first glance, therefore, whatever else may be said about its simplicity, this four-fold character typology seems at least to be derived quite systematically from the two explicit dimensions. But, in fact, the four types are much richer in content and far more complex than this would indicate. For, as the reader quickly finds out, to each of the four character-type labels Barber adds a great deal of additional personality theory that goes well beyond the initial meanings given to the active-passive and the positive-negative dimensions. He inserts a distinctive *psychodynamic* and *developmental* pattern into his description of each character type. Thus, briefly paraphrasing and quoting from pp. 12-13, the results are as follows:

> The "*active-positive*" character is "*adaptive*." He displays a congruence between much of his activity and the enjoyment of it, thereby "indicating relatively high self-esteem and relative success in relating to the environment." He shows "an orientation toward productiveness as a value and an ability to use his styles flexibly, adaptively. . . . He sees himself as developing over time relatively well defined personal goals," and emphasizes "rational mastery."
>
> The "*active-negative*" character is "*compulsive*." He experiences a "contradiction . . . between relatively intense effort and relatively low emotional reward for that effort." His activity has a "compulsive," compensatory character; "he seems ambitious, striving upward, power-seeking . . . he has a persistent problem in managing his aggressive feelings. His self-image is vague and discontinuous. . . ."

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vicissitudes of presidential recruitment are likely to screen out those who utterly reject the presidential role.

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The "*passive-positive*" character is "*compliant*." He is "receptive" and "other-directed," a personality "whose life is a search for affection as a reward for being agreeable and cooperative rather than personally assertive." He experiences a "contradiction . . . between low self-esteem (on grounds of being unlovable, unattractive) and a superficial optimism."

The "*passive-negative*" character is "*withdrawn*." He is oriented "toward doing dutiful service; this compensates for low self-esteem based on a sense of uselessness." His tendency is "to withdraw, to escape from the conflict and uncertainty of politics by emphasizing vague principles (especially prohibitions) and procedural arrangements. . . ."

Given the richness and implications of these character types, we shall want to keep in mind the problems of *constructing* such typologies and the problems of *using* them for purposes of explanation and prediction of presidential performance.[21]

III

Prediction of the expected performance of a candidate who exemplifies one of these character types requires the investigator to envisage how the candidate would interact with the *major role demands* of the Presidency as these, in turn, are shaped by the constraints of the many *situational configurations* he can be expected to encounter in that position. How, then, does Barber arrive at and justify his judgments regarding the expected performance of facets of the presidential role by the four different character types? He adopts an inductive procedure of somewhat complex proportions. The reviewer must proceed with caution in attempting to grasp Barber's research strategy and to reconstruct the often implicit logic of inquiry imbedded in the study.

The inductive component of his procedure consists in first explaining some important aspects of the performance of past Presidents in terms of their character types, and then extrapolating from the results of these historical explanations some general hypotheses to the effect that candidates with similar character types can be expected to perform those aspects of the role similarly, at least in a general way, under comparable circumstances. From this inductive procedure emerge general predictions for each of his four character types.

[21] Post-Watergate hindsight makes more noticeable the importance of old-fashioned moral character and the difficulty of incorporating this concept into character typologies such as Barber's.

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Thus, the *active-positives* (FDR, Truman, Kennedy) "display personal strengths specially attuned to the Presidency, strengths which enabled them to make of that office an engine of progress" (p. 210). While emphasizing the virtues of the active-positive type in general, Barber does note in passing certain dangers or risks for this type. Although Barber evidently does not consider the risks associated with active-positive Presidents to be equal to those to which active-negative characters are prone, the historical example he cites of FDR's effort to pack the Supreme Court is hardly reassuring in this respect. Indeed, commenting on this event, Barber observes that active-positives, "in their haste to make things happen, may too quickly and easily knock down the 'formalities' that hold the democratic order in place" (p. 246).

The *active-negatives* (Wilson, Hoover, LBJ) have character-rooted needs that "invade and dominate, to an unusual degree, their political habits and perceptions" (p. 141). They tend to "persevere rigidly in a disastrous policy" (p. 95).

Passive-negatives (Coolidge, Eisenhower) "pose a different danger . . . the danger of drift" (p. 145). They leave "vacant the energizing, initiating, stimulating possibilities of the role" (p. 173). Yet in certain historical circumstances this type can provide a needed "breathing spell" for recovery after a period of frantic politics (p. 145).

Passive-positives (Taft, Harding) are, like the passive-negatives, "responders, not initiators or pushers . . ." (p. 174). Yet, "for a people in search of community, they provide a refreshing hopefulness and at least some sense of sharing and caring" (p. 206).

We now turn to some of the problems and issues raised by Barber's inductive research strategy, not all of which I can assess with confidence. In order to discuss these matters in the necessary detail, I will focus on only one of Barber's four types, the active-negative, and forego attention to the interesting chapters he presents on the other three.

A. USING THE CHARACTER TYPOLOGY FOR DIAGNOSING PRESIDENTS

Quite obviously, the inductive procedure depends, among other things, on the correctness of the diagnosis of each President's character. Some of Barber's diagnoses seem more apt than others. There are several reasons for this. While the four types are sharply drawn at the outset and are stated as if they were mutually exclusive, in fact every person is, as Barber recognizes, some mixture of all four. This complicates the task of using the typology to diagnose a President and leads Barber to look for the dominant type-tendency displayed by each. Even that

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is difficult to establish on occasion. (We shall return to this problem later.) Still another source of difficulty stems from the fact that the historical data available for the diagnoses vary in quantity and quality. It appears to me that on occasion Barber interprets the available data rather heavily to reach some of his diagnoses. More to the point, the diagnostic procedure is not operationalized to the extent that it is objective enough *in all respects* to offer assurance that acceptable levels of reliability—not to speak of validity—can be achieved in scoring judgments. (Scholars specializing on one or another of these Presidents may disagree with Barber's character diagnosis of that individual.)

Some components or attributes of each character type are more easily applied than others. It must be remembered in this connection that Barber's conceptualization of character is very complex; it deals not merely with surface manifestations of activity-passivity and positive-negative affect, but also with underlying psychodynamic patterns, basic self-esteem, and personality needs for power, affection, respect, and so forth. The two dimensions are easiest to use for purposes of diagnosis since they tap the surface or phenomenological layer of behavior. The data are not always as good for lending strong support to Barber's additional contention that a President who is, for example, an active-positive or a passive-negative *on the surface* also displays the psychodynamic patterns, needs, etc. *said to be associated with that type in Barber's character theory.*

Barber's diagnoses of past Presidents may help to establish the validity of each of his character types. What is particularly in need of validation is the critical premise that in each of Barber's character types the various features attributed to that type do indeed go together, and only with each other. Each of his types is presented as a highly distinctive composite or cluster of characteristics. The theoretical and empirical basis for this important assumption remains obscure, notwithstanding Barber's assurance that his four character patterns have been "long familiar in psychological research" (p. 12). When Barber turns to the task of diagnosing the Presidents, therefore, the reader who is concerned about the validity of the character typology is interested to see whether Barber will be able to show that all components of a character type are clearly present in the biography of each President diagnosed as exemplifying that type. Indeed, one may speculate that Barber found himself under some pressure to find such evidence. If each President clearly displayed all of the behavioral components of one type or another, then the historical profiles of the Presidents will serve to test

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and support the validity of Barber's type constructs;[22] if not, the entire typology will need to be modified or discarded.[23]

B. EXPLAINING A PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS IN TERMS OF HIS CHARACTER

The inductive strategy employed in the study is also sensitive, of course, to Barber's efforts to explain various facets of a President's actions in terms of personality or character variables. The methodological

[22] Before we can attribute a validating function of some kind to the case studies of the Presidents, we have to consider whether the character-type constructs themselves have been formulated in part via induction and incorporation of findings from the case studies. Thus, if some of the postulated psychodynamics of a general character type are drawn from the historical case studies, an element of circularity may be involved. To the extent that the type constructs are extracted partly from the case studies, they cannot be assessed and validated by those case studies.

Admittedly, exploratory research and circularity are often hard to distinguish; the issue is of secondary importance for the development and statement of a theory as against its testing. Barber is not too clear in indicating how he arrived at the composite of characteristics he imputes to each type. That the case studies are part of the empirical material from which the theory is derived is suggested by some of the language Barber employs in summarizing and drawing together "the main character themes emerging from these three cases" (Wilson, Hoover, and Johnson). He notes that the "active" and "negative" variables that define this type were "relatively accessible to even the casual observer" of the biographical materials on these three Presidents. Continuing, Barber then makes a statement which suggests that he enriched the skeletal active-negative category via the case studies of the three Presidents: "What makes these simple dimensions interesting beyond mere description is their power in highlighting a whole range of personality qualities *which emerge from the case studies* and which explain why we find in the Presidency men who strive so mightily and enjoy it so little" (p. 95; emphasis added).

[23] Sometimes the validity of the four character types is boldly asserted in Barber's biographical profiles of the Presidents. Thus, for example, Harding is said clearly to display "the *typical* passive-positive theme: the hunger for love, the impelling need to confirm one's lovableness" (p. 199; emphasis added). As for Coolidge and Eisenhower, "Both shared *with other passive-negative people in politics* a propensity for withdrawal . . ." (p. 172; emphasis added). The clear implication of such language is that a much larger number of political leaders have been studied from the same characterological perspective and that the results have confirmed the clustering of characteristics under each of Barber's types. For this, however, no documentation is provided in *Presidential Character*. (On the other hand, perhaps such a "claim" is not intended and the statement should be regarded merely as a rhetorical embellishment of the descriptions of the Presidents.) Nor can one find adequate documentation in Barber's earlier book, *The Lawmakers*. That study contained few references to character *per se*; but some of the distinctive personality characteristics Barber inferred as being associated with his four legislative types ("Lawmakers," "Advertisers," "Spectators" and "Reluctants") do indeed bear a close resemblance to the characteristics he now imputes to his four character types. It should be noted, however, that the personality characteristics associated with his legislative types were impressionistically derived, being suggested by Barber's observations of Connecticut legislators. Indeed, with exemplary rigor and explicit caution, Barber noted that the hypotheses he advanced in *The Lawmakers* were "speculative generalizations, not verified results," and discussed in detail the methodological problems of his study (pp. 271, 16). Since the hypotheses advanced in *The Lawmakers* were evidently not subsequently assessed systematically against a new body of data, the earlier study offers useful impressionistic support at best; it does not contain rigorous empirical evidence on behalf of the validity of the four character types advanced in his latest work.

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problem in such explanations is acute. It is not difficult to find evidence that a subject's character-rooted needs or motives, or other aspects of his personality, are *expressed* in his behavior in a particular situation. Such evidence is a necessary *but insufficient* condition for establishing the *critical causal importance* of those personality factors in the explanation of that behavior. The fact that an individual strives for or achieves gratification of personal needs or motives in his performance of a political role does not automatically bestow decisive causal importance to this variable. Performance in executive positions such as the Presidency is sensitive to a variety of constraints. Faced with the play of multiple, complexly interacting causal variables, the investigator is bound to have great difficulty in assessing the weight of any given factor. Much behavior is over-determined, and often the most that can be said is that personality needs or other personality characteristics were among the many contributing factors. When the behavior of the executive is subject to cross-pressures, the critical role of personality factors in his decisions may emerge more clearly; but even in such situations the causal weight or decisiveness of the personality factor may be low.[24]

An understanding of the many facets, the complexities, and the apparent inconsistencies of an individual's personality (not merely the dominant patterns of the type he most closely resembles), and a familiarity with his behavior in a variety of past situations is necessary in order to make more discriminating explanations of past behavior and to deal with the treacherous problem of prediction. Of considerable importance in this respect is the strength and operation of the individual's ego controls—that is, his ability to control and regulate the expression of personal needs, anxieties, and defenses in order to prevent them from distorting his effort to appraise situations realistically and deal with them effectively. The effectiveness of ego controls is not to be gauged by success in denying any expression at all to personal needs in one's political functioning. This would be impossible in any case. Rather, ego controls that are well developed include the capacity for harnessing in more constructive directions the expression of one's personal needs in political behavior.[25]

[24] For a systematic discussion of the conditions under which personal variability among different actors may affect behavior in a given role, see Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization* (Chicago 1969), 46-57. See also Greenstein's discussion of the circumstances under which ego-defensive needs are likely to manifest themselves in an actor's political behavior, *ibid.*, 57-61.

[25] During the course of an individual's maturation and development, he develops a variety of constructive ego strategies in addition to his ego defenses. As Brewster Smith, Jerome Bruner, and Robert White noted many years ago, the early psycho-

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Thus, personal motives and needs aroused by a particular situation may serve to alert the individual to perceive the opportunities presented by that situation. The possibility of gratifying these personal needs may also help to energize the individual to meet difficult role and situational requirements. As a result, personality factors may facilitate and improve performance of role requirements. At the same time, an individual's ego controls may be strong enough to curb the expression of personal needs unless the behavior that would gratify them is also required by the situation and the role demands. In other words, an individual's personality needs may be subjected to effective reality-testing and disciplined by awareness of role and situational requirements *before* they are allowed expression in his performance. Personality can be said to have a dysfunctional, adverse effect on the individual's performance only when there is reason to believe that it has led him to a distorted or inadequate perception of role and situational requirements, or to a choice of inferior ways of meeting them.[26]

Given the difficulties of making the type of complex historical explanation that Barber attempts, it would not be reasonable to hold up unusually high standards in evaluating the plausibility of his explanations. Many of them are indeed plausible as well as insightful. I would have difficulty assessing others without immersing myself in the relevant but vast historical materials on each of the Presidents. Nonetheless, even a sympathetic and reasonably careful reading of the historical chapters left me with the impression that Barber's explanations are sometimes strained and bent in the direction of his theory. Alternative ex-

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analytic account of ego defense mechanisms "failed to mention the tremendous importance of constructive strategies [employed by 'normal individuals'] as a means of avoiding the vicissitudes that make crippling defenses necessary. . . . [They] often prevent things from occurring that might disrupt them or, more positively, they . . . plan events in such a way [so as to] operate effectively. . . ." *Opinions and Personality* (New York 1956) 283; see also 22.

[26] We should also take note of complicating factors: (1) the role and situational requirements that impinge on a political actor may contain conflicting or ambiguous elements that make it more difficult for him to exercise effective control and constructive regulation of his personality needs; (2) the politician's role may itself include aberrant requirements which activate personality motives and needs that are ordinarily kept under control. In other words, as Willard Gaylin, M.D., has emphasized, the nature of politics and what it takes to be successful in politics—as in business—may attract sociopathic and paranoid personality types: "The capacity to be ruthless, driving and immoral, if also combined with intelligence and imagination, can be a winning combination in politics as well as commerce. . . . Sociopathic and paranoid personality traits that are most dangerous in people of power are precisely those characteristics most suitable for the attainment of power in a competitive culture such as ours." "What's Normal?", *New York Times Magazine*, April 1, 1973.

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planations for a given behavior are not always recognized or adequately discussed.

Barber's theory indeed sensitizes him—and through him the reader—to see unexpected facets of the way in which personality *expresses* itself in political behavior. That is fascinating and richly rewarding so far as it goes. But, faced with the play of multiple causal variables, Barber tends to give greater weight to the personality variable; and, faced with the choice of three components of his personality construct, he is quicker to attribute critical events to the impact of a President's character than to that of his world view. For example, one might suppose that it was Hoover's deeply ingrained political philosophy of individualism that stood in the way of his accepting the novel idea of a federal dole as a response to unemployment. For Barber, however, Hoover's continued opposition to the public dole is clearly to be explained in terms of his character—i.e., the peculiar psychodynamics of "rigidification" that the active-negative is disposed to when ego-involvement is triggered by opposition and criticism. Similarly, the key to Johnson's policy of escalation against North Vietnam and his persistence in that policy despite rising costs and public criticism is all too clearly and decisively attributed by Barber to Johnson's character rather than to world view, domestic politics, or other factors.

Thus, although Barber is fully aware of and warns against the kind of psychological reductionism that has long plagued psychobiography, the difficulty of the task places him in jeopardy of committing this cardinal sin himself. At the same time, it is only fair to recognize that the requirements of his inductive strategy push Barber into attempting an unusually large number of difficult historical explanations within the span of a single book. It has simply not been possible, as Barber acknowledges in his Preface, for one investigator to discharge so heavy a burden of scholarship.

C. VALIDATING THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE "TRAGEDY-PRONE" ACTIVE-NEGATIVE CHARACTER

Let us take a closer look now at Barber's explanatory thesis that all three active-negative Presidents (Wilson, Hoover, LBJ) suffered political "tragedies" that were "rooted" in their distinctive type of character, which pressed each of them to "persevere rigidly in a disastrous policy" (p. 95; similar formulations elsewhere). This explanation is crucial to Barber's inductive strategy. From it he concludes that active-negatives are particularly disposed to disastrous performance if elected to the Presidency.

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As I noted earlier, it is the interaction of personality with situational variables that shapes presidential performance. For the active-negative type, the situational factor that creates the possibility of a catastrophic performance has to do with the special nature of political power in our government. Recalling Richard Neustadt's analysis of presidential power as being highly dependent upon the power to persuade, Barber sees the active-negative type as having particular difficulty in adjusting to the requirements implicit in this situational constraint. He observes at the outset of Chapter 2, "Three Tragic Tales," that it is about "three Presidents who seem to have forgotten that power means persuasion." Continuing, Barber states the inductive generalization he has drawn from his three case studies: "Different as they were in other ways, Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, and Lyndon B. Johnson came to share in their Presidencies *a common pattern: a process of rigidification*, a movement from political dexterity to narrow insistence on a failing course of action despite abundant evidence of the failure. *Each of these three helped arrange his own defeat*, and in the course of doing that, left the nation worse off than it might have been" (p. 18; emphasis added).

Three questions are relevant to an evaluation of this inductive generalization. (1) Are the tragedies comparable enough to support the generalization? (2) Is the critical role which Barber assigns to character in his explanation of each tragedy adequately demonstrated? (3) Does a similar psychodynamic pattern ("rigidification") underlie each man's behavior during the events leading to his disaster?

The three tragedies refer to completely different kinds of political events: Wilson's failure to get Senate ratification of the League of Nations; Hoover's dissipation of the public's confidence in him, as a result of which he failed in his bid for reelection in 1932; Johnson's increasingly costly and unpopular Vietnam policy, which led to his decision not to stand for reelection. What is critical for evaluating Barber's generalization is whether *the structure of the situation* in each of these three tragic episodes brought to the fore that peculiar problem of presidential power described by Neustadt which, as we noted, Barber considers critical in explaining and predicting tragedies for active-negative Presidents. A situational constraint of this kind was certainly present in Wilson's tragedy; indeed, it plays a very visible and important role in descriptions and explanations of Wilson's astonishingly inept handling of the Senate. Wilson's aggressive stubbornness in that struggle can be plausibly explained with reference to latent psychodynamic patterns imbedded in his personality which were activated by this situa-

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tion (and which, Barber fails to recall, had been activated on several earlier occasions in similarly structured situations).

Since the kind of tragedy predicted by Barber for active-negative Presidents can occur only via an interaction between core elements of the active-negative character and a particular kind of situational configuration, an equally careful delineation of the structure of the situation that faced Hoover and Johnson would be necessary in order to judge whether the tragedies they suffered have explanations similar to Wilson's. Barber's descriptions of the situational configurations facing Hoover and Johnson are inadequate in this respect; they do not enable him to display with equal visibility or plausibility that their tragedies developed out of an interaction between character and situation.

Wilson's effort to bring the United States into the League of Nations was widely acknowledged to be a worthwhile goal and enjoyed more than sufficient support both in the Senate and in the country to bring it to fruition. Wilson's tragedy developed from the fact that his own behavior was instrumental in preventing the imminent and expected realization of this goal. Barber fails to note that, of the three Presidents, only Wilson snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. The nature of Hoover's tragedy is much more diffuse. Barber seems to define it in terms of Hoover's prolonged refusal to authorize a public dole for the unemployed by the Federal Government, which led to a loss of public confidence and Hoover's defeat in the election of 1932. Indeed, the tragedy for the public lay in the prolongation of the misery of the unemployed occasioned by Hoover's attitude towards a public dole. It is not wholly satisfactory, as some of Barber's formulations imply, to regard Hoover's defeat in 1932 as the chief component of Hoover's personal tragedy, since he seems not to have been much interested in reelection until after his policies and leadership came under strong attack. The personal side of the tragedy surely lay more in the fact that Hoover, a sincere humanitarian, nonetheless contributed to the continued misery of the unemployed by his opposition to the public dole.

Barber's thesis is that Hoover's continued opposition to the dole is explained by the peculiar psychological rigidification to which active-negative persons are subject when they perceive political opposition as posing fundamental threats to their power and rectitude. This interpretation would be more plausible if Barber gave evidence that he had considered alternative explanations and found reason to reject them. Certainly Hoover was stubborn on the matter of a public dole, but he appears to have strongly opposed it from the beginning—*before* attacks

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on his policies posed threats to his power and rectitude—because he found the idea peculiarly antithetical to his political philosophy. One might consider, therefore, why the dole played so important a role in Hoover's personal ideology, and what it had come to symbolize for him in terms of his own personal development. This is merely a reminder that many different kinds of personality involvements may lie at the root of strongly-held political opinions. It behooves the investigator to consider alternative psychological interpretations and to give evidence that he has resisted the temptation to impose his favored psychological theory on the data simply because it provides a plausible interpretation.

Barber's interpretation of Hoover's character-induced tragedy would also gain in plausibility if he had given evidence of having considered a purely cognitive explanation of it in terms of world view and had found it unsatisfactory. Here (and elsewhere in his study) Barber fails to come to grips with a major theoretical and methodological problem that is central to his theory. "Stubborn" behavior at the manifest level can have different underlying causes. Thus, the underlying dynamics of Wilson's stubbornness in the fight over the League appear to me to be quite different from Hoover's in the matter of the public dole. There is strong evidence of an ego-defensive, aggressive psychodynamic pattern in Wilson's stubbornness vis-à-vis his Senate opponents over the form in which their reservations about the League Covenant should be expressed. In Hoover's case, the materials reported by Barber suggest the possibility of a strong *cognitive* basis for Hoover's opposition to the dole, rooted in his political philosophy. Moreover, Barber recognizes (pp. 28-29) that from the beginning of the depression Hoover did everything he could to encourage relief for the unemployed through private and voluntary channels; and, while opposing a public dole from Washington, he stated more than once that if the day came when voluntary agencies were unable to find resources to prevent hunger and suffering, he would employ federal resources. Indeed, however belatedly, he did move in this direction in the summer of 1932. Barber reports this (p. 30), but fails to note that Hoover's policy reversal would seem to contradict the thesis that he was in the grip of a characterological rigidification.[27]

[27] There is ample evidence that cognitive dissonance mechanisms distorted Hoover's perception of reality vis-à-vis the scope and depth of the suffering of the unemployed. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., notes striking examples of Hoover's tendency to downgrade and dismiss reports of suffering and malnutrition, and to favor more optimistic reports. He also notes that "the strain of maintaining his principles in the face of the accumulating evidence of human need doubtless led both to anxiety and to self-righteousness."

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A similar policy reversal took place in LBJ's Vietnam policy when he de-escalated and then suspended the bombing of North Vietnam in 1968. This, too, is noted by Barber (pp. 41-42), but without recognizing that it also apparently contradicts his thesis regarding rigidification. Nor does Barber take into account that, in contrast to Hoover and Johnson, Wilson did *not* reverse course in his battle with the Senate; rather than accept relatively insignificant compromises that would have assured passage of the treaty, Wilson accepted its defeat.

In this and other respects, Barber's analysis of the "tragic tales" of the three active-negative Presidents is marred by a tendency to focus on the similarities and to ignore or downplay the significance of the differences. In his search for generalization, Barber appears to have taken an essentially correct explanation for Wilson's tragedy and imposed it, with much less evidence that it fits, as an explanation for Hoover's and Johnson's tragedies.[28] Curiously, Barber fails to mention the well-known and well-documented fact that the League tragedy was strikingly foreshadowed by Wilson's difficulties as President of Princeton University and as Governor of New Jersey.[29] The repetitive pattern of self-defeating behavior in his career provides strong support for the interpretation of Wilson. Noteworthy is the fact that such repetitive

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A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Crisis of the Old Order* (Boston 1957), 241-43. But cognitive dissonance occurs in many circumstances other than the type of characterological rigidification postulated by Barber. Hoover evidently experienced an acute conflict at the cognitive level between his humanitarian values and his political philosophy, which he resolved in favor of the latter. One cannot exclude, of course, that the conflict experienced at the cognitive level was *reinforced* by personality needs and anxieties. But the precise nature of this personality involvement is, as I have suggested, another matter.

As this discussion implies, students of personality need to develop better ways of distinguishing and differentiating between explanations of behavior in terms of *cognitive* variables and explanations in terms of *psychodynamic* patterns aroused by the situation. In recent years attention has frequently been called to the danger of confounding these two explanatory variables. In addition to the need for finding indicators that will enable the investigator to discriminate between the two, ways must be found to investigate the relationship between cognitive and psychodynamic variables.

[28] Thus, Barber concludes the chapter "Three Tragic Tales" with a general observation that fits into the explanation of Wilson's tragedy but not into that of Hoover and Johnson. Speaking of the way in which the process of rigidification leaves the active-negative President locked in mortal combat with an opponent who personifies a threat felt at the personal level, Barber states that for the beleaguered President "surrender is suicide, an admission of guilt and weakness. Having invested all his moral capital in the cause, he will—he must—plunge on to the end" (p. 57). Since such a prediction would be falsified by the Hoover and Johnson policy reversals, questions are raised regarding the adequacy of Barber's characterological theory which implies that an active-negative President loses the possibility of controlling or cutting short the process of rigidification once it has started.

[29] Rather, he tries to explain why the characterological propensities to rigidification were not evident earlier in Wilson's (as well as Hoover's and Johnson's) careers (p. 99).

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tragic patterns were evidently lacking in the careers of Hoover and Johnson. The question arises whether Wilson, though sharing certain compulsive character traits with Hoover and LBJ, was not also different from them in important respects.

Finally, as already suggested, because Barber does not take into account the strength and operation of ego controls, his theory of the active-negative character does not offer any help in explaining or predicting whether and when the process of rigidification, once underway, gets turned off in persons with this type of character. And yet this possibility is central to the task of using the theory to predict performance.

IV

Barber's analysis of Nixon is by far the longest and most detailed of his presidential profiles, occupying about a hundred pages, almost a quarter of the entire book. It is testimony to Barber's respect for evidence and his recognition of the hazardous nature of the enterprise that he finally comes to question whether Nixon really fits the active-negative character well enough to support the prediction of a tragedy. But one must read to the very end of Barber's long analysis (pp. 441-42) to become aware of the full dimensions of his uncertainty about Nixon. At the outset, Barber appears to be unequivocal and quite confident of his diagnosis of Nixon and of the prediction. "Nixon was—and is—an active-negative type. The danger in his Presidency is the same as the danger Wilson, Hoover, and Johnson succumbed to: rigid adherence to a failing line of policy. . . . In Nixon's case, every one of the elements found in the Wilson, Hoover, and Johnson cases is present and discernible in the history of his public years" (p. 347). "One could hardly be wrong about Nixon's overall placement in the active-negative category" (p. 348).[30] The diagnosis and prediction are repeated along the way (pp. 418, 441).

A note of uncertainty enters, however, when Barber turns to the task of interpreting Nixon's performance during the first term of his Presidency. Barber acknowledges that the kind of tragedy predicted for Nixon had not materialized as of late-1971. Instead, Nixon thus far

[30] Compare Barber's emphasis on Nixon's negative affect towards his activity with White House correspondent Hugh Sidey's observation: "Nixon wears the Presidency like a comfortable coat of armor. It has been dented here and there and it has a few tarnished spots, but it fits him and it feels good. He loves the job." *Life Magazine*, November 17, 1972, p. 4.

Bruce Mazlish, too, finds that Nixon "obviously enjoys his new role" as President, and that "in the office of President, Nixon believes that his role and his self have finally come together." *In Search of Nixon* (New York 1972), 76.

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"appeared to many, including many strong opponents, as a highly flexible expert politician carefully wending his way through a tangle of issues as he approached the 1972 campaign" (p. 418).

Having undertaken the Nixon prediction in 1968–69 in part as an experiment to test his theory (p. 6), Barber was confronted in 1971 by the difficult task of deciding whether events and non-events during the first term served to disconfirm his theory or at least important parts of it.[31] The prior question, however, is whether the prediction of a political tragedy can indeed be taken as a critical experiment to test the theory. Barber appeared to think so at the outset; but the contrary view (which he eventually embraces), is more defensible. It is of some importance for our purposes to understand why his prediction cannot serve the function of a critical test of his theory. Assuming that a *tendency* to political tragedy is present in the active-negative character, whether it develops depends on other variables which may or may not materialize during the course of a man's Presidency. For one thing, it depends on the occurrence of a situation of the kind that will trigger rigidification. What are the characteristics of such a situation, and how likely is it to occur during a President's incumbency? It is difficult for Barber to postulate the objective characteristics of such a situation with any specificity. (It is much easier to identify, as he does, the kind of subjective perception of it by an active-negative President which would lead to or accompany rigidification.)

Not only situational variables but also personality variables that are *not* included in Barber's conceptualization of personality are critical to his prediction. Whether the process of rigidification is triggered in the first place and whether it proceeds unchecked to produce a political catastrophe depends on the person's ability to control such tendencies within himself. The strength of these ego controls under differing circumstances is difficult to foresee. Even if we assume the validity of the theory of the active-negative character, it does not tell us how the critical variable of ego controls will appear in different individuals who

[31] It may be noted in passing that Barber evidently assumed that the kind of political tragedy he predicted would be plainly visible in public events. This would seem to exclude from the scope of the effort of prediction such events as the secret illegal activities of the special investigation unit Nixon set up in the White House in 1971. At first glance, it does not appear that the personality factors that may have entered into Nixon's authorization of such activities are the same as the psychodynamic process of rigidification postulated in Barber's theory. On the other hand, retrospective analysis of these recently disclosed activities may offer Barber an opportunity for a "correction by evidence" that would attempt to show that these activities, although not initially predicted by his theory, are at least consistent with an amplified and revised version of it.

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exemplify this character type. That can be deduced—only with difficulty—from a careful analysis of the individual himself and the history of his past behavior. One can imagine that some active-negative characters are able to acquire much stronger and more resourceful controls than others over the disruptive tendencies latent in their personalities. Moreover, an individual's ego controls and, more generally, his ability to engage in unimpaired reality-testing can be strengthened or impeded by the small-group and organizational contexts in which he functions. For example, with the help of close advisers and personal staff, an executive may develop considerable resourcefulness in structuring and managing the immediate environment so as to shield himself from stressful experiences that distract, provoke, fatigue, or otherwise intrude upon his preferred way of performing in the role.[32]

For these and perhaps other reasons, the use of such a prediction to test the theory and to permit the investigator to proceed, if necessary, to the laudable objective of "correction by evidence" (p. 6) becomes elusive. So elusive, perhaps, that the theory is in danger of not being subject to falsification, at least by means of the kind of prediction-experiment Barber employs. Barber was indeed justified in deciding not to abandon his theory on the basis of the evidence of Nixon's first term. Instead, he found sufficient indications of the behavioral dynamics associated with the active-negative type in Nixon's first term to justify his continued adherence to both the theory and the prediction. This is unexceptional to be sure; but at the same time we must note that since even the non-occurrence of the prediction cannot be held to invalidate the theory, we are left without a clear indication of what it would take to falsify it.

Chapter 12 of *Presidential Character* is largely given over to "the critical question: has the President already shown signs presaging the kind of tragic freezing Wilson, Hoover, and Johnson fell into?" (p. 419). Throughout most of this chapter (pp. 421-41), Barber answers this question affirmatively, noting that the President indulged in aggressive rhetoric, concentrated power in his office, increasingly isolated himself, and gave unmistakable evidence in the Carswell case and the Cambodian venture that he scored high "on the core active-negative demand—to control and not be controlled . . ." (p. 425). The missing element for a full-blown tragedy, Barber suggests, was that in his first

[32] However, this coping strategy may in turn create a different set of risks for performance in the role. Long before the disclosures associated with the Watergate scandal, observers called attention to the dangers of isolation stemming from the President's preference for a staff system of tight buffers around him.

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term Nixon had "not yet found a cause comparable to Wilson's crusade for the League, Hoover's stand against the dole, or Johnson's pursuit of military victory . . ." (p. 425).

A closer look at the Carswell case and the Cambodian venture, however, raises questions concerning Barber's thesis. If these examples furnish him with indications "that the underlying Nixon character is still there" (p. 425), as evidenced by the fact that Nixon threw down the gauntlet in the Carswell case and reacted to opposition with "the air of injured pride, the attribution of low motives, and [a] threatening tone . . ." (p. 429),[33] they also furnish evidence that Nixon's *controls* over these tendencies were strong and effective enough to limit and cut short the process of rigidification.[34] At first, Barber ignores the significance of these controls, while attempting to find a basis for saving and reformulating his theory. But in the end he tacitly recognizes them and concedes that Nixon is a "special variant" of the active-negative character in that, "*with his remarkable flexibility regarding issues and ideologies, Nixon can be 'defeated' any number of times on specific questions of policy without feeling personally threatened.* His investment is not in values, not in standing fast for some principle. . . . His investment is in himself, and Nixon's self is taken up with its management . . ." (pp. 441-42; emphasis added).

Nixon's behavior now emerges as so different from what we have been led to expect from active-negative Presidents that one wonders whether Barber has misdiagnosed him or whether the differences among active-negatives are greater after all than the similarities and common patterns that Barber has emphasized throughout his study. These differences may well be crucial to Barber's prediction. Is Nixon another Wilson? I think not. Some of the differences have already been noted; in addition, although they share a compulsive component in their personalities, only Wilson was a compulsive *reformer*. Nixon has lacked Wilson's unquenchable need for serving as the instrument

[33] Mazlish's interpretation of the Haynsworth-Carswell affair emphasizes even more than Barber's that Nixon overreacted and became personally involved, experiencing his defeat as a humiliation (fn. 30, 127-31).

[34] The backlash against the Cambodian invasion would seem to provide precisely the kind of challenge to Nixon's power, virtue, etc., that, according to Barber's theory, should have triggered the ruinous process of rigidification in Nixon. In fact, the opposite occurred (as Barber reports without recognizing its possible significance as a "test" that *dis*confirms his prediction); for when "the reaction [to the Cambodian venture] exploded across the country, *Nixon began to back-pedal.* On May 5 he pledged to Congressional committees meeting in the White House that the Cambodian venture would be over in three to seven weeks, with all Americans withdrawn, and that he would not order troops deeper into Cambodia than 21 miles without seeking Congressional approval . . ." (pp. 439-40; emphasis added).

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for high moral achievements in the political arena which, when thwarted, could trigger rigidification. (Whether his commitment to certain foreign policy objectives constitutes a change in this respect remains to be seen.)

Another difference is that the power drive that Barber attributes to both men was clearly present only in the underlying need structure and dynamics of Wilson's personality (and was aroused, it should be added, only under special circumstances). The case Barber constructs for Nixon's "power need" (pp. 365-74) is not well-founded and only superficially plausible. (Whether a more convincing case could be made is problematical and must remain an open question.) Much of the behavior that Barber cites as evincing a power need may well turn out, upon close inspection, to be evidence not of that, but rather of Nixon's strong need for *respect*.[35] In certain circumstances it may be quite important to gauge correctly whether a President's behavior is motivated by a need for respect as against a need for power. If his personal stakes in a contested issue have to do with respect rather than power, he may find it easier—if an appropriately deferential face-saving scenario can be improvised or is provided by opponents—to back down.

For Nixon, power appears to be a secondary, *instrumental* value, not a core need of his character. Nixon does show ample interest in power and is often skillful in power maneuvers. But, as is well known, traits displayed at the surface level of behavior can have quite different underlying dynamic patterns. As the history of research on the authoritarian type and much other work on personality indicates, it is risky to infer from the presence of traits at the phenomenological layer of behavior that a deep-seated personality need exists for that kind of behavior.[36]

[35] In stating this reinterpretation of the materials Barber provides, I draw also on an unpublished study of Nixon's political personality and political style by Richard Born (Stanford 1970). Born concludes that both in his prepolitical period and during his political career Nixon has consistently evinced a strong need for respect rather than for power. As criteria that a high value is placed on respect by the person, Born utilizes Harold D. Lasswell's three indicators of this need: (1) constant need for reassurance about "how am I doing?"; (2) sensitivity to the admiration of others; (3) reactions of wounded pride and resentment to slights, real or imagined. See "Democratic Character," in *The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell* (Glencoe, Ill. 1951), 499. Whether Lasswell's indicators are adequate is less germane than the fact that some set of explicit indicators is necessary to avoid the dangers of a purely impressionistic judgment.

The difficult problem of identifying valid indicators of a power need and related problems connected with this concept and Lasswell's general hypothesis regarding the compensatory nature of power need are discussed in George, "Power as a Compensatory Value for Political Leaders," *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIV (July 1968), 29-49.

[36] A useful and incisive account of the ambiguities that plagued much of the earlier research on the authoritarian type, with direct relevance to the problems encountered in the construction of Barber's character types, is provided by Fred I. Greenstein, *Per-*

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Manifest behavior of the same kind, displayed by different individuals, may serve different functions in the workings of their personality systems. More refined, discriminating indicators and instruments are needed to infer deep-seated characterological needs from behavior. An interest and skill in power may be *learned* and displayed by a person *in response to role and situational requirements.* And it may be employed to facilitate gratification of other kinds of personality needs, such as for respect, achievement, well-being, etc.

Unlike Wilson, who displayed political ambitions from early adolescence, the young Nixon showed little interest in politics. Wilson as an adolescent identified with political statesmen and consciously modeled himself on great political orators; in contrast, political leadership for Nixon, as Barber notes, "just happened" accidentally when he was approaching his mid-thirties (p. 359). This in itself is not decisive, since an individual's power drive need not be directed to the arena of politics but may find an outlet in some other kind of activity in which political conflict and opportunities for expressing power needs are available. But if a power need is imbedded in a person's character, one expects to find some indication in his earlier years that he pursues power as a means of compensation for damaged self-esteem. No evidence of this kind is presented for Nixon's earlier years; rather, his ambition as a youth seems to have been motored by a need for respect and financial security rather than by a power need *per se.* Barber recognizes, moreover, that "ambition is a quality nearly every politician shares" and that "in its broadest sense it means little more than striving itself—for whatever goal" (p. 366).

Ambition *per se*, then, is not evidence of power need or power drive (the two terms are used interchangeably here). Nonetheless, Barber confuses evidence of Nixon's ambition with power drive. Much of the material cited as evidence of a power need is drawn from various events that occurred while Nixon was Vice President under Eisenhower. In reviewing the frustrations and dilemmas Nixon experienced as Vice President, Barber is too quick to regard as power maneuvers and power sensitivity Nixon's efforts to remain on the Republican presidential ticket in 1952, his resentment of slights, and his efforts to survive the Vice Presidency and preserve opportunities for becoming the presidential candidate.

Turning to another aspect of the interpretation, Barber correctly pre-

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sonality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization (Chicago 1969), chap. 4.

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dicts various aspects of Nixon's style in the Presidency and, further, that Nixon would move toward power concentration rather than carry out his stated intention of diluting the historic trend toward centralization of power in the White House—and, within that, in the hands of the President himself (pp. 421-22). That trend, of course, has roots in complex problems of modern government; the fact of further concentration of power in the White House under Nixon cannot be taken *ipso facto* as reliable evidence of a characterological power need. There has indeed been unusual centralization of decision making by the executive branch in the White House. The National Security Council was reorganized by Nixon and Kissinger so as to draw the power to influence major foreign and national security policies away from the departments and into the White House. This NSC model has been replicated to some extent in other policy areas. The result has been a "miniaturization" of the executive branch within the White House.[37]

Attempts to explain developments of this kind solely with reference to a President's presumed power need carry with them the danger of an oversimplified or totally erroneous explanation. To bypass the consideration of other variables that affect such developments in favor of a characterological explanation can only reduce the plausibility of personality interpretations. Besides, to the extent that the personality of the chief executive is a factor, variables other than the postulate of a deep-seated power need may be involved. One can see Nixon's centralization of decision-making power in the White House as a management strategy for coping with the ever-present, stubborn problem of bureaucratic politics within the executive branch (which in various ways reduces a President's ability to engage in policy initiatives), and for obtaining implementation of his policies by the departments and agencies. Such a management strategy may indeed have had particular appeal for one who, like Nixon, has had a pronounced distrust of the bureaucratic departments, wanted to preserve as much power as possible to influence at least the most important policy problems his administration must deal with, hoped to deal with policy crises with as little damage as possible to his personal political position, and whose approach to his work has been influenced by the special cognitive style and conscientiousness engendered by the "compulsive" component in his personal make-up.

Ironically, a coping strategy that is designed to deal with certain

[37] For discussion of these developments see, for example, Thomas E. Cronin, *The State of the Presidency* (forthcoming); Richard T. Johnson, *Managing the White House* (New York 1974).

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clearly perceived problems affecting one's ability to govern may itself entail a new set of dimly perceived risks. As many observers of Nixon's style of management have continually noted, there are real dangers in the extent to which executive-branch decision making has been centralized in the White House, particularly when coupled with the President's well-known preference for solo decision making. Notwithstanding his demand for well-prepared options from his staff and the conscientious homework he engages in before making an important decision, Nixon's tendency to withdraw from direct consultation and from the give-and-take of a system of adversary proceedings or multiple advocacy is worrisome. It increases the likelihood of poor decisions that misjudge salient aspects of the situation. Nonetheless, however seriously flawed such decisions may be on occasion, the personality factor in the explanation is not necessarily a deep-seated characterological power drive; nor does the mere invocation of a presumed need of this kind clarify or illuminate very well those cognitive and psychodynamic variables within the personality system that are interacting with situational and role variables.

I noted earlier that, while Barber concludes his interpretation of Nixon's performance in the first term by acknowledging that Nixon is a special variant of the active-negative type, he continues to assert his prediction of a character-induced tragedy. He emphasizes (not implausibly, but cryptically) that a second term may pose special temptations to the President (pp. 348, 442, 447), and focuses his prediction of rigidification on a more sharply delimited situation: "But let the issue reach his central concern, the concern of self-management, and the fat may go into the fire. Threats to his independence in particular—the sense he is being controlled from without because he cannot be trusted, because he is weak or stupid or unstable—will call forth a strong inner response." (Were not the oppositions to the Carswell appointment and to the Cambodian venture, one may ask, precisely such threats?) Barber continues, "only when . . . he cannot escape [a crisis] by moving on to some alternative crisis, and he experiences a sense of entrapment is he likely to move toward the classic form of rigidification" (p. 442).

Having thus redefined and reasserted his prediction, Barber closes his profile of Nixon with an unexpected hedge. Speaking of heroes for whom Nixon has expressed admiration in the past, Barber observes that "conceivably" Nixon "could come to find an example in another man of independence, unheroic Harry Truman . . ." (p. 442). The significance of this cryptic remark lies in the fact that Harry Truman

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is diagnosed elsewhere in the book as having an active-*positive* character. It would appear, therefore, that Barber's uncertainty about Nixon, whom he has already conceded to be a special variant of the active-negative type, is such that he cannot exclude the possibility that Nixon may emerge as an active-positive.

In view of the foregoing, it is all the more disappointing that Barber has so little to say about the possible significance of the period following Nixon's "withdrawal" from politics in 1962, after his defeat in the California gubernatorial election. Was there growth and change during this period? Did the realization of the ambition thwarted in his early adulthood to be accepted into a prestigious New York or Washington law firm and the process of staging a successful comeback in politics contribute to the shaping of a "new Nixon," as was widely suggested at the time? Barber passes over this possibility very quickly, stressing instead that evidences of the man's earlier personality can be found during his first term and that these are likely to "overshadow any transformations his moves from New York to Washington may have engendered"[38] (pp. 418-19).

Highlighted here is a major problem in Barber's theory of personality. While he recognizes that character is not firmly fixed in childhood (e.g., p. 10), in effect he operates with a notion of character structure as being generally static for at least three of his four character types, and in particular for the active-negative. The important exception in this respect is the active-positive type who, unburdened by problems of self-esteem, is capable of growth through experience. It may be recalled in this connection that ego psychology and the psychology of adaptation, on which Barber draws effectively in other respects, have muted the earlier notion that character structure retains a timeless fixity once it has been shaped in childhood. This important theoretical development has not found its way adequately into Barber's conceptualization of personality. Admittedly, it would not be an easy matter for Barber to incorporate into his own theory Erik Erikson's notion of

[38] Neither does Barber mention or refer to the possible significance, if any, of Nixon's consultations, while Vice President, with Arnold Hutschnecker, M.D., who in 1951 had written a book on psychosomatic medicine—leading to rumors later on that Nixon had seen a psychiatrist. In an article written in 1969, Dr. Hutschnecker states unequivocally that "during the entire period that I treated Mr. Nixon, I detected no sign of mental illness in him." He also states that, because of the rumors, he and Nixon came to "an understanding, years before the 1960 elections, that we should discontinue our doctor-patient relationship." Hutschnecker also refers to having had "an amicable personal relationship" with Nixon "over the years" during which time they "became friends and, as such, we discussed many subjects in an open and relaxed manner." A. A. Hutschnecker, M.D., "The Mental Health of Our Leaders," *Look Magazine*, July 15, 1969, pp. 51-54.

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identity as a dynamic development with roots in different phases of development and related to changing historical forces, or to modify his approach to personality by drawing upon social-learning theory, with its heavy emphasis on modeling, learning, and situationally determined behavior. But it seems to me that something important contained in these alternative theories is missing in a theory of personality such as Barber's. Without it, his approach is not conducive to grasping possibly important changes in personality.[39] (I shall return to this question in discussing the problems of using personality typologies for diagnosing individuals.)

Before proceeding, I should point out several additional aspects of the analysis of Nixon. The active-negative character, it will be recalled, displays a "compulsive" quality in his activity. This characteristic is indeed evident in some aspects of Nixon's approach to decision making. Barber describes Nixon's classic crisis in fascinating detail, drawing on Nixon's own revealing account (in *Six Crises*) of how he has learned to handle critical events, what he perceives the dangers to be, and the satisfactions he derives from mastering them. Barber offers the interpretation that going through such crises fulfills an important need in Nixon's personality: "he relives each time the agony of self-definition. . . . There in a short space of time Nixon acts out the drama of his life—over and over again" (pp. 417, 421). The implication of Barber's analysis is not only that Nixon maintains self-esteem in this way, but that he relishes (seeks? even provokes?) crises for this reason, and that the effort to satisfy his need for self-esteem by crisis decision-making carries grave risks.[40] After all, even Nixon recognizes and speaks openly of the way in which he must steer himself through such crises in order to control tendencies he perceives within himself—at first to avoid the issue and later to indulge his aggressive feelings or to let down his guard.

Admittedly, Nixon's own description is occasion for concern at first glance. We must remind ourselves, however, that Nixon experienced many such crises in the past and that none of them resulted in the kind of tragedy Barber predicts. While Nixon may have to struggle for

[39] The possibility of change and maturation in personality is dealt with more explicitly and with some degree of plausibility in Mazlish's psychohistorical interpretation of Nixon. While finding that Nixon has not changed "in any fundamental sense" (fn. 30, 143), Mazlish sees evidence that Nixon achieved a release from old emotions and attained stronger and more effective ego controls. *Ibid.*, 105, 125, 144-45.

[40] Similar observations about Nixon's "crisis" behavior are offered by Mazlish, *ibid.*, 26, 77, 87-88, 92, 127, 138; and by Arthur Woodstone's psychoanalytically inspired journalistic study, *Nixon's Head* (New York 1972).

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self-management, much of it appears at the conscious level; and, in any case, Nixon has thus far been relatively successful in self-management.[41] Viewed from a different perspective, therefore, one may see, in Nixon's classic crises, methods for coping with decisional stresses that he is aware of and attentive to.

Finally, one must distinguish between the *process* and the *substance* of the decisions. The process of the classic crisis may indeed be disruptive at times of rationality and of reality-oriented decision making. But this cannot simply be assumed to be the case; such a determination requires careful analysis and judgment on the investigator's part. The fact that one disapproves of a policy decision that emerges from the process of a classic crisis does not constitute a valid basis for assuming that the substance of the decision was contaminated by the subjective substratum. Moreover, even an objectively bad decision may stem from causes (e.g., inadequate information, bad advice, stupidity) other than the intrusion of disruptive personality dynamics.

It is appropriate in this connection to recall that some years ago, when political scientists were exposed to early developments in ego psychology, they were struck by the fact that arousal of a leader's anxieties and ego defenses could severely impair his ability to deal rationally with a situation. As a result, political scientists—and, indeed, some psychiatrists and psychologists as well—tended to regard any display of ego defenses (such as denial, projection, or rationalization) by a political leader in a stressful situation as a telltale sign that his ability to cope rationally and effectively with that situation had been impaired. Decisions taken in these circumstances were regarded with suspicion, and any inadequacy perceived in the substance of the decision was explained as being the unfortunate by-product of the leader's resort to ego defenses to cope with his anxieties. Explanatory hypotheses of this kind often oversimplified and distorted the role of unconscious emotional factors in decision making.

Recent developments in ego psychology and in studies of the nature of coping processes offer political scientists a much more refined and discriminating understanding of these matters. Many of the classical ego-defense mechanisms can be used constructively by an individual in the total process of coping. Defensive operations such as withdrawal, denial, or projection do not necessarily preclude intelligent and reasonable adaptation to a difficult situation. Rather, these defensive ma-

[41] Among the changes Mazlish sees in Nixon's development since the nadir in his political career is that "his control of impulse, his planning and deliberation were greater than ever" (fn. 30, 125).

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neuvers may give the individual time to regroup ego resources and provide him with the short-run, tactical ego support that sustains him momentarily until he can return to employing more constructive ego capacities such as information seeking, role rehearsal, or planning in order to deal with the problem.[42]

V

Central to Barber's theory is his typology of character, many aspects of which have already been discussed. Here I shall comment on it more explicitly from the standpoint of some well-known problems that have been encountered in the *construction* of personality typologies and in their *use*. The two sets of problems are, of course, related: the use to which a typology is to be put defines the nature and requirements of the typology to be constructed. Barber's intended use of his typology is, as we have noted, a very ambitious one; accordingly, the requirements that have to be met in constructing it are very demanding. A complex form of psychological analysis is presumed. A reconstruction of the logic by means of which his types are erected identifies three overlapping but analytically separate operations. In Fred Greenstein's terminology,[43] these tasks include (1) a description of the *phenomenology* (or "presenting characteristics") of the individual's behavior; (2) an attempt to establish the *psychological dynamics* underlying these patterns of observed behavior; and (3) an attempt to identify the *developmental experiences* that account for the emergence of the observed patterns and inferred underlying psychodynamics.

This set of distinctions among the phenomenological, psychodynamic, and psychogenetic layers of behavior is useful, indeed necessary, for clarifying theoretical and methodological issues and for identifying the requirements for validating the interrelationships postulated within

[42] For a fuller discussion see George, "Adaptation to Stress in Political Decision-making: The Individual, Small-Group, and Organizational Contexts," in G. V. Coelho, D. A. Hamburg, and J. Adams, eds., *Coping and Adaptation* (New York 1974). See also Ole R. Holsti and Alexander L. George, "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-makers" (forthcoming).

[43] Greenstein (fn. 36), especially pp. 65-68, 95-96, 102-44. For a briefer account somewhat differently stated, see Greenstein, "Personality and Politics," prepared for *The Handbook of Political Science* (forthcoming). Harold Lasswell employs a different terminology ("nuclear," "co-relational," and "developmental") in discussing similar problems. See his "A Note on 'Types' of Political Personality: Nuclear, Co-Relational, Developmental," in *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIV (July 1968), 81-92; a helpful introduction to Lasswell's article is provided by Greenstein and Lerner (fn. 16), 231-32. Greenstein's terms (phenomenology, dynamics, genesis) are used here because their substantive referents are clearer and more relevant for our purposes than Lasswell's terminology.

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each of Barber's type constructs. A character type of the kind Barber has postulated is a *composite* of the three levels of analysis. What is more, his typology presumes a causal theory linking stated patterns of behavior at the phenomenological level with underlying dynamics and the developmental experiences that account for them. Validation of the type construct requires empirical analysis that is appropriate to the causal theory imbedded therein. Definitions and concepts cannot do the work of validation.

Typologies of this kind presumably summarize findings from a wide range of studies of individuals. Typologies necessarily abstract common features from individual cases, but abstraction cannot justify ignoring or lowering the requirement for validation of the implicit causal theory linking the three layers of behavior. Putting the causal theory in the form of a typology rather than in a more detailed analysis of a single individual does not get rid of or simplify the requirement of validation. We have already discussed in some detail the problem of validation for Barber's character types. Rather than to repeat or summarize, let us go on to another problem in the construction and use of personality typologies.

In abstracting common features from individual cases for the purpose of a typology, one has to be selective. The full complexity of each individual's personality cannot be easily incorporated into a type; an attempt to do so would proliferate the number of specialized types formulated. At least initially, therefore, relatively few characteristics (e.g., Barber's active-passive and positive-negative dimensions) are singled out from which to construct a relatively small number of basic types. An attempt may be made later to identify clusters or syndromes of still other characteristics that are thought to be associated with these initial nuclear defining characteristics.

The number of basic types in personality typologies is often small, and these few basic types are sharply demarcated and mutually exclusive. Each type, that is, is distinct and separate. As Carl Hempel notes, however, there are dangers in constructing typologies in this way. Drawing precise boundary lines between the dimensions of a typology can easily prove to be an "artificial, theoretically sterile, procedure." The resulting personality types are in the nature of "extreme" or "pure" types, "of which concrete instances are rarely if ever found. . . ."[44]

[44] Carl Gustav Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (New York 1965), 157. See also the article on "Typologies" by Edward A. Tiryakian, in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XVI, 177-86.

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Barber's four character types are indeed *pure types* in this sense; each type is but one component of the complex structure of any individual's character. As Hempel notes (and as Barber would agree),[45] pure types "cannot be construed as class concepts: individual cases cannot be subsumed under them as instances, but can only be characterized as to the extent to which they approximate them."[46] Consistent with this postulate, Barber notes (p. 449) that every person's character is some mix of all four types, a mix in which one type presumably dominates or is especially prominent. Again, it is a matter of "tendencies, broad directions; no individual man exactly fits a category" (p. 13; see also p. 7).

Enough has been said to make it clear that Barber's four character types can only be *a starting point* for the diagnosis of an individual. Indeed, he does use them as starting points in developing his profiles of the Presidents; but, somewhat inconsistently, he also tends to use his four pure types as labels for them, since he has not developed a more refined set of mixed types to work with. We must recall that the value of a typology of this kind to the biographer—who must attempt to describe and explain the relevant behavior of an individual in its concreteness and complexity—is necessarily limited because of the artificially pure character of each type construct. The biographer cannot be satisfied with labelling his subject as being an instance of, or bearing a certain resemblance to, a pure type. To do so oversimplifies the task of making use of the theories and findings of dynamic psychology and personality studies, and is likely to yield results of a limited and disappointing character. The problem at issue here is not always clearly recognized or properly dealt with. *Classification is often confused with diagnosis.* To tag the subject with a label drawn from a typology, to place him in a pigeonhole of one of its pure types, does not provide what the biographer needs most: namely, a more discriminating, differentiated theory regarding the individual's more complex personality.[47]

The problem of diagnosis versus classification is a familiar one in clinical psychology where a distinction is sometimes made between the "sponge" and the "file-drawer" clinician. The former approaches

[45] In *The Lawmakers,* Barber himself warned against the beguiling nature of typologies such as his own: "At a certain stage in the development of a typology, one experiences a peculiar intellectual seduction. The world begins to arrange itself in fourfold tables. The lines separating the categories get blacker and thicker, the objects near the margins move quietly toward the centers of the cells or fade into invisibility . . ." (p. 261).

[46] Hempel (fn. 44), 158 and 151-54; see also Tiryakian (fn. 44), 183.

[47] This and the following paragraphs draw on an earlier, more detailed discussion in George, "Some Uses of Dynamic Psychology in Political Biography," reprinted in Greenstein and Lerner (fn. 16), 78-98.

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the subject with a relatively open mind—sensitized, to be sure, by general theory and by available typologies—in order to develop a specific theory about that particular person from an intensive analysis of his behavior and case history. In contrast, the file-drawer clinician is inclined to gain insight into the patient by making an astute classification of him in terms of type characteristics. For present purposes it is important to recognize that the *sophisticated* file-drawer clinician often goes beyond the use of simple pure types to articulate *subtypes* for each of the basic classifications. In this way, a simple typology can be expanded to provide a set of *mixed types*, which is more discriminating and useful for diagnosing the complexity of any individual subject than the use of pure types.

Barber's diagnoses of the Presidents strike me, for the most part, as those of a file-drawer clinician. Although Barber is aware of the limitations of pure types generally, the inadequacies of his approach are accentuated because he has not yet found a way of transforming his four pure types into a larger number of more complex subtypes. As a result, Barber's classificatory scheme does not provide him with a systematic description of what Hempel calls mixed types, which would come closer than his pure types to catching the complexity of character and personality. Lacking subtypes in his theory, Barber tends to squeeze each President into one or another of the four pure types, hoping thereby to catch at least the dominant or most prominent aspects of his character.

This is not to say that Barber reifies his types; to some extent at least, he recognizes the lack of a close fit and attempts to describe it in an *ad hoc* fashion. Thus we learn that Eisenhower, though "best approximated in the passive-negative category" (p. 156) is a "more complicated mix" (p. 146) and "comes as close as any President to being one who strays beyond our crude categories" (p. 157); that there was a strong "compensatory" element in Truman's rhetoric and his decisiveness, and that his aggressiveness requires that he be placed "near the active-negative end" of the active-positive category to which Barber has assigned him (pp. 261-62, 292); that in 1932–33, there was some question whether Roosevelt would "turn out to be a passive-positive type" rather than, as it emerged, "active-positive" (pp. 235, 292); that John F. Kennedy's orientation to activity was not without ambivalence and contradictory themes, and that this "active-positive" President had to cope with the temptation towards detachment and passivity (p. 343); that there was considerable active leadership in the early years of "pas-

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sive-positive" Harding's Presidency (p. 193); and that, as noted earlier, Nixon is a "special variant" of the "active-negative" type (p. 441).

In the end, therefore, Barber's use of a primitive, undeveloped variant of the file-drawer approach—as against a more sophisticated version employing mixed types—leaves the reader uncertain of the adequacy of his diagnoses of the Presidents for the task at hand. It is clear that Barber has become enmeshed in the familiar and ever treacherous problem of falling between stools: as he plunges into the case studies of the Presidents, he is pulled toward recognition of their individuality, but the strong typological impulse motivating his work and his search for common patterns may well have cut short a fuller consideration of important differences among individuals once they had been assigned to the same character type.

A number of difficult questions emerge which are not taken up by Barber. If every President is some mixture of all four types, what are the implications for the task of explanation and prediction of his performance? How do diverse character trends coexist within the personality, and how does the tension between them manifest itself in behavior under different circumstances? What aspects of the role and situational requirements of the Presidency fit well with each of the diverse character trends to be found within each individual? Can the presidential role bring out or strengthen one particular side of the incumbent's mixed character type?

As these questions imply, although character types can be useful as a starting point for the diagnosis of an individual, they do not offer a substitute for a full-fledged model of that individual's personality or a short-cut method for developing one. Such a limitation is inherent in the nature of character types, for they always abstract and simplify. Accordingly, character types cannot identify the full set of needs, psychodynamic patterns, ego resources, and coping strategies possessed by the individual, all of which are relevant to his performance in the Presidency.

Another problem encountered in Barber's typology concerns the clarity and usefulness of the two dimensions—active-passive and positive-negative—that serve as the starting point and form the ostensible basis for his four character types. I alluded earlier in this review to the ambiguity of these two dimensions. In one usage, they are employed as *descriptive* terms in order to portray behavior at the manifest level—i.e., the "presenting characteristics" at the phenomenological level. So long as this usage of the terms is observed, the only question that arises

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is whether to regard each dimension as a *dichotomous attribute* (a person is either active or passive, and either positive or negative) or as a *continuum* (whereby each person is placed at some point on each dimension to reflect an averaging-out or overall assessment).[48] Conceivably, such a choice could make a difference in the theory, but the matter is ignored in Barber's treatment.

In any case and perhaps more important, the usage of these two dimensions and their implications in Barber's concept of character is not confined to the descriptive, phenomenological level. Thus, in explaining why "these two simple dimensions" can be expected "to outline the main character types," Barber emphasizes that active-passive and positive-negative "stand for two central features of anyone's orientation toward life . . ." (p. 12). The implication is that these two dimensions tap not merely the phenomenological layer of behavior, but reach into the origins of character which Barber has defined as "what life has marked into a man's being," the way in which he "orients himself toward life" (p. 8).

Be that as it may, the issue of clarity of usage is pushed aside by the even more important fact that the nature of "activity" at the manifest level of behavior and its significance within the personality system can differ strikingly from individual to individual. "Activity" can have different origins and can also reflect quite different underlying psychodynamic patterns. Although Barber may not agree with the interpretation advanced here, some of his materials suggest that high activity and decisiveness (including protestations of decisiveness) at the phenomenological level can be, as in Truman's case, "a defense against its opposite, against the fear that he would lapse into vagueness, wandering, cowardice, dependence . . ." (p. 262); and that the activity of even an active-positive type can be motivated by personal needs that escape the reality-oriented controls of the personality and result in behavior that is counterproductive for the self and the polity (pp. 271-73).

The relationship of activity to passivity at the psychodynamic and psychogenetic levels, therefore, is far more complex than is implied by the description of manifest behavior in these terms.[49] One is driven to conclude that it is not useful—indeed, it may confuse rather than clarify matters—to base a character typology on descriptions of behavior

[48] If the active-passive dimension is treated as a continuum, the objection may be raised that this obscures the conditions under which a person is active and the conditions under which he is not active.

[49] On this point see, for example, Edrita Fried, *Active/Passive: The Crucial Psychological Dimension* (New York 1971).

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that are couched in terms of an undifferentiated active-passive dimension or variable at the phenomenological level, ignoring the fact that *qualitatively different activity* is displayed at the manifest level by different individuals.

The dimension of positive-negative affect also encounters difficulties. The attempt to deal, as Barber does, with the question of the subject's affect towards his *activity* inherits some of the ambiguities of this concept which we have already noted, and encounters other difficulties as well. A few observations will have to suffice to indicate that the important question of affect that Barber has raised could benefit from more detailed analysis. The phenomenon of the "affectless" person, which has led some theorists of personality to postulate a detached-character type, is not easily encompassed or described in terms of Barber's dimension of positive-negative affect. (To attempt to do so would risk confusing *low* affect of any kind with *negative* affect.) Similarly, *ambivalence* of affect towards one's activity is not easily accommodated by a simple positive-negative scale.[50] The questions raised here cannot be brushed aside since the expression or non-expression of affect towards activity does not stand by itself in Barber's theory, but is part of distinctive configurations in which certain psychodynamic and psychogenetic processes are also postulated.[51]

Given the difficulties Barber's four-fold typology of character encounters, and the questionable assumptions and ambiguities associated with the two dimensions on which it is based, the question arises as to what can be done about them. One possibility, already suggested in our discussion of the need for mixed types, is to develop a more complicated

[50] A similar observation is made by Fred Greenstein, who comments that Barber's two dimensions "need amplification to take account of individuals who exhibit mood and behavior swings and for emotionally ambivalent individuals." "Political Psychology: A Pluralistic Universe," prepared for *The Handbook of Political Psychology*, Jeanne N. Knutson, ed. (forthcoming).

[51] In addition, special problems seem to arise in applying the dimension of positive-negative affect to the compulsively oriented active-negative type. Positive-negative, it will be recalled, refers to whether a person generally enjoys what he is doing. Barber finds that the euphoric reactions an active-negative person like Nixon displays are rare and short-lived and, besides, tinged with "a masochistic element" (p. 350). This acknowledges, at least, that the emotions a compulsive person experiences while at work, and the nature of his emotional reward, cannot be described very well with reference to the simple positive-negative dimension. While a compulsive person "worries" a decision, applying himself conscientiously to it, he also gains important satisfactions thereby. In some compulsives there may be a need to deny open or full expression of the positive affect experienced, as a kind of superstitious way of warding off danger and bad luck. Reliance on surface behavior for scoring a compulsive person on the positive-negative dimension involves the risk of overlooking the element of secret or controlled pleasures and the more complex nature of affect derived from activity.

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and sophisticated version of the present typology. In my judgment, the dimensions of active-passive and positive-negative affect, as presently defined and operationalized, are unsuitable for the kind of rich developmental and psychodynamic character typology Barber has attempted to formulate; they can be retained only if they are altered to take note of *qualitative* differences in activity and affect displayed at the phenomenological level of behavior. If this differentiation can be accomplished, the more refined version of the two dimensions might be employed in order to develop a richer array of character *subtypes* which will move the typology from pure types into mixed types that reflect the greater complexity of character in real life.

Another possibility would be to simplify the present typology radically in some way. Instead of continuing Barber's ambitious quest for character types that link phenomenological, psychodynamic, and psychogenetic variables in distinctive causal configurations, one might rely on some convenient indicators of phenomenology (i.e., presenting characteristics) to formulate simpler trait/type classifications that deliberately forego the attempt to interconnect the resulting personality types via some deductive format such as Barber's four-fold table.[52]

Still another possibility, probably too difficult to envisage at this time, would be to move the typology away from its present use as a classificatory scheme to an ordering procedure. This move would involve arrangement of individuals along several axes, replacing the four-fold classificatory table by reference spaces of several dimensions, permitting subtler distinctions than the present typology and opening the way toward dealing with each dimension as a quantitative variable rather than a dichotomous attribute.[53]

In any case, none of the three alternatives addresses the question of the *validity* of the typology, which must be accorded priority over the problem of what to do with the pure form in which Barber's character types are presently stated.

VI

Barber's study emerges as the first systematic effort to apply personality theory to the task of assessing candidates for the Presidency. In doing

[52] Interesting from this standpoint is James Payne's effort to modify Barber's approach in order to avoid characterological issues. Payne, together with Oliver Woshinsky, has formulated a number of "incentive types" to characterize political activists and political leaders. The authors emphasize that "incentive" describes only a fraction of any individual politician's personality. See James L. Payne and Oliver H. Woshinsky, "Incentives for Political Participation," *World Politics*, XXIV (July 1972), 518-46.

[53] For a fuller statement of this possibility, see Hempel (fn. 44), 152-54, 158-59.

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so, Barber moves the discussion away from an exclusive preoccupation with the dangers associated with the possibility that an incumbent may develop a major mental illness. His study adds new support to the thesis that various facets of personality can have an important effect on the performance of presidential duties and the use of presidential powers, and can sometimes make a real difference in terms of political outcomes.

It is not new for political scientists and others to note that variations in performance of the presidential role can occur as a result of differences, among other things, in the personalities of incumbents. In *Presidential Power*, Richard Neustadt offered suggestive but unformalized observations on variations in the personal qualities of past Presidents which affected their ability to deal with some of the difficult role requirements of the office. However, the conceptualization and operationalization of these personal qualities, or facets of personality, has remained a problem. Erwin Hargrove attempted, with a measure of success, to fill this gap by distinguishing between personality needs, mental traits, and values and ideology.[54] Barber has come forward with a more complex conceptualization of personality in terms of character, world view, and style.

Certainly Barber's theory proves itself—as does any good theory—insofar as it sensitizes the investigator to notice many interesting facets of personality that are expressed in a leader's political behavior. The theory also helps to draw sharp contrasts between Presidents with different types of personalities, and it enables the investigator to pull together his observations and interpretations about a President into a set of coherent patterns rather than to settle for a series of interesting but discursive observations. A theory of this kind also assists the investigator to provide an explicit, reasoned basis for making predictions, if he is so inclined. Barber has displayed considerable courage in accepting the challenge of testing a theory by making predictions in the hope that such predictions can then be used to help assess and improve the theory. These are important contributions on which to build in the future.

It is true, as Barber argues, that even an incomplete theory based on crude clues to character can be used to generate relevant assessments and predictions about political candidates. However, if a theory is inadequately validated and if, in addition, the assessments and predictions it generates are likely to be affected by the investigator's own political values, serious questions may arise regarding the confidence that can

[54] Erwin C. Hargrove, *Presidential Leadership: Personality and Political Style* (New York 1966).

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be attached to the predictions. In my judgment—and leaving aside the elusive question whether his own political values have influenced his assessments of Presidents and candidates—Barber's theory is insufficiently developed and insufficiently validated to carry the burden of prediction. As Barber's forecast regarding Nixon illustrates, predictions of presidential performance generated by the theory are subject to considerable uncertainty. One may question, therefore, whether the theory is ready for practical use in the process of assessment and selection of presidential candidates. As this implies, I believe that the distinction between the scientific and policy arenas must be more sharply drawn in evaluating Barber's theory and the use to which he puts it. The desire to undertake predictions in order to test and improve the theory in the scientific arena is not at issue here; that task can be attempted, of course, without introducing an ongoing study into the political arena. Nor is Barber's right to do so, or his judgment in doing so, in question here. At the same time, however, a reviewer has an obligation to express his own assessment as to whether a theory of this kind is ready for practical application.

Efforts to devise relevant and valid procedures for screening political candidates raise many complex and interlocking questions that will need to be studied by groups of diverse specialists working together over a period of years. It is by no means clear that sufficiently valid procedures can be developed, or that they can then be operationalized and applied adequately, for screening candidates for elective office. And, in any case, the question of how and by whom such procedures would be applied, and how the results would be inserted into the processes of the selection of candidates and electoral choice, remains unanswered.

Barber's effort to bypass some of these questions by offering his results to the general public creates problems of its own and invites new dangers. If individual scholars are to publish personality assessments of candidates in which they set their own criteria and exercise their own judgment regarding the validity of their findings, then we can expect the political arena to be flooded by pseudo-scholarly, politically biased personality analyses of political candidates that fall far short of the standards to which Barber himself subscribes. The desire to make unfinished, inadequately validated scholarly efforts relevant in the extremely difficult enterprise of personality assessment will undoubtedly lead to a lowering of standards and a debasement of objectivity. We are already witnessing efforts to convert psychohistory into a method for evaluating living political actors—a dubious use of the hard-earned

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and fragile scholarly reputation of psychohistory, which threatens to revive the discredited practice of using psychoanalytic theory to debunk historical figures.[55] If this trend continues, character analysis will degenerate into character assassination, and efforts to develop scholarly and responsible investigation of the role of personality in the behavior of political leaders will be set back a generation.

We are left with dilemmas that will not be easily resolved. Insofar as the focus of concern is psychological fitness for political office, rather than major mental illness, it does indeed appear necessary (although whether it is scientifically or politically feasible is an entirely different matter) to place emphasis on *screening* candidates before an election rather than *monitoring* their performance in office. It is far more difficult to remove from office an elected official who is not mentally ill but, in someone's judgment, performs poorly because of presumed characterological problems than it is to persuade people that a candidate's personality shortcomings make it undesirable to elect him to an important political office.

On the other hand, if the focus of concern is major mental illness, then it appears that greater reliance will have to be placed on monitoring the health of elected officials in office rather than on attempting to screen out candidates on the grounds that they are poor risks insofar as future mental illness is concerned.[56] Screening candidates for the risk of severe mental illness in the future (as against its present actuality) is not likely to achieve levels of political acceptability or predictive validity. Monitoring would still be necessary to identify and treat emergent mental illness in officeholders; and, indeed, monitoring can contribute far more to dealing with the risk of severe mental illness than screening. Moreover, monitoring for mental illness would seem to be more feasible medically and more acceptable politically than screening.

We are left with the prospect that more can be done with the circumscribed problem of major mental illness by reliance on monitoring rather than on screening; the broader, in some ways more important problem of psychological or characterological fitness is likely to prove intractable to efforts to devise either screening or monitoring pro-

[55] For a review of several recent efforts of this kind, see Robert Coles, "Shrinking History—Part Two," *New York Review of Books*, XX (March 8, 1973). My own views and those of my wife, Juliette L. George, are elaborated in "Psycho-McCarthyism," *Psychology Today*, VII (June 1973), 94-98.

[56] Indeed, this direction has been taken with great caution by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry in its recent study, "The VIP with Psychiatric Impairment," VIII, Report #83 (January 1973).

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cedures. Whatever the practical outcome, however, it is important to move forward with efforts to improve knowledge, not merely of the stresses typically encountered by officials with different kinds of personalities, but also of the ways in which they cope with stress and, particularly, of the consequences that their patterns of coping may have for the quality of their performance. Such knowledge, combined with an awareness of variations in the cognitive styles of different kinds of personalities, may be helpful in efforts to make appropriate adjustments in the structure and management of top-level decision-making processes.

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COMPARATIVE GRASSROOTS POLITICS IN AFRICA

By WALTER L. BARROWS*

Nicholas S. Hopkins, *Popular Government in an African Town: Kita, Mali.* Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1972, 246 pp., $9.50.

Maxwell Owusu, *Uses and Abuses of Political Power: A Case Study of Continuity and Change in the Politics of Ghana.* Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1970, 364 pp., $11.50.

Joan Vincent, *African Elite: The Big Men of a Small Town.* New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1971, 309 pp., $11.00.

I

UNTIL recently, our best studies of the developing areas took as their point of departure the systemic level of analysis—the national parties,[1] the state institutions,[2] the cosmopolitan central elites,[3] the overarching economic and communications networks[4]—but the particular assumptions and inevitable shortcomings of this approach led to a call for more attention to subsystem levels of analysis. By now it has become commonplace to note the need for studies of politics at the local

* I would like to thank Raymond Duvall for his critical reading of this article.

[1] On political parties in general, see Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton 1966). For treatments of African parties see, for instance, James S. Coleman and Carl C. Rosberg, eds., *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley 1966); Ruth S. Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa* (London 1964); Richard L. Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties* (Princeton 1962); Aristide Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton 1964).

[2] E.g., Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven 1968); Joseph LaPalombara, *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton 1963); Amishadai L. Adu, *The Civil Service in New African States* (New York 1965); Claude E. Welch, Jr., *Soldier and State in Africa* (Evanston, Ill. 1970); Arnold Rivkin, ed., *Nations By Design: Institution-Building in Africa* (Garden City, N.Y. 1968).

[3] E.g., Lucian Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building* (New Haven 1962); William Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, eds., *African Socialism* (Stanford 1964); Raymond F. Hopkins, *Political Roles in a New State: Tanzania's First Decade* (New Haven 1971); Victor T. LeVine, *Political Leadership in Africa* (Stanford 1967); Hugh H. and Mabel M. Smythe, *The New Nigerian Elite* (Stanford 1960).

[4] E.g., Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass. and London 1953); Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton 1963); Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (New York 1957); James S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1958); Barry Riddell, *The Spatial Dynamics of Modernization in Sierra Leone: Structure, Diffusion, and Response* (Evanston, Ill. 1970).

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level[5] to gain a more intimate understanding of the way in which processes such as political development and political integration take place in the villages and small towns of the Third World's agrarian hinterland.

Research enterprises of this sort require the combined skills of the political scientist and the anthropologist. By virtue of the tasks they set for themselves, the three authors of the books under review here have attempted to blend the two disciplines. In addition (although academic training may not be the litmus test of interdisciplinary success), each took to the field armed with formal backgrounds in both spheres of learning, and each acknowledges the intellectual influence of respected anthropologists and political scientists. Owusu, a Ghanaian, brought to his task the additional advantage of being a researcher in his own land.

The real test of their ability to contribute to our understanding of politics in Africa is, of course, the final product itself. How much new and fruitful knowledge do these three books provide, not only for the study of specific local societies but also for more inclusive levels of analysis? What concepts emerge that clarify our thinking and serve as guides for further research? What new categories do they suggest which can aid comparisons within and across national boundaries in the effort to accumulate general laws about human phenomena?

Each of these studies makes a respectable contribution in its own right; in combination they provide a powerful argument for revising our thinking about a number of commonplace concepts and categories of comparative analysis. All three—Owusu in his examination of politics in Swedru, a mid-sized town in south-central Ghana; Hopkins in his study of Kita, a middle-range town in western Mali; and Vincent in her investigation of Gondo, a tiny backwater parish in central Uganda—are notable for their fundamental agreement on the relative unimportance to local folk of such oft-used categories as ethnic groups, rural-urban rifts, traditional-modern cleavages, and ideology. Instead, their results add up to a recommendation that we should devote attention to the instrumental behavior of ambitious leaders and followers and to the groups—e.g., factions—that emerge as vehicles for such political competition. In other words, they suggest strongly that, at least in the African context, a politics based on *utility* (instrumentality, expedience, goal seeking, value-maximization) provides a more serviceable research paradigm than a politics based on *identity* (likeness, com-

[5] E.g., Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa* (Chicago 1966), 153-54.

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patibility; for instance, religion, traditionality, class, ideology, ethnicity).

II

"Tribalism" is the catch-all explanation for a host of African ills. Whether put in the blatant language of superficial journalism ("wild tribesmen") or couched in the more cautious parlance of social science ("ethnic subnationalism"), tribalism has enjoyed top billing among interpretations of African political and social life. The three books under review, however, assert with remarkable accord the near-irrelevance, to contemporary local politics, of tribal identity (or ethnicity, to use a term with more general comparative applicability). For each author, ethnic composition was a major factor in determining the choice of his research site. Vincent is most specific: "Gondo [in Uganda] was selected for study precisely because of its ethnic heterogeneity . . ." (p. 257); Swedru in Ghana and Kita in Mali are also polyethnic communities. By investigating situations where ethnic identities were most likely to be activated, the researchers were in a position to test hypotheses about the ethnic basis of politics. They are unanimous in playing down the role of this factor. It is not that ethnic identities were nonexistent (they were plainly relevant to some situations), but in politics at the local level other lines of cleavage, other forms of participation, and other criteria for association came to the fore. In Swedru, according to Owusu, economic conflicts provided the basis of politics. In Kita, a "Kitan" identity fused and obliterated separate ethnic identities. And in Gondo the combination of competition for scarce resources and concert against the outside world de-activated ethnicity as a category for political rivalry.

The above should not be construed as a call for the abolition of the term "ethnic group" from the lexicon of comparative analysis. Far from it. Africa itself provides a steady supply of cases where the ethnic factor is clearly important, if not crucial, for politics. But our three studies of polyethnic communities serve to warn us of two common pitfalls of comparative analysis. First, what is an important phenomenon in one case may be a surface phenomenon in another. No doubt ethnicity comprises the basis of politics in some circumstances, but in others it merely *appears* to be a determining factor and is in reality simply an epiphenomenon of a more fundamental process. Thus, for instance, Owusu argues that competition for scarce resources underlay what appeared to be traditional, "ethnic" politics in Ghana: "The struggle for power between groups—chiefs and the new elites, new elites and

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the colonial rulers, and so on—was primarily a struggle in relation to the possession of wealth and its distribution and consumption. . . . In this politico-economic competition, individuals and groups had manipulated, whenever suitable and to their advantage, a variety of symbols, beliefs, images, and ideologies, some clearly traditional and others European in origin, to advance their interests. . . . This is what lends, in the context of social change, a flavor of 'tribalism' to much of the clearly modern political and economic competition in Africa" (p. 325). Incidentally, Owusu uses similar arguments to criticize David Apter's analysis of charisma in Ghanaian politics: what appeared to be uncritical mass adulation of Nkrumah was in reality rooted in instrumental behavior informed by an expectation of material benefits among his followers. We will return to Owusu's theme for a more critical look; the point here is simply that variables may take on spurious importance because they are readily observed or because in ostensibly similar cases they were indeed consequential. A major problem in comparative analysis entails separating the important from the unimportant; this in turn demands careful scrutiny of the manifest aspects of politics, for they may be mere symptoms of more basic forces.

A second pitfall stems from the common tendency to overestimate the inevitability and permanence of existing political groups and identities.[6] They may, in fact, have been mobilized to meet the political exigencies of the moment and, given a new set of circumstances, may recede into the social backdrop when no longer needed. Vincent's analysis of ethnicity in Gondo brings out this point. In the early days of colonialism, when Gondo was a growing port and administrative center, ethnic identity was indeed the criterion upon which local politics was based. But as its importance in Uganda's economy diminished and as the weight of colonial segregationist policy lifted, ethnicity gave way to other forms of political identification: "Interaction now occurs on the basis of sex, age, occupation, religion, politics, and prestige as well as on that of ethnicity. . . . The appeal to ethnic status is not legitimate in Gondo today, unlike the early part of the century when it was the cornerstone of political interaction" (pp. 258-59).

Vincent uses Merton's concept of the "status set," the array of statuses that attach to an individual, any one of which he may attempt to play

[6] This problem occurs at many levels of analysis. A short discussion of the urge to assume "that each nation is a preordained entity" is found in Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston 1960), 91ff. For a general treatment, see Donald T. Campbell, "Common Fate, Similarity, and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons as Social Entities," in J. David Singer, ed., *Human Behavior and International Politics: Contributions from the Social-Psychological Sciences* (Chicago 1965).

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up or down, depending on the circumstance. Ethnicity is just one among these many statuses. Anthropologists have come to stress the *situational* nature of ethnicity. An individual may choose to accentuate his ethnic identity in one situation but ignore it in another; or he may stress one ethnic identity in his natal village but use quite another in town; or he may change his ethnicity altogether by merging with another group through intermarriage, migration, patron-client ties, and the like. The instrumental use of ethnic status is a common phenomenon in Africa (and elsewhere), and it should serve to warn us against drawing firm boundaries—in cookie-cutter fashion—around categories and groups that may have a good deal less perdurability than the black-and-white figures of a population census would suggest. Comparisons over space (e.g., cross-national analysis) are more susceptible to this "fallacy of undue concreteness" than comparisons over time (e.g., developmental analysis), which by their very nature are sensitive to changes in the composition and salience of political associations.

Ethnicity, then, has a certain fluidity which allows it to be politically activated or de-activated, depending on the circumstances. The relative unimportance of ethnicity emerges clearly as a common feature of politics in Kita, Swedru, and Gondo, but in other African towns and cities the ethnic factor plays a much stronger, if not dominant, role. What accounts for this difference? Under what conditions will ethnic identity be politicized? Bates has quite aptly summarized the literature on ethnic politics in Africa, particularly in urban and urbanizing contexts.[7] He maintains that ethnic groups emerge as vehicles of competition for the benefits of modernity; they operate as the functional equivalents of "interest groups"—agencies that strive to secure for their members concrete benefits (jobs, licenses, land, education, wealth, etc.), all of which are in short supply. He hypothesizes that an important factor among the conditions that are likely to energize ethnicity as the medium for such competition is the degree to which an urban area is dominated by a single ethnic group. Minority groups are likely to mobilize politically on the basis of ethnic identity if hegemony by a majority group restricts their access to valued resources, particularly political power and control of land.[8] Each of our three cases lends support to Bates's proposition. In no case does the indigenous ethnic group—the Agona in Swedru, the Maninka in Kita, the Teso in Gondo—represent a ma-

[7] Robert H. Bates, "Ethnicity and Modernization in Contemporary Africa," *Social Science Working Paper*, Number 16, California Institute of Technology (November 1972).

[8] *Ibid.*, 31-36.

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jority of the town's population. Moreover, each town is noteworthy for the ethnic representativeness of its local political institutions; access to political power is not restricted on ethnic grounds. Finally, in no case does customary law regulate land tenure in such a way that competition for land is channeled primarily along ethnic lines. A look at land tenure in Gondo is most instructive, for it reveals a "traditional" institution of remarkable integrative capacity. Rather than setting ethnic groups off against each other in the competition for a scarce good, land-tenure practices in Gondo draw them tighter into a community whose common denominator is ownership of land. The usual pattern is for an established citizen to loan and then give a portion of his land to a newcomer who has befriended him. The giver gains prestige and a loyal neighbor; the receiver gains control of a valued resource and deeper incorporation into the community. This pattern has an additional integrative payoff: by sponsoring a mutually acceptable newcomer to take possession of a buffer zone along a disputed boundary between their holdings, two "core families" can prevent land disputes from developing into serious schisms. Ethnicity plays no role in such transactions. Indeed, interpersonal relationships—marriage ties, friendship, clientship—cut across ethnic groups in almost random fashion, neutralizing their potential political impact and drawing them into a network of reciprocal obligations. If the institutional setting is appropriate, competition for scarce resources need not emerge as the politics of ethnicity.

III

Social scientists have become inured to a time-honored theme in the study of development—the inevitable clash of interests between the modern urban center and the traditional rural periphery. Each of our case studies casts doubt upon the appropriateness of viewing the developmental process in such dichotomous—urban versus rural, modern versus traditional—fashion.

The three writers are unanimous in rejecting a two-sector model of politics for their respective research sites. In Mali, cities become centers of regionalism, endowing their hinterlands with distinctive identities and urban-influenced styles of life. According to Hopkins, small towns like Kita "play an important role of intermediary between the cities, where the national style is elaborated . . . , and the rural areas, where most of the population lives" (p. 11). Owusu also notes the intercalary position of Swedru between its own rural environs and the wider Ghanaian political arena. His emphasis on the material basis of politics

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draws attention to protoclass cleavages which cut *across* rural-urban boundaries, uniting powerful chiefs with rich traders, and poor farmers with clerks and laborers. Vincent specifies how, in her study of Gondo, she was led to abandon the dichotomous rural(tribal)-urban model in favor of an "ecological" approach that defined the boundaries of community in terms of activity and interaction rather than of preconceived categories. She concluded that "the affairs of Gondo were indeed conducted along quite other lines than those leading to tribal and urban termini" (p. 260).

Similarly, tradition was not found to be systematically opposed to modernity. Indeed, the relationship between them has proved so complex that perhaps they should be discarded as intellectual constructs that confuse more than they clarify, although none of the authors under review here advocates so extreme a measure. In Kita, the ethic of "popular participation" provided important common ground between the modernizing ideology of Mali's elite and the traditional political culture of the town—itself a complex amalgam of recent and ancient influences. Hopkins explains how both the "ideological" orientation of the modernizing elite and the "pragmatic" orientation of most townsmen were instrumentally manipulated to serve the immediate purposes of local actors. Owusu makes similar observations about Swedru in Ghana: "The expression of new politico-economic interests through the manipulation of traditional symbols, myths, beliefs, and praise-names is neither 'tribalism' nor 'retribalism,' since in many instances individuals and groups are merely searching for more effective and meaningful ways to articulate their demands in a changing socioeconomic environment" (p. 198). What appeared to be an atavistic revival of traditionalism among rich and powerful chiefs during the mid-1950's was, he asserts, in reality a device for defending their wealth and privileges in a challenging era. The relationship between tradition and modernity in Gondo is mediated by local leaders put forth by the community to deal with the wider political arena of Uganda. Vincent's "strategic elite" is composed of men equipped by temperament and experience to represent Gondo to the outside world, to protect its interests, and to maintain its own integration in the face of external flux. It is an elite that combines the "traditionalist" elements of an inward-looking community with the "modern" attributes requisite for relating to a rapidly changing and potentially hostile environment.

It is the synthetic quality of political life in Kita, Swedru, and Gondo which strikes the observer most immediately. Each local arena has been the scene of large-scale settlement by migrants, yet each has evolved

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a distinctive sense of community which transcends differences based on ethnicity, place of origin, education, or exposure to modern influences. People who reside in Kita, no matter what their ethnic background, are "Kitans"; the people of Swedru are "Swedrufo" despite the town's heterogeneous composition; Gondo's elite integrates a polyethnic population and embodies the community's identity vis-à-vis the outside world. This is not to say that conflict has disappeared in these three localities. Clearly, being human societies, they experience political competition; but the lines of conflict cut *across* the cleavages anticipated by many of our theories and models of development. Politics is based on rivalries which have little to do with corporate groups rooted in ethnic, rural-urban, or traditional-modern distinctions. Rather, each community is tied together by a web of cross-cutting cleavages based on non-categorical forms of association. The integrative mechanism in Kita, Swedru, and Gondo is the instrumental behavior of local actors, ambitious men who compete for political rewards by building alliances and followings that draw from all sectors of the population.

IV

The "Big Man" is a common phenomenon in Africa and elsewhere. He is a man (or sometimes a woman) who has come to power in his political arena by building an entourage of supporters and retainers who back him more because of what he can do for them than because of any attributes he may have inherited. High birth, chiefly connections, ethnic identity, religion—all may help, but they are valuable to the Big Man only insofar as they can aid in rewarding and protecting followers, not for their intrinsic worth. His following—and thus his power and prestige—is fashioned through the provision of tangible benefits, not on the basis of symbolic association. *Utility*, then, forms the nexus between leadership and followership in this context.

The Big-Man phenomenon takes on signal importance in the politics of our three localities. In Kita, competition among individuals for prestige is the main motive that drives leaders to build a clientele through largess, patronage, protection, and other favors made possible by power and position. In Gondo, rivalry for prestige also leads ambitious men to exploit social and economic resources in order to accumulate power; here, Big Men manipulate the agricultural cycle and its product to maximize support from work groups, the crucial ingredient for success in agrarian Uganda; such support in turn provides the wherewithal to attract future work teams from the community.

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In Vincent's words, local political actors must "compete for cooperation" in order to build power and prestige. Finally, Owusu argues vigorously—although backed by evidence less carefully arrayed than that in the other two books—that economic self-interest is the prime force which drives politics in Swedru. His argument is reminiscent of Martin Kilson's[9] use of the "reciprocity principle" in analyzing politics in Sierra Leone, asserting the existence of a direct relationship between wealth and power. Not only do members of the elite enter politics to further their economic interests, but their followers follow in return for concrete payoffs or for expectations of prosperity and the "good life." It is in this context that Owusu confronts David Apter's[10] interpretation of charisma in Ghanian politics: "What tied the follower to the political leader was . . . not charisma but economic necessity, a reciprocal tie that at times assumed the form of a patron-client relationship (and even the creditor-debtor connection discussed earlier). The relationship held so long as the patron honored his material and economic obligation, and the client his duty to vote at elections and perform various other services for the patron, including ritually praising him in public" (Owusu, 251). According to Owusu, Nkrumah fell not because his personal magnetism failed him, but because the material foundations of Ghanaian politics could no longer be supported by the economy.

It is difficult to come fully to grips with Owusu's arguments because he makes so many qualifications to and modifications of his basic theme. But if we extract the (oversimplified) theme of economic self-interest from these embellishments, we can press beyond the similarities among the three books to an important difference in emphasis. Although Owusu is at one with Hopkins and Vincent in recognizing the instrumental basis of African politics at the grassroots level, he goes further than they do by narrowing his theoretical focus to the economic realm. It is one thing to maintain that politics is inextricably entwined with the pursuit of health, wealth, protection, office, prestige, and so forth on the part of goal-seeking individuals; it is another to say that politics is based almost exclusively on the pursuit of economic self-interest. The first comments on a general style of politics; the second lends itself to rather specific hypotheses about the behavior of particular

[9] Martin Kilson, *Political Change in a West African State: A Study of the Modernization Process in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge, Mass. 1966), Part V. For a critical evaluation of Kilson's model, see Barrows, "Rural-Urban Alliances and Reciprocity in Africa," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, v (Summer 1972), 307-25.

[10] Apter, *Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton 1955); see also "Nkrumah, Charisma, and the Coup," *Daedalus*, xcvii (Summer 1968), 757-92.

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groups and individuals. Put differently, the first perspective assumes that there are a variety of social and economic resources available for conversion into political power and vice versa, while the second confines itself largely to economic gain as the raw material of politics. It is in this light that many readers will be less willing than Owusu to demote charisma to the ranks of mere residua. Among other things, a Big Man trades on his reputation. Recognition as a Big Man allows him to make promises and threats, to extend credit and call in debts, to build his power without having to expend immediate resources. His initial position may have been based on a distinct economic relationship with his followers, but their collective recognition of his leadership becomes a separate resource unto itself, utilizable for conversion into more power or more wealth or more prestige. In other words, a qualitative change takes place when numbers of people (for whatever reasons) give their individual allegiances to a leader.[11] A new resource is created —call it prestige, or in special cases charisma—which is at least partially independent of the circumstances which gave it origin.

The role of personality in politics can be conceived as part of a two-level process. At the first level a skillful leader, in an effort to gain support, addresses himself to the interests of diverse groups and individuals. Followers give support in return for expectations of beneficial performance on the part of the leader. It is to this *quid pro quo* relationship that Owusu gives attention. But he plays down the dynamic created by the *multiplicity* of these interest-bound relationships which constitute a second level of analysis. By concentrating a variety of interests upon himself, the leader is no longer dependent upon any one of them. Generalized support can emerge out of specified commitments. He has room for maneuver, an opportunity to exert his personal preferences, to build power, to revise the rules of the game—even, in cases of extreme personal prestige ("charisma"), to reshape the normative basis of the polity. Owusu himself treats prestige as a valued commodity in Ghanaian politics, but as an end product rather than as one among a number of mutually reinforcing resources that can be mobilized for political purposes. In Lasswell's terms, he regards it as a "scope" value but not a "base" value which can be used to affect other values. It is his reluctance to admit prestige into the political nexus which limits Owusu's persuasiveness. The role of personality in African politics has been underscored too often for it to be so easily dismissed.

The discussion of charisma and economic self-interest illustrates a common quandary in social scientific analysis—how to separate and

[11] For a theoretical discussion of this process, see Barrows (fn. 9).

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weigh the relative importance of two or more co-related phenomena. Comparison offers a suitable method for dealing with this kind of problem. If we assume for present purposes that the political cultures of Kita, Gondo, and Swedru are essentially the same—that is, instrumentally based, with a strong materialistic tenor—and if we find that only in Swedru was charismatic national leadership strongly present in local politics, then we can tentatively entertain the hypothesis that charisma plays a political role that is at least partly independent of economic interests. Further, if Swedru also differs from its counterparts with respect to some other variable—say participation in party affairs—then we are in a position (again tentatively) to think in terms of causal relationships. These comments are subject to a number of caveats—that other variables in addition to political culture need to be held constant; that the hypotheses formulated need further testing, ultimately outside the African context—but the point here is simply that comparison permits us to transcend some of the conceptual dilemmas inherent in monographic studies of single societies. This is particularly true if these studies are "implicitly comparative," that is, self-consciously theoretical. The efforts of Owusu, Hopkins, and Vincent are readily compared: not only have the authors grappled with similar problems at similar levels of analysis, but they also have explicated models and general statements which can be tested in other settings. There are differences of nuance that have already been mentioned, but all three have derived impressive theoretical mileage from assumptions that take as their point of departure the rational individual who attempts to maximize utility (wealth, prestige, security, and so forth) through politics.

V

Instrumentally based links between leaders and followers take many forms. Even in a sample as small as the three localities under scrutiny here, there emerges an impressive catalog of relationships upon which a Big Man can secure a body of supporters. Host-guest, core family-immigrant, merchant-farmer, patron-client, citizen-noncitizen, farmer-laborer—all constitute patterns of interpersonal ties which can and do serve as the raw material for leader-follower relationships. Perhaps the most flexible and most pervasive linkage takes place within the embrace of kinship. Kinship provides a network of rights and obligations, debts and credits, loyalties and expectations which can be manipulated, even invented, by leaders—or followers—for instrumental purposes. Further, such relationships as kinship or patron-client ties can be extended beyond their immediate contexts as a kind of generalized cul-

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tural model which underwrites leader-follower linkages in the wider sphere ("the father of our country").

Whatever their specific content, however, it is evident from the studies of Kita, Gondo, and Swedru that their leaders use a *variety* of these interpersonal relationships to gather a following, and that the end result is usually a surprisingly underexamined phenomenon in politics: factions. Factions are a distinctly political product of the kind of instrumentalism we have been discussing. They are political precisely because they are constituted from a multiplicity of social categories rather than derived from dependence on any one of them. Factions cut *across* the important divisions of society, drawing elements from all interests and segments into an alliance for utilitarian purposes. They form a system of two or more rival but essentially identical interpersonal networks which compete for prizes in the political arena.

Ultimately, comparativists are led to the "so what" questions. What is the importance of such patterns of competition? What influence do they have on political performance? What consequences do they have? Scholars differ in their assessment of faction-based politics and its consequences. Hopkins, in his study of Kita, offers a systematic and theoretical analysis which traces two decades of factionalism from the colonial days through the era of modern party politics. The rise and fall of individual groups was matched by the vicissitudes of ambitious politicians and their fickle followings, but the overall pattern of competition between two factions was stable—a line of continuity between the old colonial politics and the new Malian Socialism. Hopkins sees factions as performing positive functions for Kita. First, they provided the actual mechanism by which competition among ambitious individuals integrated society; by attracting adherents from both sides of more fundamental social and economic cleavages, factions laid down a network of ties that knit the society together. Second, the network of factions extended beyond Kita's boundaries, linking the town's politics with smaller networks in its rural hinterland and, at a higher level, with factions operating in the national arena. Third, popular participation in politics was facilitated by the reciprocity and vertical bargaining inherent in utilitarian politics; both individual and collective demands gained expression in the give-and-take of factional competition. Finally, the distribution of resources and favors (largess, patronage, etc.) was conducted largely within the framework of factions vying for allegiance in pragmatic fashion, despite the strictures of a puritanical national ideology and the rigidities of an ever-present state bureaucracy.

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In contrast, Owusu stresses the negative consequences of factionalism. As in Mali, the veneer of one-party unity in Ghana was thin—barely concealing an inner reality seething with personal ambition and selfishness. With the decline of Ghana's economy in the early 1960's, factionalism in the Congress People's Party (CPP) took firmer hold as politicians fought to secure for themselves the diminishing privileges of power and position. At the national level, and at the grassroots in localities like Swedru, the consequences were disastrous to political stability. As their legitimate authority declined, CPP politicians became more arbitrary, more unresponsive, more self-centered, and more monopolistic—guaranteeing progressive alienation among the masses. In other words, if Owusu's analysis is correct, an instrumental style of politics underwritten by an underdeveloped economy rests on a fragile foundation. A period of poor economic performance can set in motion destructive factional particularism among leaders and a withdrawal of support among followers. The ties which bind Big Men to their clientele lack the durability to survive hard times. Owusu regrets the consequences of instrumental politics and the factionalism it spawns: "What Africa needs . . . is a new ideology of sacrifice" (p. 329).

The differences between Hopkins and Owusu are less contradictory than might first appear. In fact, their arguments represent opposite sides of the same coin. Interpersonal links based on converging utilitarian benefits make for easy association among individuals and groups. It is this *integrative* side of factions which Hopkins emphasizes. On the other hand, by virtue of the very ease with which such ties are made and unmade, instrumentally based alignments are weak, tentative, and inelastic. Except under conditions of sustained material abundance, they are unable to gain strength and mature beyond the conditions which gave rise to them in the first place. It is this negative consequence for *development* which Owusu emphasizes.

VI

Vincent, in her study of Gondo, gives much less attention to factions than do the other two scholars. This could be simply the result of choice or neglect on her part, but more likely it stems from the actual nature of Gondo politics. If her empirical account is correct, the Gondo elite is much less given to competition within itself than are the Big Men of Kita and Swedru; instead of describing factional rivalries, she emphasizes the corporate features of the Gondo elite. This elicits the question, given the above-mentioned similarities—instrumental political culture, interpersonal networks, and so forth—among the three

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localities, why do two of them develop pervasive factionalism while the third gives rise to intra-elite unity? The question need not be confined to the grassroots level. Why are some systems—regions, nations, international blocs—open to internal rivalries while others, apparently similar, close ranks to present the world with a united front?

At least part of the answer may lie in the relationship between the system and its environment. What is now known as Gondo parish in Uganda has for over a century been the scene of alien overlordship, first by neighboring kingdoms and then by the British. Hierarchical institutions imposed from outside had little autochthonous validity for the decentralized people of the area—and fear, arbitrary rule, and mistrust have characterized governance of the area ever since. It is in this context that we can more fully understand Gondo's "strategic elite." The Big Men of Gondo have come to prominence not only because they embody the community's conservative values, but because they have the requisite talents and experience for dealing with outside forces, especially with the hated "parish chief" sent by the central administration to oversee local affairs. One of the key tasks undertaken by the Gondo elite involves settling grassroots disputes *before* they become so serious that outside agencies intervene. As a buffer between the community and its environment, the elite acts to minimize internal conflict in order to deflect external involvement.

In contrast, the outside world generally seemed less threatening to the citizens of Kita and Swedru. Colonial rule in the French Soudan (now Mali) and the Gold Coast (now Ghana) imposed administrative machinery which in general reached the grassroots in less alien, less harsh, and less disruptive fashion than in northern Uganda. Especially in southern Ghana (where Swedru is located), colonialism made use of existing institutions and models of government, softening the impact of foreign overlordship in a manner that contrasts sharply with the shock of hierarchical government imposed on the "stateless" peoples of Uganda. These patterns have persisted into the modern era, for Kita and Swedru are considerably less concerned than Gondo with maintaining a united front against the outside world. In both Kita and Swedru external forces have become an accepted part of internal politics. Indeed—and this is the point—factions compete for external resources; a faction's success in building a body of supporters depends at least partially on its ability to tap sources of largess and prestige that lie beyond the community's boundaries. In other words, this brief comparative exercise suggests that factionalism is likely to be given expression when the external environment offers positive inducements

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for active intercourse, but that a hostile environment is likely to engender protective closure.

This phenomenon seems to have important consequences for national integration and development. In Kita and Swedru, state and party organizations have penetrated deeply; institutionalized patterns of interaction between center and periphery have become well established. In Gondo, on the other hand, political links with the wider Ugandan system (at the time of writing) seemed tenuous at best. Interaction with the central administration was confined mostly to keeping the parish chief at bay; no important channels to the outside world were sustained by the many-tiered system of representative councils; and little, if any, regularized party activity took place in the parish. No doubt part of this difference is explained by the fact that Kita and Swedru are vibrant urban centers while Gondo is a tiny backwater town barely able to support itself. But the internal political structure also holds part of the explanation. In Kita and Swedru, central institutions gained easy acceptance at the grassroots level because local groups and individuals were anxious to make use of external resources for their own instrumental purposes. Factions provided an especially apposite agency for the local articulation of party organizations because their rivalries with each other were far more important than closing ranks against outsiders. But in Gondo, where internal conflict was muted, no such access became available. The community has remained a remote outpost whose political structure is poorly integrated with the major institutions of national political life.

Comparison has revealed more similarities than differences among the three grassroots systems treated here. More importantly, comparison was facilitated by the common perspective that guided the research and writing of these books. Each author took as his point of departure the individual political actor and the rational pursuit of his goals. Few assumptions about the collective and emotional bases of politics were entertained. In fact, many of the familiar notions about politics in Africa—communalism, tribalism, traditionalism, limitless loyalties—shriveled in the face of close investigation informed by this approach. Simplicity and accuracy are foremost among the virtues of the rational-actor model, commending its use for future research in African micropolitics. Indeed, the growing application of such simplifying assumptions as rationality and value-maximizing behavior in diverse subfields of political science—foreign policy, voting behavior, coalition theory, bureaucratic politics, and interest groups—suggests that perhaps a genuinely comparative science of politics is dawning.

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